15. Postscript¶
Core Argument¶
This postscript examines the political transition in Cuba following the replacement of Raúl Castro by Miguel Díaz-Canel as President in April 2018, arguing that the change represents a continuation of the existing reform trajectory rather than any ideological break. Díaz-Canel, Raúl’s protégé and the youngest-ever member of the Political Bureau, had been senior Vice-President for five years and emerged as part of Raúl’s reformation of the economic model — opening doors to foreign investment, permitting small-scale private businesses, and decentralising decision-making. He is presented as a safe pair of hands, expected to implement the ‘Guidelines for Economic and Social Policy’ under Raúl’s continued guidance as General-Secretary of the PCC and head of the armed forces.
The chapter draws on a New York Times report (19 April 2018) to characterise the handover as Raúl selecting his successor after opening the economy, expanding travel, and re-establishing ties with the US. Díaz-Canel faces the same challenges as when the Guidelines were first introduced: increasing productivity and efficiency in state enterprises, attracting foreign investment, overseeing privatisation while limiting displays of inequality, and now handling the Trump administration.
The most significant evidence for the direction of change comes from the debate on reforming the Cuban Constitution. The chapter cites Ariel Dacal’s sharp criticism noting that the new draft deletes the aim of “building a communist society” and the commitment that “in Cuba capitalism will never be restored”. While the author concedes that constitutional wording does not determine the regime’s character, the removal of these formulations is taken as a clear indication of the socio-economic direction the leadership wishes to pursue.
The postscript functions as a polemical coda, implicitly arguing against those who might see the leadership change as a democratic opening or a step toward genuine socialism. By foregrounding the deletion of anti-capitalist language from the constitution and the continuity of Raúl’s reform programme, the chapter suggests that the Cuban leadership is moving away from even the formal commitment to communism, while maintaining political control through the same structures. The argument is directed against apologists for the Cuban regime who might present Díaz-Canel’s ascent as a progressive development, and against those who fail to recognise the significance of constitutional changes as markers of underlying economic transformation.