After the July Events¶
Core Argument¶
After the July Events, the chapter argues that the demonstration of 2-3 July 1917 was a decisive but contradictory turning point. It revealed the reformist leaders had lost their base in Petrograd, yet also confirmed the Bolsheviks’ warning that Petrograd was not Russia: the Mensheviks and SRs retained huge provincial support among workers and peasants. Even in the capital, barrack moods were uneven, though no unit would fight for the Provisional Government or Soviet leaders. The chapter insists the Bolsheviks’ decision to lead the demonstration, giving it an organised and peaceful character, prevented a bloodbath and preserved the party’s influence over advanced workers. The painful experience taught workers to trust Bolshevik judgement, since the party had warned them but stood shoulder to shoulder with them nonetheless.
The narrative details the political crisis that followed: the Cadet ministers’ resignation over the Ukrainian question, the collapse of the First Coalition, and Kerensky’s appointment to form a Second Coalition. The suppression of the July movement emboldened the counter-revolution, with the Cadets demanding the Socialist ministers break links with the Soviets and crush the Bolshevik left. The chapter draws on Orlando Figes to illustrate the anti-Bolshevik hysteria, including anti-Semitic agitation by General Polovtsov, who blamed the Jews for the prominence of Bolshevik leaders. The press waged a hysterical campaign about Lenin as a German agent, while the Mensheviks and SRs, knowing this was a pack of lies, maintained cowardly silence and called on Lenin to “hand himself over to justice”—an open invitation to the hangman.
A central polemic concerns Lenin’s alleged personal cowardice. The chapter refutes this by reproducing Lenin’s 7 July letter to the Central Executive Committee, offering to give himself up on condition the Soviet sanctioned his arrest. Krupskaya’s memoirs confirm Lenin initially insisted on appearing in court, even bidding her farewell. He was only dissuaded when the Soviet Executive cancelled its promised inquiry, making clear the judiciary, dominated by tsarist elements, would act as a counter-revolutionary tool. The chapter argues that going into hiding was correct: Lenin was more use alive than dead or imprisoned. It draws a devastating parallel with the Spartacist uprising of 1919, where Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht failed to take precautions and were murdered, with catastrophic consequences for the German Revolution and world history. The chapter condemns inane commentary about “personal bravery,” insisting the price of such mistaken action was the rise of Hitler and fascism.
The Menshevik and SR leaders are excoriated for their contemptible role. Dan’s resolution branding Bolsheviks as criminals was passed overwhelmingly, and the Soviet right wing suspended membership of those under investigation. Nogin’s protest—that they were being condemned before trial—was ignored. Meanwhile, right-wing Duma deputies like Maslenikov and Purishkevich raged against moderate Soviet leaders as “dreamers” and “traitors,” demanding the liquidation of dual power and the reintroduction of the death penalty. The chapter interprets this as the bourgeoisie striving to re-establish order by reconstituting the old state through dictatorship.
The July defeat altered the class correlation of forces. The counter-revolution grew bolder, while workers and soldiers in the capital felt isolated and impotent. Against this carnival of reaction, the chapter highlights Leon Trotsky’s open letter to the Provisional Government, demanding his own arrest on the same grounds as Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. Trotsky insisted he shared their political position and had acted identically during the July Days, calling for peaceful demonstration while supporting the slogan “All power to the Soviets.” The authorities obliged, imprisoning him in the Kresty Fortress. The chapter presents Trotsky’s defiance as a rare voice of clarity and principle amidst the hysteria.