Materialism and Empirio-Criticism¶

V.I. Lenin¶

Core Argument¶

Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism sets out to defend the philosophical foundations of Marxism — dialectical materialism — against a wave of revisionism that emerged among Russian intellectuals following the defeat of the 1905 Revolution. The book's central thesis is that the empirio-criticism of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius, which a group of would-be Marxist intellectuals (Bogdanov, Bazarov, Lunacharsky, and others) sought to reconcile with Marxism, is in fact a revival of the subjective idealism of Bishop Berkeley and the agnosticism of David Hume. Lenin argues that this philosophical current, far from representing a modernisation of Marxism, constitutes a complete negation of its materialist core and opens the door to fideism — the doctrine that substitutes faith for knowledge.

The fundamental philosophical divide, Lenin insists, is between materialism, which holds that nature is primary and spirit secondary, and idealism, which reverses this relation. Empirio-criticism, despite its pretensions to being a new, scientific philosophy, merely repackages the old idealist sophistry that objects are "complexes of sensations" and that the external world has no existence independent of perception. Lenin demonstrates that this position, when logically extended, leads inevitably to solipsism — the belief that only the self exists — a conclusion its proponents desperately try to avoid. The book's polemical method is forensic: Lenin exposes the gap between the Machians' verbal allegiance to Marxism and their actual philosophical practice, showing that they have adduced no argument against materialism that Berkeley had not already advanced two centuries earlier.

Overview¶

The book opens with Alan Woods's introduction, which situates Lenin's work within the broader history of philosophy as a battlefield of class struggle. Woods argues that official philosophy has been systematically enlisted as a tool of reaction against Marxism, enforcing a conspiracy of silence around Hegel and fostering hostility towards dialectical materialism. The philosophical crisis that followed the defeat of the 1905 Russian Revolution saw intellectuals abandon class struggle for subjective idealism, and Lenin's intervention was a defence of the revolutionary weapon of dialectical materialism against this degeneration.

Lenin's own preface to the first edition establishes the book's task as a polemical intervention against a cluster of publications that, under the banner of Marxism, had launched a concerted assault on its philosophical foundations. The preface to the second edition, written after the October Revolution, directs the polemic squarely at Bogdanov's "proletarian culture" movement, which Lenin denounces as a vehicle for bourgeois and reactionary views disguised in Marxist language. The opening chapter, "In Lieu of an Introduction," establishes the devastating historical parallel that structures the entire work: the supposedly "new" philosophical discoveries of the Machians are a direct revival of Berkeley's arguments from 1710.

The three central chapters on the theory of knowledge systematically expose the epistemological opposition between dialectical materialism and empirio-criticism. Lenin demonstrates that Mach's "discovery of the world-elements" is a rhetorical trick: all that exists is declared sensation, then sensations are renamed "elements" and divided into physical and psychical, supposedly overcoming one-sidedness while actually smuggling materialism back into an idealist framework. Avenarius's doctrine of "introjection" is exposed as a defence of idealism that contradicts basic physiology, while the "principal co-ordination" of self and environment merely paraphrases Fichte's subjective idealism. Lenin grounds the materialist alternative in practice, following Engels's argument that if we can produce a natural process ourselves, the Kantian unknowable "thing-in-itself" ends. Three epistemological conclusions follow: things exist independently of consciousness; there is no principled difference between phenomenon and thing-in-itself, only between known and unknown; and knowledge emerges from ignorance dialectically.

The chapter on the philosophical idealists as comrades-in-arms of empirio-criticism demonstrates that Mach and Avenarius, far from inaugurating a new departure, merely revived Berkeley and Hume. The immanentists — Schuppe, Leclair, Rehmke, and Schubert-Soldern — are identified as the true philosophical progenitors of Machism, rank reactionaries and open advocates of fideism. Bogdanov's "empirio-monism" is shown to be pure idealism, functionally identical to Hegel's Absolute Idea. The chapter on the revolution in natural science argues that the discoveries of X-rays, radium, and the electron confirm dialectical materialism, not the idealist conclusions drawn by the Machians. The real meaning of "matter is disappearing" is that previously absolute properties are revealed as relative; the sole property of matter for philosophical materialism is objective reality existing outside the mind.

