From the Jiangxi “Soviet” to Yenan¶
Core Argument¶
In the transition from the Jiangxi Soviet to Yenan, the Chinese Communist Party confronted a fundamental contradiction between its revolutionary ambitions and the material constraints of peasant society. The Jiangxi Soviets, though implementing progressive land and social reforms, remained bureaucratic impositions on isolated populations, where the Party’s needs consistently overrode those of the peasantry. Land reform initially mandated total confiscation and equal redistribution, but from 1931 this was moderated to protect rich and middle peasants, whose surplus production was essential for feeding the Red Army. The Party justified these policies through the theory of a democratic dictatorship, relying on class collaboration with merchants and richer peasants rather than proletarian revolution, while abstractly claiming proletarian leadership that drained urban workers into a peasant milieu where they lost their class character.
The 1931 Marriage Regulations established free-choice marriage, child protection, and special provisions for women in divorce, granting divorce if either party insisted without prior authorisation. Yet implementation proved uneven. Local cadres resisted, and the Party retreated in the face of hostility from male peasants whose patriarchal rights were threatened—peasants the Party needed to supply food for the Red Army. Although land reform granted women property rights, deeds were ceremonially handed to male household heads. By the time the Party left Jiangxi in 1934, it openly sided with male peasants against women’s rights when conflicts arose, reflecting that within a household-based economy under patriarchy, women could not achieve independent class status.
The 12th ECCI Plenum reiterated the ultra-left “United Front From Below” strategy, isolating the CCP from the urban proletariat. Po Ku followed Moscow’s dictates without reference to Chinese realities, fostering factionalism. Mao, with a solid base in Jiangxi, was feared by Wang Ming. The Ningdu Conference in October 1932 forced Mao onto sick leave, removing him from military affairs. During the fourth extermination campaign, Po Ku claimed victory and purged Mao supporters. For the fifth campaign, Chiang deployed 500,000 troops, German advisors, and bombers, advancing inexorably with blockhouses; up to one million died.
In Shensi, the CCP again faced problems of securing political support and maximising output. Two-thirds of peasants formally owned land but were drained by usury. The Party gained mass support by lowering rents, taxes and interest rates, and cancelling debts. Mao recognised that revenue increases could only come from increased production, requiring all Party members and troops to work in villages producing food and goods, co-operating in land reclamation and mutual aid. Surplus production beyond what the Communists took went back to the villages, surprising peasants accustomed only to being robbed. Under pressure from Mao, the CCP reintroduced the same Marriage Law as in Jiangxi, but again backed off when faced with local male hostility, introducing restrictions on women’s ability to divorce, reducing their social position and the value of their formal right to own land.