On the Eve¶
Core Argument¶
On the eve of the revolutionary upsurge in Russia, Lenin’s political position appeared desperate. The chapter opens with a stark assessment: two of the three leading centres of the RSDLP—the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee and the CC inside Russia—were dominated by conciliators and Liquidators. Even the Bolshevik members of the Russian CC were conciliators, perpetually seeking agreements with the Liquidators, to Lenin’s fury. He demanded rapprochement with Pro-Party Mensheviks and implacable struggle against the ‘unprincipled bloc’ of the January Plenum, but his opponents dismissed this as ‘sectarianism’.
The material conditions of the underground were dire. Lenin’s own description from spring 1911 is quoted: informal, tiny, irregular workers’ groups and nuclei, disconnected, starved of literature, yet enjoying prestige among workers. Robert McKean’s study of St. Petersburg is then deployed to quantify the weakness. The Bolshevik factional organ claimed some 300 supporters in summer 1911; the St. Petersburg delegate to the Prague Conference in January 1912 gave the more accurate estimate of 109. At most, there were 500 Social Democratic party members in a city of 783,000 workers. The chapter uses these figures to underscore the apparent hopelessness of Lenin’s faction.
The key to the coming transformation is located in the economic base. The depression that followed the December 1905 defeat had exhausted the working class. Trotsky’s prediction—that workers would not move until the economy recovered—is cited as a brilliant prognosis confirmed by events. By early 1910, economic improvement began, strikes increased, and the need to rebuild the party was placed on the agenda. The chapter argues that Lenin counted on the workers moving in a revolutionary direction, and events proved him correct. The upsurge breathed life into underground party circles; workers gravitated to the familiar banner of the RSDLP, ignorant of inner-party splits. Lenin’s tactics are vindicated: had the Bolsheviks followed Bogdanov’s ultra-left impatience and split from the party, they would have been isolated. For every worker that joined them, 100 would have joined the RSDLP. The party was transformed by an influx of fresh workers and youth. By 1912, the Tiflis organisation had 100 members; the Urals had groups of 40–50. The main beneficiaries were the underground revolutionary groups of Bolsheviks and Pro-Party Mensheviks, and the new layers gravitated to the left wing—the Leninists—who were more active, militant, and better organised. The chapter concludes that the prestige and support for the Bolsheviks grew by leaps and bounds as the demands of the new revolutionary situation made themselves felt. The polemical thrust is against conciliationism, Liquidatorism, and ultra-left sectarianism, with Lenin’s strategic patience and faith in the working class as the decisive counterweight.