September
105. Mediation and Intervention. Radetzky and Cavaignac[262]
The armistice concluded as the result of Charles Albert's, treachery will expire in about three weeks (on September 21). France and Britain have offered to act as mediators. The Spectateur républicain, Cavaignac's paper, writes that Austria has not yet stated whether she will accept or decline the offer. France's dictator is getting annoyed over the discourtesy of the Austrians and threatens armed intervention if by a given date the Viennese Cabinet does not reply, or rejects mediation. Will Austria allow a Cavaignac to prescribe the peace terms to her, especially now after the victory over democracy in Vienna[264] and over the Italian "rebels"? Austria understands perfectly well that the French bourgeoisie wants "peace at any price", that the freedom or bondage of the Italians is altogether a matter of complete indifference to the bourgeoisie and that it will agree to anything so long as it is not openly humiliated and thus reluctantly compelled to draw the sword. It is said that Radetzky will pay a short visit to Vienna in order to say the decisive word about mediation. He does not have to travel to Vienna to do that. His policy has now prevailed, and his opinion will be none the less weighty for his remaining in Milan. If Austria were to accept the basis for peace proposed by Britain and France, she would do so not because she is afraid of Cavaignac's intervention but for much more pressing and compelling reasons.
The Italians were just as much deluded by the March events as the Germans. The former believed that foreign rule at any rate was now at an end; the latter thought that the old system was buried for good and all. On the contrary, the foreign rule in Italy is worse than ever, and in Germany the old system has recovered from the few blows it sustained in March and it acts with greater ferocity and vindictive-ness than ever before.
The Italians are now making the mistake of expecting salvation from the present Government of France. Only the fall of this Government could save them. The Italians are further mistaken in regarding the liberation of their country as possible while democracy in France, Germany and other countries continues to lose ground. Reaction, to whose blows Italy has succumbed, is not merely an Italian phenomenon, it is a European phenomenon. Italy alone cannot possibly free herself from the grip of this reaction, least of all by appealing to the French bourgeoisie, which is the real pillar of reaction in Europe as a whole.
Before reaction can be destroyed in Italy and Germany, it must be routed in France. A democratic social republic must first be proclaimed in France and the French proletariat must first subjugate its bourgeoisie before a lasting victory of democracy is conceivable in Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary and other countries.
Written by Engels on August 31, 1848
106. The Antwerp Death Sentences
Cologne, September 2. Belgium, the model constitutional state, has produced a further brilliant proof of the excellence of her institutions. Seventeen death sentences resulting from the ridiculous Risquons-Tout affair[266]! Seventeen death sentences to avenge the humiliation inflicted upon the prudish Belgian nation by a few imprudent men, a few hopeful fools,[3] who attempted to raise a small corner of the constitutional cloak! Seventeen death sentences — what savagery!
The Risquons-Tout affair is well known. Belgian workers in Paris joined forces to attempt a republican invasion of their country. Belgian democrats came from Brussels to support the venture. Ledru-Rollin assisted as much as he could. Lamartine, the "noble-minded" traitor, who was as ready with fine words and ignoble deeds for foreign as for French democrats — Lamartine, who prides himself on having conspired with the anarchists, like a lightning-conductor with the lightning — Lamartine at first supported the Belgian Legion the better to be able later to betray it. The Legion set out. Delescluze, Commissioner of the Department du Nord, sold the first column to Belgian railway officials,- the train in which it travelled was treacherously hauled into Belgian territory right into the midst of the Belgian bayonets. The second column was led by three Belgian spies (we were told this by a member of the Paris Provisional Government, and the course of events confirms it), and these treacherous leaders brought it into a forest on Belgian territory, where an ambush of loaded guns was waiting for it. The column was shot to pieces and most of its members were captured.
This tiny episode of the 1848 revolution — an episode which assumed a farcical aspect as a result of the many betrayals and the magnitude ascribed to it in Belgium — served the Brussels judiciary as
Hoffnungsvolle Toren (hopeful fools)— from Goethe's poem "Prometheus".— Ed.
a canvas on which to embroider the most colossal plot that was ever devised. Old General Mellinet, the liberator of Antwerp, Tedesco and Ballin, in short the most resolute and most active democrats of Brussels, Liege and Ghent, were implicated. M. Bavay would even have M. Jottrand of Brussels dragged into it, had not the latter known things and possessed documents whose publication would greatly compromise the entire Belgian Government, the wise Leopold included.
Why were these democrats arrested, why were these most monstrous proceedings started against men who had as little to do with the whole affair as the jurymen who faced them? It was meant to scare the Belgian bourgeoisie and, under cover of this scare, to collect the excessive taxes and compulsory loans, which are the cement of the glorious Belgian political edifice, and the payments on which were rather behindhand.
In short, the accused were arraigned before the Antwerp jury, the élite of the Flemish faro-playing fraternity, who lack both the élan of French political dedication and the cool assurance of magnificent English materialism, i.e. before those dried-cod merchants who spend their whole life vegetating in philistine utilitarianism, in the most short-sighted and timid profiteering. The great Bavay knew his men and appealed to their fear.
Indeed, had anyone ever seen a republican in Antwerp? Now thirty-two of the monsters faced the terrified men of Antwerp, and the trembling jury in concert with the wise bench consigned seventeen of the accused to the tender mercies of Article 86 and others of the Code pénal, i.e. the death sentence.
Mock trials were also held during the Reign of Terror in 1793, and convictions based on other facts than those officially stated did occur, but even the fanatical Fouquier-Tinville did not conduct a trial so distinguished by clumsy barefaced lies and blind partisan hatred. Moreover, is Belgium in the grip of a civil war and are the armies of half Europe assembled at her frontiers conspiring with the rebels, as was the case in France in 1793? Is the country in danger? Has a crack appeared in the crown? On the contrary, no one intends to subjugate Belgium, and the wise Leopold still drives every day without an escort from Laeken to Brussels and from Brussels to Laeken.
What has the 81-year-old Mellinet done to be sentenced to death by jury and judges? The old soldier of the French Republic saved the last spark of Belgian honour in 1831. He liberated Antwerp and in return Antwerp condemns him to death! His only sin is that he defended his old friend Becker against the insinuations of the Belgian official press and did not change his friendly attitude towards Becker even when the latter was plotting in Paris. Mellinet was in no way connected with the plot. And because of this he is without further ado sentenced to death.
