29. In Power¶
Core Argument¶
During the October days, decisions were made with minimal discussion, almost improvised, yet they were correct because the path had been predetermined by the pressure of events and the clear demands of history. Marxism, in this conception, is the conscious expression of the unconscious historical process; revolution is the inspired frenzy where the highest theoretical consciousness merges with the immediate action of the masses. Leaders operated in a state of inspiration, akin to creative or oratorical possession, where instinct and higher theory fused. Physically, they were exhausted, hungry, and unwashed, unable to recall the critical hours clearly.
After the seizure of power in Petrograd, Lenin and Trotsky, sleep-deprived and grey-faced, improvised the government’s name: rejecting ‘ministers’, they settled on ‘people’s commissars’ and the ‘Soviet of People’s Commissars’. Lenin, who could fall in love with people and revise his opinions, proposed Trotsky as chairman of the government, a post Trotsky declined. Trotsky, who had never considered his personal role after victory, wanted to direct the press. Lenin insisted he take the interior commissariat to fight counter-revolution; Trotsky objected on grounds of his Jewish origin. Lenin dismissed this as a trifle. Sverdlov and the Central Committee sided with Trotsky, and he reluctantly became head of foreign affairs, which he treated as a temporary post for issuing proclamations. The real work—extending the revolution and fighting counter-revolution—was done outside departments, through constant collaboration with Lenin, who used decrees as propaganda to announce the new power’s aims.
Lenin was driven by a conviction of historical continuity, believing that the revolution’s legislative work must be made clear for future generations, regardless of whether the Bolsheviks stayed in power. He insisted on rapid publication of socialist classics and the erection of revolutionary monuments to fix events in popular memory. Meetings of the Soviet of People’s Commissars were daily, improvised, and urgent, with no precedents. Lenin used short notes to gather information, then announced sharply worded resolutions that typically became the basis for decrees. Trotsky argues this required a powerful realistic imagination, the ability to reconstruct concrete reality from fragmentary evidence. Though the decrees contained blunders, they remain historic proclamations of a new world.
As practical problems of civil war, food, and transport grew, Trotsky chaired several extraordinary commissions. In foreign affairs, he engaged in a radio duel with Paris (the Eiffel Tower station), answering Clémenceau’s abuse until the tone became civil. He met General Judson of the American mission, who offered no official recognition, and French ambassador Noulens, with no result. Trotsky expelled General Niessel’s mission after its information bureau spread lies, demanding the closure of the bureau, removal of the radio installation, and recall of officers. This was followed by an unstable truce after Trotsky moved to the Commissariat of War, but the French mission later became a centre of plots against Soviet power.