Tactics of the Insurrection¶
Core Argument¶
From his Razliv hut, Lenin tracked the revolution’s pulse with forensic intensity, sifting election returns, Soviet votes, union ballots, and army committee reports to gauge when the party should strike. He knew election statistics gave a partial, distorted picture of class forces, but every indicator confirmed the Bolsheviks’ swift advance. The Kornilov revolt’s memory still galvanised workers and soldiers; the counter-revolutionary threat drove rapid polarisation and radicalisation inside the Soviets. New elections across industrial centres, the fleet, and the northern front registered astonishing Bolshevik gains. Power was draining from the right-wing leaders who had proven impotent during the emergency. Petrograd, Finland, the Baltic fleet, the northern armies, Moscow, the central industrial region, and the Urals all shifted allegiance from Mensheviks and SRs to the Bolsheviks.
The picture was not uniform. The SRs still dominated peasant Soviets and front-line regiments, but internal differentiation was accelerating. A left-wing tendency inside the Social Revolutionary Party gained ground rapidly, splitting and aligning with the Bolsheviks. Right-wing SRs held strongest in the Black Earth region and Central Volga; in Ukraine they shared control with left nationalists. The Mensheviks lost ground everywhere except their traditional Caucasus stronghold, where they alone retained the Soviet dominance they had once held across all Russia. This balance of forces determined Lenin’s next step. The Bolsheviks were now decisive inside the Soviets; reformist leaders were isolated and besieged in their final refuge, the Soviet Executive. Was it not time to strike the decisive blow?
Lenin was convinced the moment was ripe and any delay could prove fatal. But not all party leaders agreed. The top leadership remained profoundly affected by the July defeat, inclined towards excessive caution. Zinoviev, who had always followed Lenin’s line, was badly shaken and clung to Kamenev, who as usual took the road of moderation. From early September Lenin bombarded the Central Committee with letters demanding insurrection be organised. His letter of 12-14 September opened bluntly: the Bolsheviks, having obtained a majority in the Soviets of both capitals, could and must take state power. The Central Committee was so aghast they decided to destroy the letter. Bukharin later recalled entering to find Milyutin announcing they had received “a little letter”. Everyone gasped; no one had yet put the question so sharply. After deliberation, they decided to burn it—perhaps the only time in party history the Central Committee destroyed a Lenin letter.
Further letters followed, each more emphatic. Lenin accused the leadership of merely passing resolutions and losing time. To wait for the Congress of Soviets under such circumstances, he insisted, would betray internationalism and the world socialist revolution. He warned that a tendency favouring waiting and opposing immediate insurrection must be overcome; otherwise the Bolsheviks would cover themselves with eternal shame and destroy themselves as a party. Missing the moment would be utter idiocy or sheer treachery. Exasperated, Lenin threatened to resign from the Central Committee and carry the struggle into the party ranks. He cited the Central Committee’s unanswered demands, the Central Organ deleting references to errors from his articles, the shameful decision to participate in the Pre-Parliament, and the admission of Mensheviks to the Soviet presidium. He interpreted these as a subtle hint he should keep silent and retire. He tendered his resignation, reserving freedom to campaign among the rank and file and at the Party Congress, convinced that waiting would ruin the revolution.