As to Ballin, he was a friend of Mellinet's, often visited him, and was seen in the company of Tedesco in a coffee-house. Reason enough to sentence him to death.
And finally Tedesco. Had he not visited the German Workers' Association, did he not associate with people on whom the Belgian police had planted stage daggers? Had he not been seen with Ballin in a coffee-house? The case was established — Tedesco had provoked the great battle of Risquons-Tout — to the scaffold with him!
And so with the others. We are proud of being able to call many of these "conspirators", sentenced to death only because they are democrats, our friends. If the venal Belgian press slings mud at them, then we, at least, want to vindicate their honour before the face of German democracy; if their country disowns them, we want to acclaim them.
When the President of the Court pronounced the death sentence on them, they passionately exclaimed: "Long live the republic!" Throughout the whole procedure and the reading of the sentence they behaved with truly revolutionary steadfastness.
And now listen to what the wretched Belgian press has to say:
"The verdict," writes the Journal d'Anvers, "has caused no more of a sensation in the city than the entire trial, which aroused hardly any interest. Only among the working classes" (read: the lumpenproletariat) "can one find sentiments hostile to the paladins of the republic; the rest of the population hardly took any notice of it. The attempt to bring about a revolution does not cease to appear absurd to them even after the death sentence, which, in any case, no one believes will be executed."
To be sure, if the citizens of Antwerp were afforded the interesting spectacle of watching the guillotining of seventeen republicans headed by old Mellinet, their liberator, then they would certainly have taken notice of the trial.
The savagery of the Belgian Government, the Belgian jury and law-courts lies precisely in the fact that they play with death sentences.
The Libéral Liégeois says: "The Government wanted to show its strength, but it has merely demonstrated its savagery."
But then that has always been the lot of the Flemish nation.
Written by Engels on September 2, 1848
107. The Conflict between Marx and Prussian Citizenship[268]
Cologne, September 4. As has already been mentioned earlier,[3]
Karl Marx, the editor-in-chief of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, has become involved in a conflict with Prussian citizenship. This affair is a new example of the way in which the attempt is made to conjure away the promises of March. How the matter stands emerges from the following document that Marx has sent to the Minister of the Interior, Herr Kühlwetter:
Dear Minister,
Permit me to protest against a decision of the local royal administration which affects me personally.
I left my homeland, Rhenish Prussia, during the year 1843 in order to settle for the time being in Paris. In 1844 I learned that the royal Oberpräsidium in Koblenz had sent to the respective border police authorities an order to arrest me because of my writings. This piece of news was also published in the censured Berlin newspapers.
From that moment on, I regarded myself as a political refugee Later on, in January 1845, I was expelled from France at the direct instigation of the then Prussian Government and settled in Belgium.
Since here too the Prussian Government applied to the Belgian Ministry for my expulsion, I was finally forced to relinquish Prussian nationality. I had to use this last expedient in order to escape these persecutions. The best proof that I only asked for permission to emigrate in self-defence is the fact that I did not accept citizenship in
See this volume, p. 383.— Ed.
any other state even though it was offered to me by members of the Provisional Government in France after the February revolution.
After the March revolution, I returned to my homeland and applied for citizenship in Cologne in the month of April. It was readily granted to me by the local City Council. Under the law of December 31, 1842, the matter was sent for confirmation to the royal administration. I then received from the local acting Police Superintendent, Herr Geiger, a communication which reads as follows:
"Dear Sir, "I am herewith informing you that in view of your position up to now the royal administration has for the present not used in your favour Paragraph 5 of the law of December 31, 1842, which authorises it to bestow the status of a Prussian subject upon a foreigner. You are therefore still to be regarded as a foreigner. (Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the cited law.)
Cologne, August 3, 1848 acting Police Superintendent
(signed) Geiger
To Dr. Marx, Esquire, No. 2678."
I regard the decision of the royal administration as unlawful on the following grounds:
Under the decision of the Federal Diet of March 30 of this year, political refugees, too, may vote for and be elected to the German National Assembly provided they return to Germany and declare that they want to resume their German citizenship.[26]
The decision of the Preparliament,[270] which it is true does not have a direct legal force but nevertheless sets the standard of the prospects and promises which were held out to the German people immediately after the revolution, accords the right'to vote and to be elected even to all those political refugees who became citizens abroad but want to resume their German citizenship.
In any case, the decision of the Federal Diet and the electoral regulations of the Camphausen Government which are based upon it, are legally valid in Prussia.
Since I declared clearly enough my intention to resume my German citizenship by virtue of my application to obtain the right to reside in Cologne, it is an established fact that I had the right to vote for and to be elected to the German National Assembly. Thus I at least possess citizenship rights in the German Empire.
If, however, I possess the greatest right which a German can possess, so much less reason is there for refusing me the lesser right of Prussian citizenship.
The royal administration at Cologne refers to the law of December 31, 1842. This law, taken together with the above-mentioned decision of the Federal Diet, also speaks in my favour.
Under Paragraph 15, 1 and 3, a subject loses his Prussian citizenship if he asks to be relieved of it or if he has resided abroad for ten years. After the revolution many political refugees who had been abroad for more than ten years returned home and so had lost their rights as Prussians under Paragraph 15 of the above-mentioned law as much as I have. Some of them, Herr J. Venedey, for example, even sit in the German National Assembly. Thus, if they wanted to, the Prussian "police authorities" (Paragraph 5 of the law) could likewise refuse Prussian citizenship to these German legisla-tors!
Finally, I deem it to be thoroughly improper that the local royal administration or Police Superintendent Geiger uses the word "subject" in the notice sent to me, considering that both the former and the present Ministry have barred this designation from all official documents and speak instead only of citizens. It is equally improper, disregarding for the moment my right to Prussian citizenship, to label me, a citizen of the German Empire, as a "foreigner".