The chapter on empirio-criticism and historical materialism demolishes the attempts by Russian Machians to reconcile their philosophy with Marxism. Bogdanov's assertion that "social being and social consciousness are identical" is dismissed as absurd nonsense that contradicts Marx's fundamental position. The conclusion distils the entire critique into four standpoints: theoretical comparison reveals empirio-criticism as reactionary; its trajectory leads towards idealism; its connection to the crisis in physics is a transient infatuation; and beneath its epistemological scholasticism lies a struggle of parties in philosophy reflecting antagonistic class ideologies. The supplement on Chernyshevsky deploys a native Russian materialist authority to expose the Machians as muddleheads who have abandoned materialism for subjectivism.

Chapter Guide¶

Introduction by Alan Woods — Official philosophy has been enlisted as a tool of reaction against Marxism, and Lenin's work defended dialectical materialism against the Machian revisionism that followed the defeat of the 1905 Revolution.
Preface to the First Edition — Lenin opens with a polemical salvo against four books whose authors, despite political differences, represent a coherent philosophical revisionism that renounces the materialist outlook affirmed by Marx and Engels.
Preface to the Second Edition — Lenin reaffirms the text's enduring purpose and directs the reader to an appended article exposing Bogdanov's "proletarian culture" as a vehicle for bourgeois views disguised in Marxist language.
In Lieu of an Introduction — The supposedly "new" philosophical discoveries of the Machians are a direct revival of arguments advanced by Bishop Berkeley in 1710, encapsulated in the formula esse est percipi.
The Theory of Knowledge of Empirio-Criticism and of Dialectical Materialism – I — Mach's definition of things as "complexes of sensations" contradicts Engels's materialist position and leads inevitably to solipsism.
The Theory of Knowledge of Empirio-Criticism and of Dialectical Materialism – II — The dialectical materialist theory of knowledge is grounded in practice, refuting the agnostic and idealist deviations of empirio-criticism.
The Theory of Knowledge of Dialectical Materialism and of Empirio-Criticism – III — The Machian denial of objective reality, causality, and the objective reality of space and time serves fideism by severing knowledge from its material foundation.
The Philosophical Idealists as Comrades-In-Arms and Successors of Empirio-Criticism — Mach and Avenarius revived the subjective idealism of Berkeley and the agnosticism of Hume, marching in lockstep with the reactionary immanentist school.
The Recent Revolution in Natural Science and Philosophical Idealism — The discoveries of X-rays, radium, and the electron confirm dialectical materialism, and the crisis in physics stems from ignorance of dialectics, not from the collapse of materialism.
Empirio-criticism and Historical Materialism — The Russian Machians' attempts to reconcile empirio-criticism with Marxism betray dialectical materialism and serve fideism by denying objective reality.
Conclusion — Empirio-criticism is reactionary, moves towards idealism, exploits the crisis in physics, and reflects the class struggle between materialism and fideism.
Supplement to Chapter 4, Section 1 — Chernyshevsky's materialist critique of Kant proceeds from a direction opposite to that of the Machians, demonstrating that the forms of sense-perception do resemble objective reality.

Key Concepts¶

Dialectical materialism — The Marxist philosophical outlook holding that nature is primary, spirit secondary, and that consciousness reflects the material world, tested through practice.

Empirio-criticism — The philosophy of Mach and Avenarius, which Lenin exposes as a revival of Berkeleian subjective idealism disguised in modern terminology.

Esse est percipi — Berkeley's formula "to be is to be perceived," which Lenin identifies as the logical foundation of all subjective idealism.

Thing-in-itself — The Kantian concept of an unknowable reality behind appearances, which Lenin argues is refuted by practice and the dialectical movement from ignorance to knowledge.

Fideism — The doctrine that substitutes faith for knowledge, which Lenin argues is the ultimate beneficiary of every philosophical deviation from materialism.

Principal co-ordination — Avenarius's doctrine of the indissoluble connection of self and environment, which Lenin exposes as a paraphrase of Fichte's subjective idealism.

Practice — The materialist criterion of truth, following Marx's second Thesis on Feuerbach, which proves the correspondence of our perceptions with objective reality.

Objective reality — The sole property of matter for philosophical materialism, denoting existence independent of the human mind.

Relativism — The doctrine that Lenin distinguishes from dialectics, arguing that relativism as the basis of the theory of knowledge denies any objective measure and justifies sophistry.

Immanentists — The school of Schuppe, Leclair, Rehmke, and Schubert-Soldern, identified as the true philosophical progenitors of Machism and open advocates of fideism.

Chapters¶

12 chapters