21. The Road to Pentonville¶
Core Argument¶
The miners’ strike of 1972 was a decisive working-class victory that sent a shockwave through the British ruling class. A secret government report, circulated in its aftermath, painted a picture of widespread industrial disorder and left-wing militancy. In response, the state apparatus was quietly fortified: the Civil Contingencies Unit was established in the spring of 1972, while the Tories, though eager to abolish the National Dock Labour Scheme, hesitated in the face of local militancy. The National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC), presided over by Sir John Donaldson, soon became the chosen instrument of confrontation. It fined the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) for contempt over a boycott of haulage firms. The TGWU leadership, however, refused to call a national strike, instead appealing to the Trades Union Congress (TUC). Jack Jones proposed that the TUC accept financial responsibility for the fines, but the General Council rejected this, offering a paltry £20,000 and advising the TGWU to pay.
The dock shop stewards defied this capitulation and continued the boycott. On 21 July 1972, five dockers were imprisoned in Pentonville. The response was immediate and explosive: 44,000 dockers and 130,000 other workers struck spontaneously. The TUC, dragged reluctantly into action, called a one-day general strike for 31 July. The Tory government, panicking, deployed the Official Solicitor to secure the dockers’ release, and the general strike was called off. A state of emergency was declared, but the government rejected using troops for fear of wider sympathy strikes. The dockers’ action forced a deal by mid-August. Later that year, the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) was fined £55,000; 750,000 workers struck unofficially, but the union leadership merely protested verbally. The Shrewsbury 24 trial was a political frame-up of building workers for mass picketing; Des Warren and Ricky Tomlinson were imprisoned, and under the subsequent Labour government, Roy Jenkins refused to release them. Warren’s health was destroyed. In total, 1972 saw 23.9 million strike days lost. The Labour Party’s National Executive Committee swung left, and the TUC held talks with Ted Heath, only for the government to abruptly end them, declaring key issues non-negotiable.
After the failure of tripartite talks, Heath imposed Phase One and Two of a statutory incomes policy in late 1972. Industrial militancy ebbed; strike-days lost fell to under 8 million in 1973, though shop steward numbers rose to 300,000 and union membership grew. Phase Three, allowing a 7% wage norm below inflation, provoked renewed resistance. The miners, strengthened by the election of Communist Party member Mick McGahey as NUM vice-president and by the quadrupling of oil prices, imposed an overtime ban on 12 November 1973. Heath declared a state of emergency and a three-day week from 1 January 1974. A national ballot gave 81% support for strike action, announced for 9 February. Heath called a snap general election for 28 February, attempting to isolate the miners. Labour, having shifted leftwards and endorsed nationalisation of the top 25 monopolies, promised a “fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power”. The ruling class was alarmed at left-wing penetration of the Labour movement. Labour won 301 seats to the Tories’ 296; Heath’s attempt to form a coalition with the Liberals collapsed. He resigned on 4 March. The miners returned to work with major concessions. Margaret Thatcher replaced Heath as Tory leader. For the first time, an elected government had been brought down by industrial action.