Furthermore, if the royal administration "in view of my position up to now" refuses to confirm my Prussian citizenship, it cannot refer to my material circumstances since, even according to the text of the law of December 31, 1842, only the City Council of Cologne could decide this issue and has done so in my favour. Thus it can only refer to my activities as editor-in-chief of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung and that means in view of my democratic attitude and my opposition to the present Government. But even if the local district administration or the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin should have the authority, which I deny, to withhold from me my Prussian citizenship because this is a special case which comes under the decision of the Federal Diet of March 30, such tendentious reasons could only be employed in the old police state, not however by revolutionary Prussia and her responsible Government.
Finally, I must mention that Police Superintendent Müller, upon my comment that I could not transfer my family from Trier to Cologne under these uncertain circumstances, assured me that there would be no objections to my renaturalisation.
For all of these reasons I demand that you, Herr Minister, instruct the local royal district administration to confirm my right (request) to take up residence which was approved by the local City Council, and thereby to restore my Prussian citizenship to me.
Please, Herr Minister, accept the assurances of my perfect esteem.
Cologne, August 22, 1848
Karl Marx
108. The Danish Armistice
Cologne, September 7.
"What will become of Germany if she is no longer led by Prussia, if Prussia's armies no longer protect Germany's honour, if Prussia's strength and influence as a great power perish in the fanciful might of an imaginary German Central Authority!"
Thus boasts the Prussian party, the party of the heroes "with God for King and Fatherland",[3] the counter-revolutionary knighthood of Further Pomerania and the Uckermark.
Well, Prussia has led, Prussia has protected Germany's honour, in Schleswig-Holstein.
And what was the result? After a series of easy, inglorious victories over a weak enemy, after a warfare which was paralysed by the most pusillanimous diplomacy, after the most disgraceful retreats before a beaten army, finally, an armistice which is so dishonourable for Germany that even a Prussian generalb found reason not to sign it.
The hostilities and negotiations began anew. The Imperial Regent0 authorised the Prussian Government to conclude an armistice. This authorisation had not been countersigned by any of the Imperial Ministers and it did not therefore possess any validity whatsoever. It recognised the first armistice, but with the following modifications: 1. Even before the conclusion of the armistice, the members of the new Government of Schleswig-Holstein "are to be agreed upon in such a manner that the permanency and the salutary effectiveness of the new Government appear safeguarded". 2. All the laws and decrees of the Provisional Government issued before the conclusion of the armistice are to retain full validity. 3. All the troops that remain behind in Schleswig-Holstein are to remain under the command of the German commander-in-chief.
If one compares this directive with the stipulations of the first Prussian-Danish project, then its purpose becomes quite evident. It certainly does not secure all that victorious Germany could have demanded, but by making quite a few concessions for form's sake, it saves many matters in effect.
The first stipulation was intended to guarantee that within the new Government the Schleswig-Holstein (German) influence would retain predominance over the Danish. And what does Prussia do? It agrees that Karl Moltke, the head of the Danish party in Schleswig-Holstein, becomes the head of the new Government and that Denmark obtains three votes in the Government against two for Schleswig-Holstein.
The second stipulation was supposed to accomplish the recognition although not of the Provisional Government itself which had been recognised by the Federal Diet, but of its activity up to now. Its decisions were to be maintained. And what does Prussia do? Under the pretext that Denmark, too, will drop its illusory decisions issued from Copenhagen for the duchies, and which never acquired even the shadow of legal force except upon the Island of Alsen,(1) under this pretext, counter-revolutionary Prussia agrees to nullify all decisions of the Provisional Government.
The third stipulation finally was to bring about the provisional recognition of the unity of the duchies and their incorporation into Germany. By placing all troops remaining in Schleswig and Holstein under the German commander-in-chief, it was supposed to thwart the attempt of the Danes to smuggle the Schleswigers serving in the Danish army back into Schleswig. And Prussia? Prussia agrees to separate the Schleswig troops from the Holstein troops, to remove them from the supreme command of the German general and to put them simply at the disposal of the new Government which is [3]/sth Danish.
Besides, Prussia was only authorised to conclude an armistice of three months (Article 1 of the original draft) but concluded one of seven months on its own authority, i.e. it granted a truce to the Danes during the winter months when the chief weapon of the Danes, their fleet, became useless for a blockade of the German and Schleswig coasts and during a time when the cold would have enabled the Germans to cross the ice of the Little Belt, to conquer Fünen (2) and to limit Denmark to Zealand.
In short, Prussia has spurned its authority in respect of all three points. And then why not? After all, it had not been countersigned] And did not Herr Camphausen, the Prussian envoy to the Central Authority, state point-blank in his communication of September 2 to "His Excellency"(!!) Herr Heckscher that on the basis of that authority the Prussian Government
"considered itself empowered to negotiate without any restrictions"?
But that is not all. The Imperial Regent sends "his" Under-Secretary of State Max Gagern to Berlin and from there to Schleswig in order to supervise the negotiations. He sends along with him an authorisation which once again is not countersigned. Herr Gagern — we do not know how he was treated in Berlin — arrives in the duchies. The Prussian negotiators are in Malmö. He is not told anything. The ratifications are exchanged in Lübeck. Herr Gagern is informed that this has taken place and that he can now calmly go home again. Naturally there is nothing left to do for the unfortunate Gagern with his not countersigned authorisation but to return to Frankfurt and to bemoan the shabby role which he has played.
Thus the glorious armistice was born which ties the Germans' hands during the most favourable time for war, which dissolves the revolutionary Government and democratic Constituent Assembly of Schleswig-Holstein, which destroys all decrees of this Government— a Government that the Federal Diet had recognised — which delivers the duchies to a Danish Government led by the hated Moltke, which pulls the Schleswig troops out of their regiments, withdraws them from the German supreme command and delivers them up to the Danish Government that may dissolve them at its discretion, which forces the German troops to withdraw from Königsau(3) to Hanover and Mecklenburg and which delivers Lauenburg into the hands of the old reactionary Danish Government.(4)
Not just Schleswig-Holstein, but all Germany, with the exception of old parts of Prussia, is enraged about this ignominious armistice.
