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Germany 1918-1933: Socialism or Barbarism

Core Argument

Rob Sewell’s Germany 1918–1933: Socialism or Barbarism sets out to prove that the defeat of the German Revolution was not an inevitable historical tragedy but a political catastrophe caused by the betrayal of the working class by its own leaders. The book’s central thesis is that the German proletariat, possessing the most powerful labour movement in the world and displaying exemplary courage, had more opportunities to take power than any working class in history. Yet each revolutionary opportunity was squandered, not by the masses themselves, but by reformist and Stalinist leaders who consciously or unconsciously served the interests of the bourgeoisie.

The author argues that the German Revolution of 1918–1923 was a genuine revolution in the Marxist sense, defined by the masses’ forcible entry onto the political stage, the overthrow of the monarchy, and the establishment of workers’ and soldiers’ councils. However, it was a revolution that stopped halfway, failing to destroy the economic power of the bankers and capitalists. Sewell insists that a revolution must go all the way or fail; there is no halfway house. The workers’ councils, despite holding power in their hands, handed it to Social Democratic leaders who used it to rescue capitalism rather than establish a socialist republic.

The book’s polemical thrust is directed against two targets: bourgeois historiography, which denies historical laws and reduces revolutions to dramas of princes and states, and the reformist leadership of the German labour movement, which is held criminally responsible for the defeat. Sewell draws on the Marxist method of historical materialism, invoking Marx’s dictum that history repeats itself, first as tragedy then as farce, precisely to argue that the task is to break this cycle through conscious study. The purpose of studying the German defeat is to prepare the new generation for the stormy events that confront capitalism today.

Overview

The book traces the trajectory of German Social Democracy from its revolutionary origins to its catastrophic betrayal in 1914, examining the internal contradictions that transformed a mass workers’ party into an instrument of bourgeois order. Marx and Engels developed scientific socialism in Germany, and the fusion of the Lassallean and Eisenach currents at Gotha in 1875 created the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). By 1912, the SPD boasted one million members, four thousand full-time workers, and ninety daily newspapers, yet Germany remained a reactionary autocracy. The period of relative social peace fostered a conservative outlook in the leadership, who prioritised reforms over revolution. The growing party bureaucracy developed vested interests, and the Erfurt Programme separated ‘minimum’ reforms from a ‘maximum’ socialist goal with no transitional bridge.

The November Revolution of 1918 erupted not from below but from the crumbling apex of German society. The revolution began on 3 November with a naval mutiny at Kiel, spreading to 100,000 sailors and then to workers onshore who established workers’ councils. By 9 November, workers’ and soldiers’ councils had been established in Berlin, and the Kaiser fled. Yet the masses lacked revolutionary leadership. The National Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils voted overwhelmingly to support a parliamentary democracy, bringing forward National Assembly elections. The Spartacist League transformed itself into the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) but made a tactical mistake by refusing to participate in the elections, isolating themselves from the masses.

The counter-revolution moved swiftly to decapitate the movement. The Freikorps entered Berlin on 10 January 1919, commanded by monarchist officers under Noske’s direction. On 15 January, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were arrested, beaten, and murdered by Freikorps officers with the full compliance of Social Democratic ministers. The KPD wrongly boycotted the National Assembly elections against Luxemburg’s advice. Noske, as Minister of War, scrapped army democratisation, restored officer authority, and used Freikorps to destroy Workers’ Councils across Germany. By the fighting’s end, some 3,000 workers were killed and at least 10,000 wounded.

The Kapp Putsch of March 1920 exposed the brittle foundations of the Weimar Republic. Freikorps units marched on Berlin to install the right-wing nationalist Wolfgang Kapp as chancellor. The Social Democratic government fled after the Reichswehr refused to defend the republic. Trade union leaders reluctantly called a general strike, and workers responded overwhelmingly, paralysing Berlin within hours. The young KPD initially made a major blunder, calling for neutrality between “two counter-revolutionary wings,” but reversed its position within twenty-four hours. The defeat of the putsch demonstrated workers’ power but also the absence of revolutionary leadership.

