21. Paris bombarded: Rossel flees¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter 21: Paris Bombarded: Rossel Flees¶
On 8 May, seventy naval guns opened a merciless bombardment of Paris from bastion 60 to the Point du Jour. Thiers, with characteristic duplicity, issued a proclamation denying any intention to bombard the city while simultaneously inviting Parisians to open the gates. The Commune’s Council, rather than uniting against the existential threat, descended into petty squabbling over the minutes and publicity of its sittings. Félix Pyat, a master of theatrical accusation, denounced Rossel for incompetence; Rossel’s supporters retaliated by producing a written order from Pyat that had caused the disastrous surprise at Moulin Saquet. The Council, in a display of institutional paralysis, merely reaffirmed the Central Committee’s subordination to the Military Commission.
At the War Office, Rossel’s response was a study in desperate authoritarianism. He confronted the chefs-de-légion with an armed platoon, then demanded 12,000 men for an attack on Clamart station. That evening, the fort of Issy was evacuated after a single shell killed sixteen defenders. Learning of this on 9 May, Rossel posted 10,000 copies of a proclamation announcing that the tricolor flew over the abandoned fort, and immediately resigned. His resignation was a comprehensive indictment, blaming the Central Committee, the Commune, and the chefs-de-légion alike. The shocked Council resolved into secret committee, criticised the Committee of Public Safety, and replaced it with Ranvier, Arnaud, Gambon, Delescluze, and Eudes. Delescluze was named Delegate at War. Rossel was arrested but escaped under guard. The new Committee issued a melodramatic proclamation claiming to have uncovered a monarchical conspiracy.
The confusion surrounding the defence of Fort Issy reveals the deeper organisational rot. The Committee of Public Safety had issued an order on 3 May to General Wroblewski, instructing him to go immediately to Fort Issy to organise engineering and artillery services. Pyat publicly maintained in the Vengeur that this was the Committee’s only direct order concerning Issy’s defence, and that it did not displace him. In reality, the defence of Fort Issy was not Wroblewski’s responsibility but La Cécilia’s, who held the chief command on that side since the reoccupation, with Wetzel commanding the fort’s approaches. The chefs-de-légion gave a figure of 10,000; the truth lies between the two estimates. This account, from P. Vichard, former chief of staff to Garibaldian General Bossack, as reported by the unimpeachable Lefrançais, exposes the fatal gap between revolutionary rhetoric and military reality.