The Imperial Government, to be sure, trembled at first upon being informed about it by Herr Camphausen but in the end it shouldered the responsibility for it after all. What else could it have done? Herr Camphausen seems to have threatened and official Prussia is still a power for the cowardly counter-revolutionary Imperial Government. But now it was the turn of the National Assembly. Its approval was necessary, and edifying as this Assembly is, "His Excellency" Herr Heckscher was nevertheless ashamed to come forward with this official document. He read it aloud to the accompaniment of a thousand bows and the most humble pleas for calm and moderation. The result was a general outburst. Even the Right Centre, indeed a part of the Right and Herr Dahlmann himself flew into the most violent fit of anger. The committees were ordered to report within 24 hours. In view of this report, it was decided to discontinue immediately the retreat of the troops. No decision has yet been taken concerning the armistice itself.
The National Assembly for once has finally passed an energetic resolution even though the Government declared that it would resign, if the resolution is carried. This resolution is not the cancellation but a breach of the armistice. In the duchies it will create not only excitement but open opposition to the execution of the armistice and to the new Government and it will bring about new complications.
But we have little hope that the Assembly will repudiate the armistice. Herr Radowitz only needs to obtain nine votes from the Centre and he has a majority. And should he not be able to do that during the few days when the matter rests?
If the Assembly decides to uphold the armistice, we shall have the proclamation of a republic and civil war in Schleswig-Holstein, the subjugation of the Central Authority by Prussia, the universal contempt of all Europe for the Central Authority and the Assembly and yet just enough complications as will suffice to crush any future Imperial Government under unsolvable difficulties.
If it decides to discard the armistice, we shall have another European war, a rupture between Prussia and Germany, new revolutions, the disintegration of Prussia and the genuine unification of Germany. The Assembly should not let itself be intimidated: at least two-thirds of Prussia supports Germany.
But will the representatives of the bourgeoisie at Frankfurt not rather swallow any insult and will they not rather place themselves under Prussian servitude than risk a European revolutionary war and expose themselves to new storms which would endanger their own class rule in Germany?
We believe that they will. Their cowardly bourgeois nature is too powerful. We do not have enough confidence in the Frankfurt Assembly to believe that it will redeem in Schleswig-Holstein Germany's honour which it has already sacrificed in Poland.
Written by Engels on September 7, 1848
109. Editorial Note Accompanying the Article " The Financial Project of the Left"[272]
We find it hard to understand that deputies on the Left submit financial plans for the procurement of the necessary funds to a Ministry that they intend to overthrow. The principal and in Herr Hansemann's case perhaps the only means of overthrowing a Ministry is precisely the refusal of funds. If at least some reforms had been included in the financial plan — but no, its aim is to spare the Government the hated measure of a compulsory loan. But what could be better for the opposition than the Ministry making itself hated?
Written by Engels on September 8, 1848
110. The Fall of the Government of Action
Cologne, September 8, 10 p. m. The Government of Action has fallen. After it had "stumbled" several times, it was only able to stay in office by insolence. Finally, the constantly rising pretensions of the Government revealed the secret of its existence to the Assembly.
In yesterday's session of the Agreement Assembly Stein's motion[273] was debated. The motion reads:
"It was the urgent duty of the Government to issue without more ado the decree which was approved on August 9 to pacify the country and avoid a break with the Assembly."
The Government declared that it would not consider any attempt at whitewashing or mediation.
The Left declared that it would walk out if the Assembly were to drop its resolution of August 9.
After a meaningless speech by the Prime Minister,[3] Deputy Unruh introduced the following amendment at yesterday's session:
"Taking into account that the resolutions of August 9 do not constitute any investigation into attitudes or any constraint of conscience, but that they merely intend to bring about the agreement between the people and the army which is necessary in a constitutional state and that it is their purpose to avoid reactionary endeavours as well as further conflicts between the citizens who belong to the army and those who are civilians", the Assembly declares
"that the Government does not possess the confidence of the country if it hesitates any further to issue to the army a decree which corresponds to the resolution of August 9."
Rudolf von Auerswald.— Ed.
This amendment of the Left Centre was opposed by a second one from the Right Centre advanced by Deputy Tamnau. It reads:
"The National Assembly wishes to make the following declaration: by its resolution of August 9 of this year, the National Assembly intended to bring about a decree to the commanders of the army similar to the one promulgated by the Ministries of Finance and of the Interior to the Regierungspräsidenten on July 15. It does not intend to oblige the officers of the army to set forth their political views or to prescribe to the Minister of War the text of the decree. It regards such a decree, in which the officers of the army are warned against reactionary and republican endeavours, as necessary in the interest of civil peace and for the advancement of the new constitutional state system."
After the debate had gone on for some time, the "noble" Schreckenstein declared on behalf of the Government that he agreed with the Tamnau amendment. And this after the proud protestation that it would not accept any mediation!
After the debate had continued again for some time and after even Herr Milde had warned the Assembly not to become a revolutionary National Convention (Herr Milde's fear is entirely superfluous!) a vote is taken with an enormous throng of people pressing towards the meeting hall:
The result of the division: The Unruh amendment was rejected by 320 votes to 38. The Tamnau amendment was rejected by 210 votes to 156. The Stein motion was adopted by 219 votes to 152. The majority against the Ministers:
67 votes. One of our Berlin correspondents reports: Today the excitement in the city was great. Thousands of people surroundçd the meeting house of the Assembly, so that, when the President read the quite loyal address of the civic militia, Herr Reichensperger moved that the Assembly shift its sessions to another town since Berlin was endangered.
Indescribable rejoicing broke out when news of the Government's defeat became known to the assembled crowd, and when the deputies of the Left came out, they were accompanied as far as Unter den Linden by incessant "Vivats!" But when Deputy Stein (the mover of today's vote) was caught sight of, the enthusiasm reached its climax. Several men from the people immediately lifted him upon their shoulders and carried him thus in a triumphal procession to his hotel in the Taubenstrasse. Thousands of people joined this procession and to the accompaniment of endless hurrahs the masses rolled across the Opera House Square. Never before has such an expression of joy been seen here. The greater the previous anxiety about success, the more surprising the brilliant victory.
Against the Government voted: the Left, the Left Centre (the Rodbertus-Berg party) and the Centre (Unruh, Duncker, Kosch). The President[3] voted for the Government on all three issues. According to this, a Waldeck-Rodbertus Government will enjoy an absolute majority.
