36. The Military Opposition¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter 36: The Military Opposition¶
The Red Army’s triumph in the Civil War hinged on the correct relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry. Trotsky claims he confronted peasant grievances more directly than any other leader between 1918 and 1921, citing his March 1919 demand for a Central Executive Committee inquiry into illegalities in the Volga region—a demand he made to Stalin—and his role in securing Kalinin’s election as chairman of the Central Executive Committee due to Kalinin’s affinity with the middle peasantry. By February 1920, Trotsky advocated abolishing the food levy, but mustered only four votes against eleven; Lenin opposed the change, and Stalin voted against Trotsky. The New Economic Policy was adopted a year later, unanimously, amid the Kronstadt rebellion.
Military organisation concentrated the party’s difficulties. The Military Opposition defended electoral methods, opposed enlisting tsarist officers, and rejected the introduction of discipline and centralisation. They argued that centralised armies were capitalist and that revolution required small, mobile detachments. Trotsky dismisses this as an idealisation of weakness, disproved by the experience of the Civil War. He demanded communists who could obey, not agitators. The opposition melted away as the Red Army won.
Tsaritsyn, centred on Voroshilov, was a special case. Voroshilov, a worker-revolutionist who became a patriot during the Great War and a democratic supporter of Guchkov and Milyukov in February 1917, led an opposition of non-commissioned officers and irregulars against centralised military organisation. Stalin shaped his intrigue there against Trotsky. Trotsky obtained Stalin’s recall via Sverdlov, then threatened Voroshilov with a revolutionary tribunal unless he obeyed orders. Stalin later had Tsaritsyn renamed Stalingrad. Trotsky provides excerpts from party correspondence: on 4 October 1918 he demanded Stalin’s recall; Lenin proposed a compromise on 23 October, which Trotsky accepted, but it failed. On 14 December Trotsky demanded Voroshilov’s transfer to Ukraine; on 10 January 1919 he told Sverdlov that the Tsaritsyn policy meant ruin.
Trotsky argues that a compromise is necessary, but not a rotten one—a phrase Lenin later used against Stalin before the Twelfth Party Congress. In March 1919, Trotsky told Zinoviev he blamed himself only for trying negotiations with Voroshilov when firm administrative action was needed. On 1 June 1919, Trotsky told Lenin that Ukrainian demands for a separate army group under Voroshilov were indefensible; what was needed was unity against Denikin, not Donetsk separatism. Lenin immediately telegraphed Voroshilov to stop agitation and work on a military basis. The Politburo unanimously rejected the Ukrainian plan. The Central Committee then ordered Trotsky to recover military supplies Voroshilov had arbitrarily seized. Lenin described the situation as “complete chaos.” Trotsky argues this was a repetition of the Tsaritsyn practices. His military work created enemies among the dissatisfied, who gravitated to Stalin or Zinoviev. Stalin managed behind-the-scenes machinations, submitting memoranda criticising Trotsky’s use of specialists. Lenin occasionally doubted but always restored solidarity after talking with Trotsky. Trotsky told Lenin the army contained at least 30,000 former officers; Lenin later used this figure publicly to defend the military policy. Menzhinsky warned Trotsky that Stalin was conducting a complex intrigue against him, insinuating he was grouping hostile men around him. Trotsky confronted Lenin, who dismissed it as “trifles.” Trotsky concluded that Stalin systematically sowed trouble out of laziness and implacable jealousy.