The Defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter Digest: The Defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution¶
This chapter dissects the catastrophic defeat of the second Chinese revolution in 1927, arguing that the disaster was not an inevitable setback but the direct product of Stalinist policy imposed on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through the Communist International (Comintern). The core argument is that the strategy of the "bloc of four classes"—an alliance of the proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie—paralysed the revolution at its moment of greatest promise. As the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) advanced, Shanghai’s workers seized the city through insurrection on 21 March 1927. Yet the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau overruled Chen Duxiu’s call for proletarian leadership, insisting power be handed to the bourgeoisie. Chiang Kai-shek delayed his entry, permitting warlord troops to attack the workers, while the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) ordered the CCP to avoid clashes and surrender arms. On 12 April, Chiang’s forces, backed by gangsters and foreign powers, massacred thousands of Communists and workers, before crushing organisations across southern China. Stalin grotesquely presented this as a victory, claiming it purged counter-revolutionary bourgeois elements from the Kuomintang (KMT).
The CCP continued the same fatal policy in Wuhan, restraining workers’ struggles and subordinating unions to the left KMT. Chitarov’s report confirmed that the CCP rejected offers of military support from sympathetic NRA divisions, leaving workers defenceless. Stalin insisted the left KMT was a revolutionary democratic dictatorship in embryo, forbidding the creation of soviets. The 5th CCP Congress (April 1927) formally blamed Chen Duxiu but re-elected him, calling for land nationalisation only of estates over 30 hectares, exempting military men’s land. The ECCI presented Wang Jingwei’s Wuhan government as revolutionary leaders without evidence. The CCP accepted KMT ministerial posts, introducing class-collaborationist policy used to hold back revolution. Stalin’s 1 June telegram proposed mutually exclusive tasks: seize land but not disturb KMT officers’ estates, form a new army while remaining within the bloc. Roy showed the telegram to Wang, who began preparing to expel Communists. On 15 July, the left KMT issued an ultimatum ending the bloc within. The ECCI then instructed the CCP to withdraw only from the KMT government, not the KMT itself.
The chapter’s notable polemic targets the aftermath. ECCI representatives bypassed the CCP leadership to organise the Nanchang uprising (July–August 1927). An extraordinary CC meeting on 7 August, upgraded to a "Conference" with only twelve or thirteen attending, blamed Chen Duxiu and Tan Pingshan, confirmed Ch’u Ch’iu-pai as de facto General Secretary, and dropped Mao from the leadership. It declared the revolution had entered a higher stage, despite mass exterminations of Communists. The ECCI ordered hopeless putschist actions, presented as victories to cover Stalin’s disastrous decisions. By October 1927, policy shifted to peasant guerrilla warfare, allowing the ECCI to repudiate failures. The November CC resolution characterised the revolution as permanent, bypassing the democratic stage—a misdiagnosis distinct from Trotsky’s theory. The new line substituted insurrection for KMT subservience, ordering soviets created during a downturn while still flying the KMT banner. The 7 August clique would later be blamed for Stalin’s new mistakes, completing a cycle of imposed defeat and scapegoating.