12. “Bayonets don’t cut coal”¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter 12: “Bayonets don’t cut coal”¶
This chapter examines the political and industrial crisis that culminated in the 1926 General Strike, tracing the interplay between state strategy, trade union leadership, and rank-and-file militancy. The immediate context was the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, which briefly revived British coal exports. When French troops withdrew in 1924, exports collapsed, and coal owners demanded wage cuts of 10–25 per cent. Chancellor Churchill’s return to the Gold Standard in 1925 further undermined export competitiveness, intensifying pressure on miners’ living standards. The miners rejected the owners’ demands, and the TUC pledged support. Prime Minister Baldwin declared that all workers must accept wage reductions. The government, unprepared for a confrontation, granted a nine-month subsidy and established a Royal Commission. This retreat was celebrated as “Red Friday”, but the Cabinet intended to fight later.
The TUC Congress passed left-wing resolutions but failed to strengthen the General Council’s powers. The government meanwhile prepared for a showdown, establishing Civil Commissioners and the paramilitary Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies. The left, led by A. J. Cook and the Communist Party’s National Minority Movement, built hopes on the miners’ strategic position, but Trotsky warned that without a revolutionary party to direct working-class energy, even a general strike could be dissipated.
On 14 October, the Home Secretary ordered the arrest of twelve Communist Party leaders under the 1797 Act, charging them with seditious libel and incitement to mutiny; they received six to twelve months’ imprisonment, keeping most out of action until May 1926, though the party had prepared a second-line leadership. Fifty miners were arrested during a strike in West Wales. The TUC’s Industrial Committee, composed of five right-wingers and three lefts, made no real preparations, hoping to avoid conflict. The Samuel Commission reported on 10 March 1926, recommending wage reductions and longer hours. The Miners’ Federation rejected this, insisting: “Not a penny off the pay, not a second on the day!” On 20 March, a National Minority Movement conference drew 883 union delegates representing nearly one million workers. The General Council did not meet to plan for a strike until 27 April, three days before the subsidy ended, as Ernest Bevin later admitted. On 30 April, trade union executives voted by 3,653,527 to 49,911 to place powers in the General Council’s hands and conduct a general stoppage. Bevin announced that first-line unions would cease work from midnight on Monday 3 May. The TUC leaders entered the struggle unprepared; the response from below stunned the government and shocked the TUC leaders. The chapter’s core argument is that the state’s strategic preparation and the TUC’s institutional caution combined to contain a genuinely explosive working-class movement, while the Communist Party’s organisational weakness and the absence of a revolutionary leadership prevented the strike from transcending its defensive limits.