Thus in a few days we shall have the pleasure of seeing the author of the compulsory loan, the Minister of action, "His Excellency" Herr Hansemann, pass through here in order to return to his "bourgeois[8]
past" and to reflect on Duchâtel and Pinto.
Camphausen fell respectably. Herr Hansemann who brought about Camphausen's fall by his intrigues, Herr Hansemann has met with a very sad end! Poor Hansemann-Pinto!
Written by Engels on September 8, 1848
Wilhelm Grabow.— Ed. In the original bürgerlich, which can mean "civil" or "bourgeois".— Ed.
111. His Successors
Cologne, September 9. So the prospect is held out of a Waldeck-Rodbertus Ministry. We do not believe it. The King[3] will hardly submit to these gentlemen's demands, especially since his journey to Cologne.[274] Consequently there is no other choice than Radowitz and Vincke, an open break with the Assembly, an open break with the revolution — and there is no need to say what will follow next.
Written by Engels on September 9, 1848
112. The Danish-Prussian Armistice
Cologne, September 9. Again we revert to the Danish armistice — we are given time to do this owing to the thoroughness of the National Assembly, which, instead of taking prompt and energetic decisions and compelling the appointment of new Ministers, allows the committees to deliberate in the most leisurely manner and leaves the solution of the government crisis to God — a thoroughness which barely conceals "our dear friends' lack of courage".[3]
The war in Italy was always unpopular with the democratic party , and has for a long time been unpopular even with the democrats of Vienna. The storm of public indignation over the war of extermination in Posen could be staved off only for a few weeks by means of falsifications and lies on the part of the Prussian Government. The street-fighting in Prague,(1) despite all the efforts of the national press, aroused sympathy among the people only for the defeated, but not for the victors. The war in Schleswig-Holstein, however, from the outset was popular also among the people. What is the reason?
Whereas in Italy, Posen and Prague the Germans were fighting against the revolution, in Schleswig-Holstein they were supporting it. The Danish war is the first revolutionary war waged by Germany. We therefore advocated a resolute conduct of the Danish war from the very beginning, but this does not denote the slightest kinship with the sea-girt bourgeois beer-garden enthusiasm.
It is a sad thing for Germany that her first revolutionary war is the most ridiculous war ever waged.
Let us come to the point. The Danish nation is in commercial, industrial, political and literary matters completely dependent on Germany. It is well known that the real capital of Denmark is not Copenhagen but Hamburg; that for a whole year the Danish Government copied all the United Diet experiments conducted by the Prussian Government which expired on the barricades; that Denmark obtains all her literary as well as material sustenance via Germany, and that apart from Holberg, Danish literature is a poor imitation of that of Germany.
Impotent though Germany has been from time immemorial, she has the satisfaction of knowing that the Scandinavian nations, and especially Denmark, have fallen under her sway, and that compared with them she is even revolutionary and progressive.
Do you require proofs? Then read the polemics carried on by the Scandinavian nations against each "other ever since the concept of Scandinavianism arose. Scandinavianism is enthusiasm for the brutal, sordid, piratical, Old Norse national traits, for that deep-rooted inner life which is unable to express its exuberant ideas and sentiments in words, but can express them only in deeds, namely in rudeness towards women, perpetual drunkenness and wild berserk frenzy alternating with tearful sentimentality.
Scandinavianism and the theory of kinship with sea-girt Schleswig-Holstein[3] appeared simultaneously in the territories of the King of Denmark. The two concepts are correlated; they evoked each other and were in conflict with each other, thereby asserting their existence.
Scandinavianism was the form taken by the Danes' appeals for Swedish and Norwegian support. But as always happens with the Christian-Teutonic nation, a dispute immediately arose as to who was .the genuine Christian-Teuton, the true Scandinavian. The Swede contended that the Dane had become "Germanised" and had degenerated, the Norwegian said the same of the Swede and the Dane, and the Icelander of all three. Obviously, the more primitive a nation is, the more closely its customs and way of life resemble those of the Old Norse people, the more "Scandinavian" it must be.
Morgenbladet from Christiania(2) for November 18, 1846, is lying in front of us. This charming sheet contains the following amusing passages in an article on Scandinavianism.
A paraphrase of the first words of a song written in 1844 by Matthäus Friedrich Chemnitz.— Ed.
After stating that the whole concept of Scandinavianism is nothing but an attempt by the Danes to create a movement in their own interest, the paper writes about the Danes:
"What have these gay, vivacious people in common with the ancient, gloomy and melancholy world of warriors (med den garnie, alvorlige og vemodsfulde Kjämpeverden)^ How can this nation, which — as even a Danish writer admits — has a docile and gentle disposition, believe itself to be spiritually related to the tough, lusty and vigorous men of a past age? And how can these people with their soft southern accent imagine that they speak a northern tongue? Although the main trait of our nation and the Swedes, like that of the ancient Northerners, is that our feelings are kept hidden in the innermost part of the soul, and not given outward expression, nevertheless these sentimental and affectionate people, who can so easily be astonished, moved and swayed and who wear their hearts upon their sleeves, nevertheless these people believe that they are of a northern cast and that they are akin to the two other Scandinavian nations!"
Morgenbladet attributes the degeneration of the Danes to their association with Germany and the spread of German traits in Denmark. The Germans have indeed
"lost their most sacred asset, their national character; but feeble and insipid though the German nation is, there is another nation still more feeble and insipid, namely the Danes. While the German language is being ousted in Alsace, Vaud and on the Slav border" (!! the services of the "Netze brethren" still remained unnoticed at the time) "it has made enormous progress along the Danish border."
The Danes, we are told, now had to oppose their nationality to the Germans and fpr this purpose they invented Scandinavianism. The Danes were unable to resist,
"for the Danish nation, as we have said before, was essentially Germanised, although it did not adopt the German language. The writer of these lines has seen it admitted even in a Danish paper that the Danish nation does not differ essentially from the German nation."
Thus Morgenbladet. Of course, it cannot be denied that the Danes are a more or less civilised nation. Unfortunate Danes!
