Appendix III. 1923: An Opportunity Missed?

Soon after the publication of Jan Valtin’s Out of the Night, Mick Jones sent a letter, which was published in the Militant International Review Issue no 39 in Spring 1989, criticising our position that 1923 was a missed revolution. “There is a myth, especially in would-be Trotskyist circles, that a revolution was missed in October 1923,” he wrote. Rob Sewell’s reply to his points was printed in the same issue and is reproduced here.

The revolutionary events of November 1918 resulted in the overthrow of the Hohenzollern monarchy and state power falling into the hands of the workers’, sailors’ and soldiers’ councils that had spontaneously sprung up throughout Germany. Tragically, the labour leaders, who reluctantly found themselves at the head of the revolution, quickly handed power back to the ruling class.

A golden opportunity was lost to establish a German socialist republic. Such a victory would have broken the isolation of the Russian workers’ state and quickly prepared the way for a socialist united states of Europe.

Despite the setback following November 1918, the turmoil in Germany was to give the working class further opportunities to carry through the socialist revolution: in particular the attempted coup of Kapp in March 1920 and the occupation by the French of the Ruhr in January 1923.

The major difference between the revolutionary upheavals of 1920 and those that were to unfold in 1923 was the creation of a mass Communist Party. By December 1920 the mass centrist party, the USPD, vacillating between reform and revolution, voted to affiliate to the Communist International.

As a result 500,000 of its members fused with the existing Communist Party, to create a mass organisation. The revolution, with hard and patient work, under the guidance of the Communist International, now seemed to be assured. Unfortunately events turned out differently.

In January 1923, the French army occupied the industrial heartland of Germany, the Ruhr. The pretext for this action was the failure of the German government to pay its war reparations promised under the Treaty of Versailles.

National revulsion against the French occupation spread like wildfire throughout the country with 500,000 demonstrating in Berlin alone. Under pressure, the government organised a campaign of ‘passive resistance’. There was to be no cooperation with the French forces.

A wave of industrial militancy swept the Ruhr as inflation bit into the workers’ living standards. The price of basic foodstuffs and essentials spiralled out of reach. Inflation turned into hyper-inflation. Those living on fixed incomes were devastated. The middle-class were pauperised overnight.

Society was thrown into turmoil. A revolutionary crisis was in the making. The four conditions laid down by Lenin for a revolutionary situation were clearly present: splits in the ruling class, the vacillation of the middle class, the determination of the working class to struggle, and the existence of a mass revolutionary party.

Workers defence organisations - ‘Hundreds’ - sprung up in many areas. Layers of workers deserted their traditional SPD for the Communist Party (KPD). The German bourgeois was terrified and appealed to the French ruling class to help restore order, recalling their past collaboration in crushing the Paris Commune. By August the inflation accelerated out of control. Spontaneous strikes, affecting millions, broke out throughout the country, demanding the overthrow of the government. On 12 August the capitalist Cuno government resigned.

Mick Jones states that it was at this time the ebb in the movement set in which “began a process of stabilisation.” The idea that the revolutionary situation had persisted to October 1923 was “a myth”. But this clearly is not the case. Mick himself confuses the timetable of events.

Inflation

Firstly, the fall of the Curio government did not give way to stabilisation politically or economically. The new Stresemann government was a government of crisis. Due to the financial losses and the drastic fall in industrial production, Stresemann ended the policy of passive resistance on 26 September, a move which created widespread revulsion. A few weeks late, after tail-ending the movement, the KPD called off a planned insurrection (except in Hamburg where the message didn’t get through) and capitulated without a fight. It was the worst possible situation.

In September and October inflation went through the roof! The cost of a loaf of bread had increased from 1.5 million marks in September to a peak of 201 billion marks in November. Yet Mick talks about the formation of the Stresemann government (mid-August) as beginning “a process of stabilisation”. He says “the mark was stabilised...and the crisis passed”. In fact the Stresemann government collapsed in December and was followed by the government of Wilhelm Marx who was forced to rule by emergency powers.

Just taking the official exchange rate alone the position is not stable but catastrophic. On August 31, 1923 one pound sterling equalled 47 million marks; September 12, 440 million marks; October 1, 1,100 million; October 5, 2,730 million; 9 October, 25,000 million and on October 19, 80,000 million!

The currency was eventually stabilised, through foreign loans and adopting the gold standard, not in August 1923, not in September, or October, or November but by the end of the year and the beginning of 1924 - in other words, after the fall of the Stresemann government.

