2. The coalition opens fire on Paris¶
Core Argument¶
The chapter details the escalating confrontation between the Versailles government and Paris in March 1871, culminating in Thiers’ decision to seize the National Guard’s cannon. The core argument is that the monarchist coalition in the Assembly deliberately provoked a conflict with Paris, misreading the unity it had forged between the middle class and proletariat. The Assembly’s actions—decreeing Paris would no longer be the capital, enforcing immediate payment of bills and rents, suppressing six republican journals, and condemning revolutionaries to death—are presented as a calculated assault designed to break the city’s resistance. The author contends that these measures, rather than cowing Paris, produced the opposite effect: they fused disparate social layers into a common defence of the Republic.
Key claims are supported by specific evidence. The Assembly’s decision to sit at Versailles is described as “calling forth the Commune,” since Paris would be left without government or municipality. The economic decrees are shown to have been devastating: 150,000 bills were dishonoured between 13th and 17th March, throwing workers and small shopkeepers into bankruptcy. The suppression of newspapers with a combined circulation of 200,000 is cited as proof of the regime’s hostility to all shades of republican opinion. The author notes that even Jules Ferry, a government agent in Paris, telegraphed on 5th March that the city was perfectly calm, yet Picard insisted “the tranquillity is only apparent” and demanded action.
The chapter draws heavily on the immediate historical context of the siege of Paris and the February 1871 elections. It references the pact of Bordeaux, where Legitimists and Orleanists agreed to share power under Thiers, united only in their hostility to Paris. The military situation is detailed: Thiers had only 25,000 unreliable troops against 100,000 armed National Guards, many of them veterans of the siege. The author cites a general officer’s revelation that Thiers had planned to wait until he had 40,000 men kept isolated from Paris, but was forced to act prematurely by the Assembly’s pressure.
The polemic is directed squarely at Thiers and the coalition government. The author portrays Thiers as a lifelong dupe, “throwing himself head foremost into the venture” without calculating his forces, spurred by Jules Favre and Picard who believed revolutionaries incapable of serious action. The financiers who urged action are accused of wanting “50,000 men sacrificed” to revive speculation. The chapter also mocks the boastfulness of reactionary generals like Ducrot, who swore he could have crushed the demagogues. The Central Committee is defended as no government with a utopia, but merely “a sentinel” against a monarchist coup—an “assurance company” formed by battalions united by fear of the monarchy. The author insists no attack was planned by Paris; the first shot would not be fired by the people.