By the same right under which France took Flanders, Lorraine and Alsace, and will sooner or later take Belgium — by that same right Germany takes over Schleswig; it is the right of civilisation as against barbarism, of progress as against stability. Even if the agreements were in Denmark's favour — which is very doubtful — this right carries more weight than all the agreements, for it is the right of historical evolution.
So long as the Schleswig-Holstein movement remained a purely legal philistine agitation of a civic and peaceful nature it evoked enthusiasm only among well-meaning petty bourgeois. When, before the outbreak of the February revolution, the present King of Denmark[2] at his accession promised a liberal Constitution for all his territories, envisaging the same number of deputies for the duchies as for Denmark, and the duchies were opposed to this, the petty-bourgeois parochial nature of the Schleswig-Holstein movement became distastefully conspicuous. The issue, at that time, was not so much union with Germany — did a Germany exist at that time?—as separation from Denmark and establishment of a small independent parochial state.
But then came the revolution, which gave the movement a different character. The Schleswig-Holstein party was forced either to attempt a revolution or to perish. It quite correctly chose the revolution. The Danish promises, which were very favourable before the revolution, were quite inadequate after the revolution; union with Germany — formerly an empty phrase — now acquired meaning. Germany made a revolution and as usual Denmark copied it on a small provincial scale.
The Schleswig-Holstein revolution and the Provisional Government to which it gave rise behaved at first still in a rather philistine way, but the war soon compelled them to adopt a democratic course. This Government, whose members are all moderate liberal worthies, formerly kindred spirits of Welcker, Gagern and Camphausen, has given Schleswig-Holstein laws which are more democratic than those of any other German state. The Kiel Provincial Assembly is the only German assembly based not only on universal suffrage but on direct elections. The draft Constitution which the Government submitted to it was the most democratic Constitution ever drawn up in the German language. As a result of the revolutionary war, Schleswig-Holstein, which had always trailed behind Germany in political matters, suddenly acquired more progressive institutions than all the rest of Germany.
The war we are waging in Schleswig-Holstein is therefore a truly revolutionary war.
And who, from the outset, supported Denmark? The three most counter-revolutionary powers in Europe—Russia, England and the Prussian Government. As long as it was possible the Prussian Government merely pretended to be waging a war—this is evidenced by Wildenbruch's Note,[276] by the alacrity with which the Prussian Government, on the representations of England and Russia, ordered the withdrawal from Jutland, and finally by the two armistice agreements. Prussia, England and Russia are the three powers which have greater reason than anyone else to fear the German revolution and its first result — German unity: Prussia because she would thereby cease to exist, England because it would deprive her of the possibility of exploiting the German market, and Russia "because it would spell the advance of democracy not only to the Vistula but even as far as the Dvina and the Dnieper. Prussia, England and Russia have conspired against Schleswig-Holstein, against Germany and against the revolution.
The war that may now arise from the decisions taken at Frankfurt would be a war waged by Germany against Prussia, England and Russia. This is just the kind of war that the flagging German movement needs — a war against the three great counter-revolutionary powers, a war which would really cause Prussia to merge into Germany, which would make an alliance with Poland an indispensable necessity and would lead to the immediate liberation of Italy; a war which would be directed against Germany's old counter-revolutionary allies of 1792-1815, a war which would "imperil the fatherland" and for that very reason save it by making the victory of Germany dependent on the victory of democracy.
The bourgeois and the junkers at Frankfurt should not deceive themselves — if they decide to reject the armistice they will be setting the seal to their own downfall, just as the Girondists did during the first revolution when they took part in the events of August 10 and voted for the death of the ex-King,(3) thereby preparing their own downfall on May 31.[277] If, on the other hand, they accept the armistice, they will still be sealing their own downfall: they will be placing themselves under the jurisdiction of Prussia and cease to have any say in things. It is up to them to choose.
The news of Hansemann's downfall probably reached Frankfurt before the vote was taken. This may influence the vote significantly, especially since it is expected that a Government of Waldeck and Rodbertus will follow who, as we know, recognise the sovereignty of the National Assembly.
The future will show. But we repeat — Germany's honour is in bad hands!
Written by Engels on September 9, 1848
113. Arrests
Cologne, September 11. We are addressing the following request for information to whichever gentlemen in the Public Prosecutor's department it may concern:
Is it true that at 8 o'clock yesterday evening Herr Salget and Herr Blum Jr., from Cologne, who had already formed a workers' association in Cassel, were arrested in Wesseling, by the Burgomaster Herr von Geier, on the instigation of the parson? They had intended to form a workers' association[3] in Wesseling too, but were arrested before they had even spoken a word in public and before the meeting had begun.
Is it true that the only reason for this arrest, which did in fact take place, was the pastor's denunciation that the two gentlemen wanted (!) to stir up the workers?
Assuming that this is how matters stand, will the Public Prosecutor take steps to deal with this outrageous infringement of the law or — in expectation of the Radowitz Ministry and of the speedy abolition of the right of free association — will he give Herr von Geier a vote of thanks?
Written by Engels on September 11,1848
114. The Crisis and the Counter-Revolution
[Neue Rheinische Zeitung No. 100, September 12, 1848]
Cologne, September 11. Anyone reading the reports from Berlin printed below can judge for himself whether we predicted the course of the government crisis correctly. The Ministers resigned; it seems that the camarilla did not approve of the Government's plan to dissolve the Agreement Assembly and to use martial law and guns in order to remain in office. The junkers from the Uckermark are thirsting for a conflict with the people and a repetition of the Parisian June scenes in the streets of Berlin, but they will never fight for the Hansemann Government, they will fight for a Government of the Prince of Prussia. The choice will fall on Radowitz, Vincke and similar reliable men who keep aloof from the Berlin Assembly and are in no way committed to it. The Government of the Prince of Prussia which is to be bestowed on us will comprise the cream of the Prussian and Westphalian knights associated for form's sake with a few bourgeois worthies from the extreme Right, such as Beckerath and his like, to whom will be assigned the conduct of the prosaic commercial side of the business of state. Meanwhile hundreds of rumours are being spread, Waldeck or Rodbertus is perhaps summoned, and public opinion is misled, while at the same time military preparations are being made to come out openly at the appropriate moment.