Mick refers to the Dawes plan, but according to the historian Ramos Oliveira in his People’s History of Germany: “The allies...drew up the Dawes plan at the beginning of 1924 and in the summer of that year it was put into effect. The object of this plan was to repair German finances, beginning with the currency...At the end of 1924 Germany began to return to normal. The French had retired from the Ruhr.” (p143 - my emphasis) This view is confirmed by Evelyn Anderson who states “strictly speaking, Germany’s recovery began only after the London Conference of August 1924 and the acceptance of the Dawes Plan.”

This hardly fits Mick Jones’s scheme of stabilisation after mid-August 1923. This does not mean that the revolutionary situation had not matured prior to October. It clearly had. But even as late as October it would have been possible, given a correct leadership, to have carried through the German revolution. In Trotsky’s view the real political ebb occurred in November as a result of the October debacle. It was a shattering defeat, but had nothing to do with any so-called political or economic stabilisation. The fundamental responsibility for the missed opportunity lay with the prevarication of the Zinoviev/Stalin leadership of the Communist International.

For Mick to refer to the testimony of Jakob Walcher, a KPD leader in 1923, as evidence of a non-revolutionary situation in October 1923 is somewhat thin. To then point to Walcher’s notes of his discussions with Trotsky as evidence of Trotsky’s assessment of 1923 is even thinner. Why not point to Trotsky’s writings directly? They are clear enough.

To begin with, Walcher, along with Brandler the main KPD leader, underestimated the situation in 1923 and both subsequently had a vested interest in attempting to cover up their mistakes in the October fiasco.

Centrism

In April 1935 Trotsky dealt with Walcher, who had become the leader of the small centrist group, the SAP, and his role in Germany in 1923: “The centrist is afraid to act. That is why he hedges in his analysis of the situation... In 1923 Brandler and Walcher missed the revolutionary situation.

Later they failed to understand this. From this - the greatest experience of their lives - they learned nothing. Since they were obliged to defend themselves for quite some time, they collected all the arguments for turning a revolutionary situation into a non-revolutionary situation.” (Writings Supplement 1934-40, p576 my emphasis). Mick is using these latter arguments to justify his position.

For Mick to say that the missed revolution in October 1923 is a myth, “especially in would-be Trotskyist circles” is nonsense. Would Mick count Trotsky as part of these ‘circles’? Trotsky was perfectly clear as to the nature of the event: “Here we had a classic example of a missed revolutionary situation. The Communist Party executed the turn very irresolutely and after a very long delay... (they) viewed rather fatalistically the process of revolutionary development up to September/October1923.” Trotsky then wrote a whole book, Lessons of October, drawing all the parallels of the actions of Zinoviev and Kamenev in October 1917 and, by implication, the hesitations of the German and Comintern leaders in 1923. For him, it was nothing to do with the lack of a revolutionary situation - far from it - but the failure of leadership.

Prevarication

Mick attempts to justify the calling off of the insurrection by Brandler because “the SPD workers had given up ideas of revolution.” He refers to the Chemnitz Trade Union Conference that opposed the general strike call. Unfortunately it was the prevarications amongst the KPD leaders that introduced confusion into the situation. Their skepticism transmitted itself to the SPD ranks. With a clear bold consistent policy any wavering would have been overcome. Mick should not blame the workers for any hesitations but the temporising of the Brandler leadership which was reinforced by the Comintern. In fact, Trotsky had correctly attacked the leaders of the Comintern and the KPD for underestimating the revolutionary situation and prevaricating. He quotes approvingly the astonishing statement in Pravda (25th May, 1924), which contradicted its previous line: “It is clear that in October 1923, during the unprecedented economic crisis, during the complete disintegration of the middle classes, during a frightful confusion in the ranks of the social democracy resulting from the powerful and sharp contradictions within the bourgeoisie itself and an unprecedented militant mood of the proletarian masses in the industrial centres, the Communist Party had the majority of the population on its side; it could and should have fought and had all the chances for success.” (My emphasis)

As to Stalin, Mick suggests that undue weight is given to his influence. But to understand Stalin’s role, it is necessary to see the background events developing in Russia. In 1923 with Lenin paralysed by a stroke, Stalin, who had been appointed General Secretary the previous year, created a bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev to keep Trotsky out of the leadership. This ‘troika’ organised a secret caucus in the politbureau of the Russian Communist Party which had a majority on all questions.

Zinoviev, who was now President of the Comintern, and Kamenev, had both opposed the insurrection on the eve of the October 1917 revolution. Lenin in his Testament, referred to this as no mere ‘accident’. Both individuals were prone to vacillation in times of crisis. As became clear later, Stalin’s role in the ‘troika’ was to pour cold water over the revolutionary potential in Germany and urge Zinoviev and Bukharin in writing to restrain the KPD. “Should the Communists strive to seize power without the social democrats, are they mature enough for that?” wrote Stalin. “That, in my opinion, is the question.

