London, February 7
The opening of Parliament was a lusterless ceremony. The absence of the Queen and the reading of the Speech from the Throne (1) by the Lord Chancellor(2) banished every theatrical effect. The Speech from the Throne itself is short without being striking. It recapitulates the faits accomplis(3) of foreign politics and, for an estimation of these facts, refers to the documents submitted to Parliament.*(4) Only one remark created a certain sensation, the one in which the Queen "trusts(5) there is no reason to apprehend any disturbance of the peace of Europe". It in fact implies that European peace is relegated to the domain of hope and faith.
In accordance with parliamentary practice, the gentlemen who moved the Reply to the Speech from the Throne in the two Houses had already been commissioned by the ministers with this business three weeks before. In conformity with the usual procedure, their Reply consists of a broad echo of the Speech from the Throne and of fulsome praises that the ministers bestow upon themselves in the name of Parliament. When Sir Francis Burdett anticipated the official movers of the Address in 1811 and seized the opportunity to subject the Speech from the Throne to a cutting criticism,3 Magna Charta[181] itself appeared to be imper-illed. Since that time no further enormity of the kind has happened.
The interest of the debate on the Speech from the Throne is therefore limited to the "hints" of the official Opposition clubs and the "counter-hints" of the ministers. This time, however, the interest was more academic than political. It was a question of the best funeral oration on Prince Albert, who during his life found the yoke of the English oligarchy by no means light. According to the vox populi, Derby and Disraeli have borne off the academic palm, the first as a natural speaker, the other as a rhetorician.
The "business" part of the debate turned on the United States, Mexico, and Morocco.
With regard to the United States, the Outs (those out of office) eulogised the policy of the Insh (the beati possidentesc). Derby, the Conservative leader in the House of Lords, and Disraeli, the Conservative leader in the Lower House, opposed not the Cabinet, but each other.
Derby in the first place gave vent to his dissatisfaction*1 over the absence of "pressure from without".* He "admired", he said, the stoical and dignified bearing of the factory workers. As far as the millowners were concerned, however, he ought to exclude them from his commendation. For them the American disturbance had come in extraordinarily handy, since overproduction and glutting of all markets had in any case imposed on them a restriction of trade.
Derby went on to make a violent attack on the Union government, "which had exposed itself and its people to the most undignified humiliation" and had not acted like "gentlemen", because it had not taken the initiative and voluntarily surrendered Mason, Slidell and company and made amends. His seconder in the Lower House, Mr. Disraeli, at once grasped how very damaging Derby's onslaught was to the Conservatives' aspirations to the Ministry. He therefore declared to the contrary:
"When I consider the great difficulties which the statesmen of North America have had to encounter ... I would venture to say they have met these manfully and courageously."f On the other hand — with the consistency customary to him— Derby protested against the "new doctrines" of maritime law. England had at all times upheld belligerents' rights against the pretensions of neutrals. Lord Clarendon, it was true, had made a "dangerous" concession at Paris in 1856.[182] Happily, this had not yet been ratified by the Crown, so that "it did not alter the state of international law". Mr. Disraeli, on the contrary, manifestly in collusion with the ministry here, avoided touching on this point at all.
Derby approved of the non-intervention policy of the ministry. The time to recognise the Southern Confederacy had not yet come, but he demanded authentic documents for the purpose of judging "how far the blockade is effective and therefore legally binding". Lord John Russell, on the other hand, declared that the Union government had employed a sufficient number of ships in the blockade, but had not everywhere carried this out consistently. Mr. Disraeli will permit himself no judgment on the nature of the blockade, but demands ministerial papers for enlightenment. He gives such emphatic warning against any premature recognition of the Confederacy since England is compromising herself at the present moment by threatening an American state (Mexico), the independence of which she herself was the first to recognise.
