4. Theory of Force. (Conclusion)¶
Core Argument¶
4. Theory of Force (Conclusion)¶
Engels delivers a decisive refutation of Herr Dühring’s central thesis that the domination of man is a prerequisite for the domination of nature. Dühring’s imagined sequence—where a large proprietor must first subjugate bondmen in order to subdue the land—is contradicted by the entire sweep of historical fact. Early civilised peoples, from the Germanic tribes to the village communities of Asia and the Orient, cultivated the soil through common ownership, not under the heel of a landlord. Dühring’s ignorance of Maurer’s work on the primitive mark system is here exposed as fatal. In Greece’s heroic age, independent peasants tilled their own plots; Rome’s latifundia, worked by slaves, ultimately ruined Italy; medieval cultivation was the domain of free colonists; and North America was opened by free farmers. Where large landowners did appear, they often turned arable land into pasture, devastating entire countries. The image of the great landlord subduing nature through bondmen is a figment of Dühring’s imagination.
Engels then traces the actual origins of class domination. It arose first from common social functions—adjudication, water control—within primitive communities. These functions became independent and hereditary, eventually hardening into domination over society itself. Political supremacy endured only so long as it discharged its social function. The second path emerged when productive labour became sufficiently valuable: war prisoners were enslaved rather than killed. Slavery, born from economic necessity, was a great step forward, enabling the division of labour, Greek civilisation, and the Roman Empire. All historical class antagonisms stem from the underdevelopment of human labour; only modern industry’s immense productivity makes ruling classes superfluous.
Engels dismisses Dühring’s contempt for Hellenic slavery as absurd as reproaching the Greeks for lacking steam engines. Dühring’s claim that modern wage-labour is merely a mitigated heritage of slavery is either trivial or false; one could as easily call it mitigated cannibalism. Political force, Engels argues, is always organically based on an economic, social function. Once independent, it either accelerates economic development or works against it—and in the latter case, force almost always succumbs. The rare exceptions are barbarian conquests that destroy productive forces they cannot use, as in Moorish Spain. But permanent conquerors must adapt to the higher economic situation. If economic structure depended on political force, Frederick William IV could have imposed medieval guilds on Prussian industry, and the Tsar would not need Western loans. Dühring treats force as absolute evil, but it plays a revolutionary role: it is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. He admits only reluctantly that force may be necessary to overthrow exploitation, ignoring the moral impetus of victorious revolutions. This impotent, parson-like mode of thought presumes to impose itself on the most revolutionary party in history.