Appendix IV. The German Revolution,1917-1923, by Pierre Broué¶
Core Argument¶
This appendix reprints Rob Sewell’s review of Pierre Broué’s monumental study of the German Revolution, a work that traces the catastrophic sequence of missed revolutionary opportunities between 1917 and 1923. The core argument is that the German working class, possessing the most powerful Social Democratic movement in the world, repeatedly stood on the verge of taking power but was betrayed or led astray, culminating in the Nazi victory of 1933 and the destruction of the workers’ movement. The review treats the revolution as a tragedy of leadership, organisation, and timing.
The narrative begins with the shock of August 1914, when the SPD leadership capitulated to the imperialist war, a betrayal Lenin initially believed to be a forgery. The review traces the slow regroupment of internationalists through the Zimmerwald conference of 1915, the formation of the Spartacist group, and the split that created the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD). The February and October Revolutions in Russia are presented as electrifying events that shook German workers, soldiers, and sailors. The November 1918 revolution broke out spontaneously, with workers’ and sailors’ councils forming everywhere, but the old SPD leaders rushed to place themselves at the head of the movement to shore up the old order. The Spartacists were too weak to seize the moment, and the brutal murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in January 1919 beheaded the communist movement at a crucial juncture.
The review devotes substantial attention to the destructive role of ultraleftism. Broué is praised for his treatment of the “lunacy of boycotting the trade unions, anti-parliamentarism, and premature attempts to seize power.” The March Action of 1921, pushed by the Hungarian Béla Kun and the so-called “theory of the offensive,” led to a disastrous premature uprising that cost the party 200,000 members. Lenin intervened sharply, denouncing the theory as “absurd” and insisting that the task was to “win the masses as a preliminary to winning power.” The review contrasts this with the subsequent United Front policy, summed up as “March separately, strike together,” which rebuilt the party’s strength.
The climax is the revolutionary crisis of 1923, triggered by the French occupation of the Ruhr and hyperinflation that reduced the working class to absolute pauperisation. The review notes that when Brandler telegrammed Moscow for guidance, Stalin urged delay. Trotsky pressed for a fixed date for insurrection, but the leadership hesitated. A trade union conference at Chemnitz failed to support a general strike, the insurrection was called off, and the KPD was declared illegal. Trotsky’s verdict is quoted: “In Germany, the leadership as a whole vacillated and this irresolution was transmitted to the party and through it to the class.” The review concludes that the rise of Stalin in the USSR sealed the fate of the Communist International, and the ultraleft “Third Period” policy split the German working class, allowing Hitler to come to power without resistance. The polemic is directed against both the reformist SPD leaders who betrayed the revolution and the ultraleft adventurists who destroyed the party’s capacity to lead it.