The Question of the Soviet Congress¶
Core Argument¶
In this chapter, the author dismantles the formal-logical opposition between defence and offence, arguing that in both war and class struggle these categories constantly pass into one another. The central narrative thrust is to vindicate Trotsky’s tactical insistence on postponing the October insurrection until the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, against Lenin’s initial preference for an immediate seizure of power in September 1917. The author grounds this argument in a broader theoretical claim: that the socialist revolution is primarily a political task, not a military one. Unlike a bourgeois standing army, which can choose the moment of attack, the proletariat must win over the masses and the armed forces. This requires that the revolutionary movement always present itself as defensive, placing responsibility for violence on the ruling class.
The chapter draws heavily on the experience of 1917. Lenin himself, in June 1917, wrote that “the workers of Petrograd will give them no opportunity to disclaim responsibility” and insisted that “the future Cavaignacs begin first.” The author uses this to show that even Lenin understood the political necessity of appearing to act in self-defence. The key dispute between Lenin and Trotsky over timing is examined in detail. Trotsky’s position is defended as sound: the majority of workers and soldiers still looked to the authority of the Soviets, and would support a seizure of power only if it were done in the name of the Soviets, not the Bolsheviks alone. The insurrection therefore had to coincide with the Congress, where the Bolsheviks and their allies were assured a majority. Lenin’s fear that delay would let the opportunity slip is acknowledged, but the author argues that Trotsky’s approach was correct, citing the mood on the ground: reports showed workers would fight for a Soviet government proclaimed by the Congress, but not necessarily for one proclaimed by a single party.
The chapter contains a notable polemic against Kamenev and Zinoviev, who opposed taking power altogether. Kamenev’s defeatism is illustrated through a conversation with Raskolnikov, in which he exaggerated the strength of the government’s Cossacks and cadets while doubting the resolve of the Petrograd garrison. The author characterises this as a loss of nerve under the pressure of bourgeois public opinion. There is also a sharp polemic against the later Stalinist account, which claimed that Trotsky’s proposal “in practice meant bungling the insurrection and allowing the Provisional Government to pull up its forces.” The author counters by noting that the insurrection took place as Trotsky proposed, coinciding with the Congress, and that the Bolshevik Military Organisation’s reports of unreadiness were probably exaggerated, reflecting an excessive focus on military-technical questions rather than the decisive political factors. The Northern Region Congress of Soviets, held in Petrograd from 11 to 13 October, is presented as a key moment: dominated by the left, it passed a resolution for a Soviet government but linked it to the forthcoming All-Russian Congress, reflecting the general mood that the insurrection needed the stamp of Soviet authority.