Was October a Coup?¶
Core Argument¶
The chapter dismantles the bourgeois claim that the October Revolution was a coup, arguing instead that it was a mass democratic process unfolding over nine months. The Bolsheviks won the decisive majority of workers and poor peasants through open political struggle, not conspiracy. The ease with which the Kerensky government collapsed is presented as proof of this mass support: no one was prepared to defend it. The chapter cites a contemporary right-wing newspaper, Russkaya Volya, which admitted the Bolsheviks’ principal support was “the ignorance of the popular masses” — an admission that inadvertently confirms the party’s genuine base.
The chapter draws on the French Revolution and the Paris Commune as historical precedents for mass revolutionary action, referencing the anarchist Kropotkin and historian George Rudé as exceptions to the rule that historians ignore the masses’ role. It polemicises against “bourgeois critics” and “objective academics” who slander October to prevent future generations from learning its lesson. The argument that only small numbers fought in the insurrection is refuted by analogy with war: only a minority of any army fights at the front, but victory depends on the whole population’s support. The insurrection is likened to the crest of a wave — a part of the revolution, not the whole.
The chapter contrasts the revolution’s initial magnanimity — releasing White General Krasnov on parole, who then raised the Don region — with the later violence of counter-revolution, citing Victor Serge. It argues that the Bolsheviks did not act behind the masses’ backs; if anything, they sometimes lagged behind the revolutionary mood, quoting sailor Raskolnikov’s memoirs of soldiers and workers impatient for action. The party gave conscious form to working-class strivings, just as a piston box gives steam its force. Without organisation, the proletariat’s power remains potential.
The chapter also polemicises against reformist leaders who repeatedly threw away revolutionary opportunities — in Germany, Britain, Spain, France, Portugal, Italy, Pakistan, Chile — blaming the generals who refused to lead, not the soldiers who fought. It concludes with Lenin’s internationalist perspective: the Bolsheviks never believed they could hold power in Russia alone, and his 24 October letter urging armed mass action is quoted to show that everything hung by a thread. The chapter’s core argument is that October was a revolution, not a coup, because it was driven by the conscious, organised intervention of the masses.