After the United States, it was Mexico's turn. No member of Parliament condemned a war without declaration of war,[183] but they condemned interference in the internal affairs of a country under the shibboleth of a "non-intervention policy", and the coalition of England with France and Spain in order to intimidate a semi-defenceless country. As a matter of fact, the Outs merely indicated that they reserve Mexico to themselves for party manoeuvres. Derby demands documents on both the Convention between the three powers and the mode of carrying it out. He approves of the Convention because — in his view — the right way was for each of the contracting parties to enforce its claims independently of the others. Certain public rumours caused him to fear that at least one of the powers — Spain — purposed operations going beyond the provisions of the treaty. As if Derby really believed the great power, Spain, capable of the audacity of acting counter to the will of England and France! Lord John Russell answered: The three powers pursued the same aim and would anxiously avoid hindering the Mexicans from regulating their own political affairs.
In the Lower House, Mr. Disraeli defers any judgment prior to scrutinising the documents submitted. However, he finds "the announcement of the government suspicious". The independence of Mexico was first recognised by England. This recognition recalls a notable policy — the anti-Holy-Alliance policy — and a notable man, Canning. What singular occasion, then, drove England to strike the first blow against this independence? Moreover, the intervention has changed its pretext within a very short time. Originally it was a question of satisfaction for wrong done to English subjects. Now there are rumours about the introduction of new governmental principles and the setting up of a new dynasty. Lord Palmerston refers to the papers submitted, to the Convention that prohibits the "subjugation" of Mexico by the Allies or the imposition of a form of government distasteful to the people. At the same time, however, he opens a diplomatic loophole. He has it from hearsay that a party in Mexico' desires the transformation of the republic into a monarchy. The strength of this party he does not know. He, "for his part, only wishes that there shall be established some form of government in Mexico with which foreign governments may treat". He wishes, therefore, to establish a "new" form of government. He declares the non-existence of the present government. He claims for the alliance of England, France and Spain the prerogative of the Holy Alliance to decide over the existence or non-existence of foreign governments. "That is the utmost," he adds modestly, "which the government of Great Britain is desirous of obtaining." Nothing more!
The last "open question" of foreign policy concerned Morocco. The English government has concluded a convention with Morocco in order to enable her to pay off her debt to Spain, a debt with which Spain could never have saddled Morocco without England's leave. Certain persons, it appears, have advanced Morocco money with which to pay her instalments to Spain, thus depriving the latter of a pretext for further occupation of Tetuan and resumption of war.[184] The British government has in one way or another guaranteed these persons the interest on their loan and, in its turn, takes over the administration of Morocco's customs houses as security. Derby found this manner of ensuring the independence of Morocco "rather strange",,(6) but elicited no answer from the ministers. In the Lower House Mr. Disraeli went into the transaction further: it was "to some extent unconstitution-al", since the ministry had saddled England with new financial obligations behind Parliament's back. Palmerston simply referred him to the "documents" submitted.
Home affairs were hardly mentioned. Derby merely warned members, out of regard "for the state of mind of the Queen", not to raise "disturbing" controversial questions like parliamentary reform. He is ready to pay his tribute of admiration regularly to the English working class, on condition that it suffers its exclusion from popular representation with the same restraint and stoicism as it suffers the American blockade.
It would be a mistake to infer from the idyllic opening of Parliament an idyllic future. Quite the contrary! Dissolution of Parliament or dissolution of the ministry is the motto of this year's session. Opportunity to substantiate these alternatives will be found later.
Endnotes
[180] pi r st published in English in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Civil War in the United States, New York, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 150-55.
[181] l s i Magna Charta Libertatum—the charter signed by King John of England on June 15, 1215 under pressure from his insurgent barons supported by knights and townspeople. It restricted the king's rights, mostly to the benefit of the barons, and contained certain concessions to the knights and towns. Even in the 19th century, the British bourgeoisie regarded it as the mainstay of the Constitutional system.
[182] 1S- This refers to the Déclaration réglant divers points de droit maritime (see Note 141).
[183] 18S On the intervention in Mexico see Note 88.
[184] 1S4 Under the peace treaty concluded after the 1859-60 Spanish-Moroccan war (see Note 89) the town of Tetuan was to remain under Spanish occupation until Morocco had paid out the entire contribution imposed by Spain.