18. The work of the Commune¶
Core Argument¶
The administrative machinery of the Commune, forged in the crucible of insurrection, was a study in stark contrasts between necessity and chaos. On 20 April, the Executive Commission was replaced by delegates from nine commissions, yet the real burden of work continued to fall upon the original presiding figures. The Finance Commission, centred on Jourde, faced the monumental task of raising 675,000 francs daily. Between 20 March and 30 April, some 26 million francs were scraped together, but the War Office alone devoured over 20 million. Total expenses amounted to roughly 46.3 million francs, of which 16.7 million came from the Bank of France and nearly 12 million from the octrois duties. Most services were run by workers or former subordinates operating with a quarter of the normal staff; the postal service was reorganised in 48 hours by Theisz, a metal-chaser, while Camélinat at the Mint manufactured postage stamps and coined bullion.
The War Office, by contrast, was a scene of disorder. Cluseret issued orders without enforcing them, the Central Committee and Artillery Committee squabbled incessantly, and both the commissariat and barricade construction were mismanaged. Rossel, the chief-of-staff, failed to impose any semblance of order. The Commission of Public Safety, headed by Rigault, was negligent: conspirators operated freely, only a handful of hostages were taken, and serious discoveries at the Picpus convent and St. Laurent Church were left uninvestigated. Yet the Commune displayed genuine humanity: it offered to exchange Archbishop Darboy for Blanqui—an offer Thiers refused—guaranteed individual liberty, ordered inquiries into detentions, and dismissed abusive officials.
The delegation for external relations, given a paltry 100,000 francs, neglected contact with European workers, who supported the Commune through meetings, processions, and sympathetic press coverage. It failed to aid these allies, allowing defenders to starve. Inexperienced and resourceless, it could not counter Thiers. The Justice delegation, led by a lawyer, failed to enact socialist judicial reforms—a people’s tribunal judging all cases by jury, abolition of notaries and bailiffs—merely appointing salaried officers and issuing unimplemented decrees. It did not prosecute Jecker, missing the chance to expose the crimes of the Mexican expedition. The Education delegation suppressed school crucifixes but produced no programme, memoir, or address; commissions for teaching and women’s education achieved nothing before the Versaillese entered.
Only the Labour and Exchange delegation, led by Leo Frankel and composed of revolutionary socialists, accomplished substantive work. It suppressed night-baking, prepared decrees abolishing pawnshops and wage stoppages, and decreed that deserted workshops be returned to workers’ cooperatives. It proposed contracts specifying labour costs and prioritising workers’ corporations. Its report declared that pawnshop suppression required a social organisation protecting workers from capital. Except for Labour, the delegations failed. They possessed bourgeois archives dating from 1789 but published almost nothing. Their ignorance, not Bonapartism, explained their inaction.