We are facing a decisive struggle. The simultaneous crises at Frankfurt and Berlin and the latest decisions of the two Assemblies compel the counter-revolution to wage its last fight. If the counter-revolution in Berlin dares to spurn the constitutional principle of majority rule, if it confronts the 219 members of the majority with twice as many guns, if it dares to defy the majority not only in Berlin but also in Frankfurt by presenting to them a Government which is quite unacceptable to either of the two Assemblies — if it thus provokes a civil war between Prussia and Germany, then the democrats know what they have to do.
[Neue Rheinische Zeitung No. 101, September 13, 1848]
Cologne, September 12. Although already by midday we may receive news of the definite formation of a new Government as described by us yesterday and confirmed from other quarters, the government crisis in Berlin continues. There are only two solutions to this crisis:
Either a Waldeck Government, recognition of the authority of the German National Assembly and recognition of popular sovereignty;
Or a Radowitz-Vincke Government, dissolution of the Berlin Assembly, abolition of the revolutionary gains, a sham constitutionalism or even the United Diet.
Don't let us shut our eyes to the fact that the conflict which has broken out in Berlin is a conflict not between the agreers and the Ministers, but between the Assembly, which for the first time acts as a Constituent Assembly, and the Crown.
The point is whether or not the latter will have the courage to dissolve the Assembly.
But has the Crown the right to dissolve the Assembly? True, in constitutional states the Crown in case of disputes has the right to dissolve the legislative chambers convened on the basis of the Constitution and to appeal to the people by means of new elections.
Is the Berlin Assembly a constitutional, legislative chamber? It is not. It has been convened "to come to an agreement with the Crown on the Prussian Constitution", it has been convened not on the basis of a Constitution, but on that of a revolution. It received its mandate by no means from the Crown or from the Ministers answerable to the Crown, but from those who elected it and from the Assembly itself. The Assembly was sovereign as the legitimate expression of the revolution, and the mandate which Herr Camphausen jointly with the United Diet prepared for it in the shape of the electoral law of April 8 was nothing but a pious wish, in regard to which the Assembly had to decide.
At first the Assembly more or less accepted the theory of agreement. It realised that in doing so it had been cheated by the Ministers and the camarilla. At last it performed a sovereign act, acting for a moment as a constituent assembly and no longer as an Assembly of Agreement.
Being the sovereign Assembly of Prussia, it had a perfect right to do this.
A sovereign assembly, however, cannot be dissolved by anybody, and cannot be given orders by anybody.
Even as a mere Agreement Assembly, even according to Herr Camphausen's own theory, it has equal status with the Crown. Both parties conclude a political treaty, both parties have an equal share of sovereignty — that is the theory of April 8, the Camphausen-Hansemann theory, the official theory recognised by the Crown itself.
If the Assembly and the Crown have equal rights, then the Crown has no right to dissolve the Assembly.
Otherwise, to be consistent, the Assembly would also have the right to depose the King.
The dissolution of the Assembly would therefore be a coup d'état. And how people reply to a coup d'état was demonstrated on July 29, 1830, and February 24, 1848.(1)
One may say the Crown could appeal again to the same voters. But who does not know that today the voters would elect an entirely different assembly, an assembly which would treat the Crown with much less ceremony?
Everyone knows that after the dissolution of this Assembly it will only be possible to appeal to voters of an entirely different kind from those of April 8, that the only elections possible will be elections carried through under the tyranny of the sword.
Let us have no illusions. If the Assembly wins and succeeds in setting up a Left Government, then the power of the Crown existing alongside the Assembly is broken, then the King is merely a paid servant of the people and we return again to the morning of March 19 — provided the Waldeck Government does not betray us, as did many a Government before it.
If the Crown wins and succeeds in setting up a Government of the Prince of Prussia, then the Assembly will be dissolved, the right of association abolished, the press muzzled, an electoral law based on property qualifications introduced, and, as we have already mentioned, even the United Diet may be reinvoked — and all this will be done under cover of a military dictatorship, guns and bayonets.
Which of the two sides will win depends on the attitude of the people, especially that of the democratic party. It is up to the democrats to choose.
We have again the situation of July 25. Will they dare to issue the decrees being devised in Potsdam? Will the people be provoked to make the leap from July 26 to February 24 in a single day?
The will to do it is certainly there, but what about the courage!
[Neue Rheinische Zeitung No. 102, September 14, 1848]
Cologne, September 13. The crisis in Berlin has advanced a step further. The conflict with the Crown, which yesterday could still be described as inevitable, has actually taken place.
Our readers will find below the King's reply to the resignation of the Ministers.[280] By this letter the Crown itself comes to the fore, sides with the Ministers and opposes the Assembly.
It goes even further — it forms a Government outside the Assembly, it nominates Beckerath, who represents the extreme Right at Frankfurt and who, as everyone knows, will never be able to count on the support of the majority in Berlin.
The King's message is countersigned by Herr Auerswald. Let Herr Auerswald, if he can, justify the fact that he thus uses the Crown to cover up his ignominious retreat, that at one and the same time he tries to hide behind the constitutional principle as far as the Chamber is concerned and tramples on the constitutional principle by compromising the Crown and invoking the republic.
Constitutional principle! shout the Ministers. Constitutional principle! shouts the Right. Constitutional principle! faintly echoes the
Kölnische Zeitung.
"Constitutional principle!" Are these gentlemen really so foolish as to believe that it is possible to extricate the German people from the storms of 1848, and from the imminent threat of collapse of all traditional institutions, by means of the Montesquieu-Delolme worm-eaten theory of division of powers, by means of worn-out phrases and long exploded fictions!
"Constitutional principle!" But the very gentlemen who want to save the constitutional principle at all costs should realise first of all that at a provisional stage it can only be saved by energetic action.
"Constitutional principle!" But the vote of the Berlin Assembly, the clashes between Potsdam and Frankfurt, the disturbances, the reactionary attempts, the provocations of the brutal soldiery — has all this not shown long ago that despite all the empty talk we are still on a revolutionary basis, and the pretence that we have already reached the basis of an established, complete constitutional monarchy only leads to collisions, which have already brought the "constitutional principle" to the brink of the abyss?
