12. The Party Congress and the Split¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter 12: The Party Congress and the Split
The Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, convened first in Brussels and then in London, was the crucible in which the Bolshevik-Menshevik schism was forged. Lenin, already a fully mature political strategist at thirty, dominated the émigré circles abroad. He worked alongside the venerated ‘Group of Liberation of Labour’—Plekhanov, a brilliant Marxist theorist already in decline as revolution approached; Zasulich, sharp-minded and historically knowledgeable; and Axelrod, the embodiment of German Social Democracy. Lenin was the political leader of Iskra; Martov was its literary force. Even before the formal split into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ factions, the tension between them was palpable in their personal relations. Lenin concentrated organisational connections in his own hands, with Krupskaya as secretary, and sought independence from Plekhanov, clashing over the party programme. He proposed co-opting Trotsky onto the editorial board to secure a stable majority against the older editors; Plekhanov, correctly guessing Lenin’s aim, opposed this. The board instead invited Trotsky in an advisory capacity. Lenin insisted the editorial board, not the Russian Central Committee, should guide the party, arguing for a dictatorship of the board.
The congress itself was plagued by fleas and detectives; the head of the Tsar’s secret service, Harting, had orchestrated surveillance via an agent who helped organise the proceedings. The decisive split crystallised around Paragraph 1 of the party constitution. Lenin wanted membership restricted to the underground organisation; Martov sought to include those working under its direction. Lenin argued for clear-cut relationships; Martov for diffuse forms. The author sided with the ‘softs’, influenced by Martov, Zasulich and Axelrod, and saw Lenin’s attempt to remove the older editors as sacrilegious. Lenin believed they were an impediment to the future; the author saw this as ruthless. The split was unexpected and upset both sides; Lenin fell ill afterwards. The author argues the break was politically necessary: Lenin alone foresaw the stern tasks ahead. Martov lacked will; Plekhanov sensed Lenin’s Robespierre-like quality. The author later came to Lenin independently, having weighed the experience of revolution, counter-revolution and war.