The Kornilov Rebellion¶
Core Argument¶
The chapter traces the Bolshevik recovery after the July Days repression and the subsequent counter-revolutionary offensive that culminated in General Kornilov's abortive coup. The core argument is that the Kornilov rebellion, intended to crush the revolution, instead produced the opposite effect—galvanising the Bolsheviks and accelerating the radicalisation of the masses.
The narrative opens with Yakov Sverdlov's organisational work to rebuild the party after the July repression, which had failed to destroy the Bolsheviks because the counter-revolution was "still feeling its way," forced to camouflage its actions behind revolutionary language. The chapter then examines the internal party debate over Lenin's proposed tactical shift. Lenin's article On Slogans argued that the July Days had fundamentally altered the situation: power now lay with "a military clique of Cavaignacs," rendering the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" obsolete, since the existing Soviets had become organs collaborating with the bourgeoisie. The chapter notes that Lenin was initially opposed within the party—ten of fifteen Central Committee members voted against his proposal—and that subsequent events proved him mistaken in abandoning the Soviet slogan, as the Bolsheviks could still win majorities in the Soviets. Lenin later admitted his isolation from the situation.
The chapter provides a detailed characterisation of Kornilov: a Cossack smallholder's son, personally brave but politically illiterate, who demanded the death penalty at the front, the disbanding of revolutionary regiments, and the suppression of soldiers' committees. The polemic is directed against historians like Orlando Figes, who argue that Kornilov only intended to "save" the Provisional Government from a Bolshevik coup. The chapter dismisses this as "a pathetic line of argument," insisting that Kornilov's claim of a defensive action was a transparent Bonapartist tactic—"the well-worn path trodden by every would-be Bonapartist." The rivalry between Kerensky and Kornilov is presented as a contest between two aspiring Bonapartes, with Kerensky denouncing Kornilov only after learning that the general demanded dictatorial powers for himself, leaving no room for a second dictator.
The decisive section concerns Bolshevik tactics during the crisis. Lenin insisted on a united front against Kornilov without supporting Kerensky's government—using Kerensky as a "gun rest" to fight the greater enemy, then dealing with him later. This is presented as a classic example of the Leninist united front: the Bolsheviks proved in action that they were the best fighters against counter-revolution, thereby winning over workers and soldiers who had previously believed the slanders about "German agents." The chapter draws on Sukhanov's admission that the Committee for Struggle was "effectively dependent on the military organisation of the Bolsheviks," without which it could only produce "appeals and idle speeches."
The rebellion's collapse is described vividly: railway workers sabotaged troop movements, Bolshevik agitators persuaded Cossacks not to fight, and a delegation of Caucasian Muslims addressed the Savage Division in their own language, leading to the arrest of rebel officers. Krymov shot himself. The chapter concludes with Marx's observation that the revolution needs "the whip of the counter-revolution"—Kornilov's defeat gave an immense impulse to radicalisation, as soldiers turned against their officers, peasant soldiers returned to their villages, and the peasant revolt flared up in September. The revolution had entered its decisive phase.