“When we seized power. we had in Russia such reserves as (a) peace, (b) the land to the peasants, (c) the support of the great majority of the working class, (d) the sympathy of the peasantry. The German Communists at this moment have nothing of the sort. Of course, they have the Soviet nation as their neighbour, which we did not have, but what can we offer them at the present moment? If today in Germany the power, so to speak, falls, and the Communists seize hold of it, they will fall with a crash. That in the ‘best’ case. And at the worst, they will be smashed to pieces and thrown back.

“The whole thing is not that Brandler wants to ‘educate the masses’ but that the bourgeoisie plus the right social democrats will surely transform the lessons - the demonstration - into a general battle (at this moment all the chances are on their side) and exterminate them. Of course, the fascists are not asleep, but it is to our interest that they attack first: that will rally the whole working class around the Communists (Germany is not Bulgaria). Besides, according to all information, the fascists are weak in Germany. In my opinion, the Germans must be curbed and not spurred on.”

Comintern

At the same time, Stalin supported and reinforced the skeptics and vacillators within the leadership of the German party.

Leaders like August Thalheimer, who wrote in the British Labour Monthly in October 1923, at the time of the aborted insurrection, that “politically and organisationally, there is still a good stretch of ground to be covered before the conditions are ripe enough to secure victory for the working class”!! That is why Trotsky concluded that “the Zinoviev-Stalin leadership of the Comintern as a whole was responsible for the German catastrophe.” It was not a conscious betrayal as was Stalin’s policy in the 1930s. Stalin, Zinoviev, Bukharin, etc all wanted a successful revolution in Germany, but, without Lenin, they lacked a clear policy and firmness to carry it through.

Stalin’s influence in 1923 can only be appreciated by the behind-the-scenes role he played. To believe that his influence was secondary is to fail to appreciate the real position of power that he was developing at this stage. There is no question that Stalin’s attitude played an important role in holding back the German leadership at the crucial time. Along with Zinoviev, Stalin shares the main blame for the defeat in October 1923.

Mick’s attempt to call upon the actions of Radek and Pyatakov to justify Brandler’s decision to call off the insurrection is equally false. Trotsky was sharply critical not only of Brandler’s temporising, but also that of Radek and Pyatakov. In 1931, to clarify his earlier position, Trotsky explained he had “nothing in common with Radek’s thesis (on the German revolution). This appraisal, which I arrived at approximately in July 1923, I have upheld unaltered in its essentials to this very day.” Trotsky continued that Radek “intended to mitigate Brandler’s guilt, and to justify the conduct of Pyatakov and Radek themselves...” This is hardly an endorsement of their actions in 1923!

All the conditions for a revolutionary situation had developed in 1923, but what was missing for a successful revolution was the most important element: a theoretically and organisationally tested leadership prepared to go to the end. The German and Comintern leaders dithered and allowed the favourable situation to slip through their fingers. This was nothing to do with the objective situation which was ripe for revolution. Mick Jones lets the KPD leaders and those in the International off the hook by portraying a “non-revolutionary situation” in October.

If the Bolsheviks had not been rearmed and re-orientated by Lenin in April 1917 towards the conquest of power, then the October Russian Revolution would have been a debacle. No doubt then all the smart-aleck academics, of the Deutscher variety, would have wrote volumes about the non-revolutionary situation of October 1917 and the ‘adventurer’ Lenin. Both Zinoviev and Kamenev who opposed the insurrection and put forward a ‘non-revolutionary’ parliamentary perspective at the time - would have been painted as the ‘realists’ of the Bolshevik party. This is exactly what Mick Jones is attempting to do in relation to Brandler, Zinoviev and Stalin over the Germany debacle.

Opportunity

The missed opportunity in 1923 was a terrible tragedy. The struggle of the working class cannot remain at a revolutionary fever pitch forever. If there is no fundamental change in a desperate situation, enthusiasm turns to disillusionment, energy to passivity. The defeat of 1923 laid the political basis for the relative stability of German capitalism between 1924-28. The failure of the labour leaders to overthrow capitalism led to the emergence of fascist reaction that was to destroy the German labour movement by 1933.

For Marxists, the events of 1918-23 demonstrated time and again the willingness of the working class to struggle to change society. But the decisive lesson of the period was the absence of a far-sighted revolutionary leadership able to match up to the events.