The defeat of October 1923 inaugurated a prolonged ebb in the revolutionary tide. The Rentenmark stabilised the currency, and the Dawes Plan secured American loans, but this ‘borrowed prosperity’ rested on foreign debt reaching half of national income. The Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in 1928 declared a new ‘Third Period’ of wars and revolutions, introducing the disastrous theory of ‘social fascism,’ which denounced Social Democracy as fascism’s twin. The fratricidal struggle between the KPD and SPD rendered the working class impotent. In the March 1932 presidential election, the SPD backed Hindenburg as the ‘lesser evil’ against Hitler. On 30 January 1933, Hindenburg appointed Hitler Chancellor, and the Reichstag fire on 27 February was used as a pretext for mass repression. After years of denouncing Social Democrats as ‘social fascists,’ the Comintern abruptly reversed course in March 1933, calling for a united front—too late.

Chapter Guide

  1. Preface — Establishes the German Revolution as a subject of supreme historical importance whose lessons have been criminally neglected, arguing that defeat was caused by treacherous leaders, not inevitability.
  2. Introduction — Places the German Revolution in the context of the post-war revolutionary wave, arguing that a revolution must go all the way or fail.
  3. Chapter One: The Rise of German Social Democracy — Traces the SPD from its revolutionary origins to its betrayal in 1914, examining how opportunism and revisionism transformed a mass workers’ party into an instrument of bourgeois order.
  4. Chapter Two: In the throes of Revolution — Narrates the November Revolution of 1918, the establishment of workers’ councils, and the missed opportunity for socialist revolution.
  5. Chapter Three: Counter-Revolution Raises its Head — Details the deliberate provocation of the ‘Spartacist week,’ the murder of Liebknecht and Luxemburg, and the bloody suppression of the Berlin and Bavarian uprisings.
  6. Chapter Four: The Kapp Putsch March 1920 — Examines the Kapp Putsch, the successful general strike that defeated it, and the KPD’s initial ultra-left blunder of neutrality.
  7. Chapter Five: The Spoils of War — Analyses the Treaty of Versailles, the Ruhr occupation, hyperinflation, and the disastrous October 1923 insurrection that sealed the revolution’s fate.
  8. Chapter Six: The Interregnum — Covers the period of temporary capitalist stabilisation, the rise of Stalinism, and the introduction of the disastrous ‘social fascism’ theory.
  9. Chapter Seven: Fascism’s Rise to Power — Examines how the Great Depression transformed the Nazis from a fringe group into a mass movement, and how the fratricidal struggle between KPD and SPD rendered the working class impotent.
  10. Chapter Eight: The Nazi Terror — Argues that the German labour movement could have defeated Hitler if united, but reformist leaders preferred capitulation to civil war.
  11. Appendix One: Hitler’s British Connections — Exposes extensive links between the British establishment and the Nazi regime, from the Bank of England to the monarchy.
  12. Appendix Two: The Case of Béla Kun — Reproduces Lenin’s suppressed speech against Béla Kun’s ultra-leftism, demonstrating the political affinity between Lenin and Trotsky.
  13. Glossary — Provides concise definitions for key organisations, newspapers, and individuals referenced in the main text.
  14. Bibliography — Lists primary and secondary sources consulted for the volume.

Key Concepts

  • Dual power — The situation when workers’ and soldiers’ councils exist alongside the bourgeois state, creating a revolutionary crisis that must be resolved one way or the other.
  • Social fascism — The Stalinist theory that Social Democracy is the twin of fascism, which prevented a united front against Hitler and led to catastrophic defeat.
  • Bonapartism — A form of capitalist state that becomes semi-independent, balancing between classes during extreme crisis, as seen under Brüning’s emergency decrees.
  • United front — The tactic of united action by working-class organisations against a common enemy, which Trotsky advocated but Stalinists rejected as ‘the most dangerous theory’.
  • Bolshevisation — The Stalinist campaign that transformed Communist parties from revolutionary organisations into pliant tools of Moscow, sealing the fate of the German revolution.
  • Revisionism — The theoretical justification of opportunism, beginning with Bernstein’s claim that capitalism could avoid crises and that the final goal is nothing, the movement everything.
  • Proletarian Hundreds — Armed defensive formations of workers that were crushed after the October 1923 defeat, marking the end of the revolutionary wave.
  • Lesser evil — The disastrous tactic of supporting reactionary bourgeois candidates to prevent worse ones, which led the SPD to back Hindenburg against Hitler.

Chapters

14 chapters