4. The Kapp Putsch¶
Core Argument¶
Here, the chapter examines the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 as a pivotal moment that exposed the true nature of the German state and the catastrophic consequences of the KPD’s initial ultraleftism. The narrative thrust is that the putsch, a military coup attempt by Freikorps and Reichswehr units under General Lüttwitz and the reactionary Wolfgang Kapp, was only defeated by a massive, spontaneous general strike and armed working-class resistance. The text highlights the treachery of the Reichswehr, which refused Noske’s orders to defend the republic, and the cowardice of the SPD-led government, which fled Berlin. The key polemic is directed against the young KPD, which in a “completely ultraleft fashion” initially declared neutrality, viewing the struggle as one between “two counter-revolutionary wings.” The chapter argues this was a colossal blunder, forcing the KPD to reverse its position within 24 hours, having misjudged the workers’ determination.
The chapter draws a direct historical parallel between the Kapp Putsch and the Kornilov uprising in Russia in August 1917, citing Lenin’s comparison. Unlike the KPD, the Bolsheviks threw themselves into a united front with Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries to defeat the counter-revolution. The text uses the example of the Ruhr, where a 50,000-strong “Red Army” of armed workers put the Reichswehr to flight, to demonstrate that with a revolutionary leadership, the German workers could have taken power, much like the Spanish proletariat in July 1936. The chapter then details the political consequences: a dramatic swing to the left, with the USPD doubling its vote and the SPD losing half its support, alongside a corresponding rise of the far right. It notes the hypocrisy of the state, which sent troops who had refused to fight Kapp to brutally crush the armed Ruhr workers who had defeated him.
The chapter uses this historical episode to introduce a broader theoretical discussion on the development of mass communist parties and Lenin’s struggle against ultraleftism. It argues that the Kapp Putsch created the conditions for the USPD to move towards Marxism, culminating in its merger with the KPD in December 1920 to form a mass party of nearly half a million. This is contrasted with the disastrous “March Offensive” of 1921, where the KPD, egged on by ultraleft Comintern representatives like Béla Kun, launched a putschist uprising that was isolated and crushed, costing the party over 200,000 members. The chapter concludes by outlining the Comintern’s turn to the United Front policy, arguing that in a period of temporary capitalist stabilisation, the task was not the immediate conquest of power but the “Conquest of the Masses” through patient, united action in day-to-day struggles.