Elections to the Fourth Duma¶
Core Argument¶
The chapter examines the 1912 elections to the Fourth Duma as a decisive test of Bolshevik strategy against both Tsarist repression and opportunist pressures from the Mensheviks and liberal Cadets. The Mensheviks entered the campaign with substantial advantages—funding from the German SPD, a daily legal paper (Luch), and a demagogic appeal for ‘unity’ and ‘non-factional’ candidates that resonated among non-party elements. The Cadets, fearing defeat, resorted to deceit, with their organ Rech’ urging votes for ‘progressive forces’ against ‘reaction’—a classic siren song Lenin identified as blackmailing the masses into supporting the ‘lesser evil’. Lenin fought uncompromisingly for class independence and revolutionary policies, rejecting any notion of a non-party ‘progressive bloc’.
The chapter draws on the first-hand account of Bolshevik candidate A.Y. Badayev, whose book Bolsheviks in the Tsarist Duma provides the core evidence. Badayev describes the Bolshevik headquarters at Pravda’s editorial offices, where illegal meetings were held under constant police surveillance. Workers resorted to subterfuge—small gatherings of ten to twenty people, often disguised as picnics in forests beyond the Okhta, where police spies dared not follow. At these meetings, fierce arguments erupted with the Liquidators (Mensheviks), who incessantly preached ‘unity’ and a ‘united front’ while pushing their own candidates. The Bolsheviks insisted on running candidates in all workers’ curiae on unabridged demands, refusing any agreements with other parties, including the Menshevik-Liquidators.
However, the chapter notes a tactical nuance: in the second curiae of city electors and in village elections, where reactionary victories were possible, the Bolsheviks permitted limited agreements—with bourgeois democrats (Trudoviks) against Liberals, and with Liberals against government parties—but only during the second ballot for electors. Crucially, in the five big towns with direct elections and second ballots (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Odessa, Kiev), Social Democrats ran independent lists with no agreements, as there was no Black Hundred danger. The Prague party conference resolutions emphasised that such agreements must not involve a shared platform, bind candidates politically, or prevent resolute criticism of the Liberals’ counter-revolutionary nature and the bourgeois democrats’ half-heartedness. Thus, these were tactical arrangements, not blocs of political parties.
The chapter provides detailed evidence of the rigged electoral system: indirect voting, property qualifications, and a multi-stage process that weighted representation toward landlords and bourgeoisie. Workers in small workshops (under 50 employees) had one representative, while big factories—more militant and pro-Bolshevik—had only one per 1,000 workers. Despite this obstacle race, workers elected 3,500 representatives across Russia, with Social Democrats holding 54 per cent (80 per cent including sympathisers). In St. Petersburg, of 82 representatives, 26 were Bolsheviks, 15 Mensheviks, and 41 non-party RSDLP sympathisers. Police responded with arrests and employer-demanded reruns. Ultimately, Bolsheviks won six Duma seats (Badayev, Samoilov, Shagov, Muranov, Petrovsky, and the agent provocateur Malinovsky), while Mensheviks secured seven—three in their Caucasus stronghold, only three of their deputies being workers. The chapter presents this as an outstanding triumph for the newly established Bolshevik party, achieved with minimal preparation, and a major organisational boost. The polemic is directed squarely against Liquidator opportunism and liberal deceit, defending the principle of revolutionary class independence against any dilution by ‘unity’ or ‘lesser evil’ appeals.