A New Chinese Working Class¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter Digest: A New Chinese Working Class¶
This chapter charts the explosive formation and deepening contradictions of China’s new working class, the largest proletariat in history. Assembled with startling speed, this class is concentrated in the Pearl River and Yangtze River deltas and the Yellow River valley, with female labour comprising 60–70% of factory workers, many housed in company dormitories. Urbanisation is unprecedented: over half of China’s 1.4 billion people now live in cities, with projections of one billion urban dwellers by 2030. Three generations of migrant workers have emerged. The first arrived in the 1980s–1990s; the second, from the late 1990s, proved more willing to take collective action; the third, now entering production, brings heightened awareness of workers’ rights. Strikes are increasing and becoming normalised. Yet the growth rate of migrant workers has fallen to near zero, and economic growth has declined sharply—to 7.4% in 2014, with IMF projections of 6.8% for 2015 and 6.5% for 2016. To maintain living standards and social stability, continued growth of 7–10% is deemed necessary.
Working conditions are extreme. Actual working days are at least ten hours, with compulsory overtime; employees often work 72 hours weekly, far exceeding the legal 40-hour week plus 36 hours monthly overtime. The International Labour Organisation reports about 380,000 Chinese workers die annually in industrial accidents, with gross under-reporting. In Dongguan, only 6,000 of over 20,000 hazardous enterprises report to authorities, and only 280 were monitored. In construction, safety standards are appallingly low, with bamboo scaffolding. Since 1984, regulations have banned permanent on-site staff; workers are hired by sub-contractors on subsistence wages, expecting lump sums at year-end. Many sub-contractors disappear without paying, causing over half of all strikes, often resulting in violent clashes with police.
A 2014 China Labour Bulletin survey identified three main causes of labour disputes, all worsened by declining industrial output. The most common factor—one third of disputes—is employers relocating to cheaper labour areas, sometimes fleeing without paying wages or redundancy. The second—a quarter of strikes—involves reducing labour costs by reclassifying weekend work as normal hours, cutting allowances, delaying wages, or clawing back minimum wage increases. The third—one fifth—is straightforward wage increase claims to match rising living costs. Teachers in smaller cities often go months unpaid.
The 2008 Labour Contract Law allows some workers to challenge employers in court, but those worst affected are excluded because they lack contracts—nearly two-thirds in some SEZs and construction. Court decisions are anti-worker due to local government dependence on enterprise success; higher courts or the CCP overturn favourable judgements. Workers must first complete mandatory arbitration, a complex, lengthy process requiring hours of travel. If more than five applicants appear together, they face arrest for illegal gathering. Workers argue their own cases against professional lawyers, and local governments lack the will to enforce decisions. Women seeking redress for discrimination face the same obstacles, plus lawyers screen out such cases due to low fees.
The chapter offers a detailed polemic against the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). At Foxconn’s Longhua plant, management set up a trade union in 2006 under pressure from adverse media and the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions; the union chairwoman is a special assistant to the CEO. A survey found about 90% of Foxconn workers had never heard of elections for union officials. The ACFTU also established regional unions organising workers across small factories, independent of any single employer but dependent on the CCP and state. Wages tended to rise to the highest level, popular with workers. Employers accepted this because it was state-backed, controlled militancy, and was of net benefit. The ACFTU’s policy during the SEZs’ growth had three problems: workers were generally unaware of membership; the ACFTU mainly negotiated with large employers while strikes occurred in medium and small firms; and few ACFTU officers had experience or sympathy with workers in conflict. Despite this, genuinely elected workers’ representatives are beginning to appear, often emerging during unofficial strikes. At a Shenzhen toy factory, workers elected