39. Lenin’s Illness¶
Core Argument¶
In early May 1922, Lenin suffered his first stroke, losing the ability to walk and speak. Trotsky learned of this only on the third day, from Bukharin. Trotsky later concluded this delay was no accident: Stalin and his emerging faction—the Stalin-Zinoviev-Kamenev trio—had concealed the news to gain time to organise against Trotsky. Lenin recovered by July, returning to work in October. During his convalescence, he agreed with Trotsky’s proposal to hold Socialist-Revolutionary leaders as hostages, making execution conditional on cessation of terrorist acts. After returning, Lenin detected shifts in the party apparatus. He opposed Stalin’s manoeuvre to remove anti-religious propaganda from Trotsky’s control, attacking Molotov over the appointment of Yaroslavsky. Trotsky argues Stalin had always felt intellectually and morally inferior to Lenin, and had sought support from Trotsky against Lenin’s control, but Trotsky rebuffed him, generating Stalin’s hatred. Lenin preferred obedient deputies like Rykov, Tsiurupa and Kamenev, recognising Trotsky was unsuited to that role.
Between his first and second strokes, Lenin pondered the post-Lenin leadership and formulated what became his ‘Will’. He proposed that Trotsky become his deputy and successor as chairman of the Soviet of People’s Commissars, but Trotsky warned that the main obstacle was the bureaucracy, not only in state institutions but also in the party, centred on the Organisational Bureau—the heart of Stalin’s apparatus. Lenin responded by offering a bloc against bureaucracy in general and the Organisational Bureau in particular, planning a Central Committee commission to fight bureaucracy and break up the Stalin faction. This context explains Lenin’s ‘Will’, which names six people: it describes Zinoviev and Kamenev’s 1917 capitulation as “not an accident”, Bukharin as a scholastic rather than a Marxist, Pyatakov as an able administrator but poor politician, and Trotsky as the ablest but over-confident. Stalin is described as rude, disloyal, and capable of abusing power, and should be removed to avoid a split. Lenin was preparing to deliver a crushing blow at Stalin at the twelfth congress on the national question, party regime, and monopoly of foreign trade. However, Lenin’s second stroke paralysed him in March 1923. Trotsky refused to act independently, fearing it would be seen as a personal fight for Lenin’s place. Stalin, as General Secretary, exploited the interregnum. Kamenev, after initially accepting Trotsky’s terms to reverse Stalin’s policy in Georgia, received word of Lenin’s paralysis and instead carried out Stalin’s policy, cementing the trio against Trotsky.
Lenin’s offensive targeted Stalin’s staff, particularly Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze. Dzerzhinsky was described as a man of explosive passion, constantly in a state of tense mobilisation, with no opinions of his own and needing immediate political guidance. He had followed Rosa Luxemburg, then joined the Bolsheviks in 1917, and in his last years supported Stalin, sharing all his errors. Lenin argued Ordzhonikidze should be expelled for bureaucratic high-handedness in the Caucasus; Trotsky argued against it. Lenin replied, “At least for two years.” Lenin’s campaign aimed to create conditions for Trotsky to direct the party, either alongside Lenin or in his place. The struggle was never carried out. It produced the opposite result: Stalin’s faction closed ranks, tightened control over the apparatus, and accelerated artificial selection. The trio feared Trotsky on matters of principle. Bukharin later admitted, “We have no democracy because we are afraid of you.” 1923 saw the silent stifling of the Bolshevik party. By autumn, tension resolved into a ‘discussion’ against the opposition, beginning the fight against Trotskyism—in reality, a fight against Lenin’s ideological legacy.