Every provisional political set-up following a revolution requires a dictatorship, and an energetic dictatorship at that. From the very beginning we blamed Camphausen for not having acted in a dictatorial manner, for not having immediately smashed up and removed the remains of the old institutions. While thus Herr Camphausen indulged in constitutional dreaming, the defeated party strengthened its positions within the bureaucracy and in the army, and occasionally even risked an open fight. The Assembly was convened for the purpose of agreeing on the terms of the Constitution. It existed as an equal party alongside the Crown. Two equal powers in a provisional situation! It was this division of powers with the aid of which Herr Camphausen sought "to save freedom"—it was this very division of powers in a provisional situation that was bound to lead to conflicts. The Crown served as a cover for the counter-revolutionary aristocratic, military and bureaucratic camarilla. The bourgeoisie stood behind the majority of the Assembly. The Government tried to mediate. Too weak to act resolutely on behalf of the bourgeoisie and the peasants and overthrow the power of the nobility, the bureaucracy and the army chiefs at one blow, too unskilled to avoid always harming the bourgeoisie by its financial measures, the Government merely succeeded in compromising itself in the eyes of all the parties and bringing about the very clash it sought to avoid.
In any unconstituted state of affairs it is solely the salut public, the public welfare, and not this or that principle that is the decisive factor. The only way in which the Government could avoid a conflict between the Assembly and the Crown lay in recognising the public welfare as the sole principle, even at the risk of the Government itself coming into conflict with the Crown. But it preferred "not to compromise" itself in Potsdam. It never hesitated to employ public welfare measures (mesures de salut public), dictatorial measures, against the democratic forces. What else was the application of the old laws to political crimes, even after Herr Märker had recognised that these articles of the Prussian Law ought to be repealed? What else were the wholesale arrests in all parts of the kingdom?
But the Government carefully refrained from intervening against the counter-revolution in the name of public welfare.
It was this half-heartedness of the Government in face of the counter-revolution, which became more menacing with every day,
16-3447 that compelled the Assembly itself to dictate measures of public welfare. If the Crown represented by the Ministers was too weak, then the Assembly itself had to intervene. It did so by passing the resolution of August 9. It did so in a form still rather mild, by merely warning the Ministers. The Ministers took no notice of it. [81]
Indeed, how could they have agreed to it? The resolution of August 9 flouted the constitutional principle, it is an encroachment of the legislative power on the executive power, it destroys the division of powers and their mutual control, which are essential in the interests of freedom, it turns the Assembly of Agreement into a National Convention.
There follows a running fire of threats, a vociferous appeal to the fears of the petty bourgeois and the prospect of a reign of terror with guillotines, progressive taxes, confiscations and the red flag.
To compare the Berlin Assembly with the Convention. What irony!
But these gentlemen were not altogether wrong. If the Government continues in the way it has been doing, we shall have a Convention before long — not merely for Prussia, but for Germany as a whole — a Convention which will have to use all means to cope with the civil war in our twenty Vendees and with the inevitable war with Russia. At present, however, we merely have a parody of the Constituent Assembly.[282]
But how have the Ministers who invoke the constitutional principle upheld this principle?
On August 9, they calmly allowed the Assembly to break up in the belief that the Ministers would carry out the resolution. They had no intention of making known to the Assembly their refusal to do so, and still less of resigning their office.
They ruminated on the matter for a whole month and finally, when threatened with a number of parliamentary questions, they curtly informed the Assembly that it was self-evident that they would not put the resolution into effect.
When the Assembly thereupon instructs the Ministers, nevertheless, to put the resolution into effect, they take refuge behind the Crown, and cause a rupture between the Crown and the Assembly, thus invoking the republic.
And these gentlemen still talk about the constitutional principle! To sum up: The inevitable conflict between two powers having equal rights in a provisional situation has broken out. The Ministry was unable to govern with sufficient energy; it has failed to take the necessary measures of public welfare. The Assembly has merely performed its duty in demanding that the Ministry do its duty. The Ministry declares this to be an encroachment upon the rights of the Crown and discredits the Crown at the very moment of its resignation. The Crown and the Assembly confront each other. The "agreement" has led to separation, to conflict. It is possible that arms will decide the issue.
The side that has the greater courage and consistency will win.
[Neue Rheinische Zeitung No. 104, September 16, 1848]
Cologne, September 15. The government crisis has once again entered a new phase, due, not to the arrival and vain efforts of the impossible Herr Beckerath, but to the army revolt in Potsdam and Nauen.[28]* The conflict between democracy and aristocracy has broken out even within the guard regiments. The soldiers consider that the resolution carried by the Assembly on the 7th liberates them from the tyranny of their officers; they cheer the Assembly and send letters of thanks to it.
This has wrenched the sword from the hands of the counter-revolutionaries. They will not dare now to dissolve the Assembly, and since this cannot be attempted, they will have to give in, carry out the resolution of the Assembly and form a Waldeck Ministry.
It is quite possible that the soldiers in revolt at Potsdam will save us a revolution.
Written by Marx on September 11, 12, 13 and 15, 1848
115. Army Order, Election Candidates, Semi-Official Comments on Prussian Ambiguity
We have received Danish newspapers up to September 9. An army order of September 4 gives the following instructions: General Krogh takes over command in Jutland, headquarters Viborg. For the duration of the armistice the garrison in Alsen(1) has a special command. The corps in the field is quartered as far as possible in its recruiting areas and is therefore spread across Jutland and the islands. Forty to fifty men per company remain under arms, the rest will be sent home on leave, and the brigade commanders are instructed to inspect their troops frequently and prepare for a new campaign. However, since the King(2) wants to make a personal inspection of the troops before they go on leave, these decisions will not be carried out until further orders. It is also unlikely that they will be, for as the postscript of the Faedreland announced on the 9th, news of the decision passed by the National Assembly about suspending the withdrawal has just reached Copenhagen in private letters.
The Danes can rely fairly firmly on the troops recruited in North Schleswig, this is evident from the fact that it was precisely these sections of the army that were moved to the vicinity of the Schleswig frontier or Alsen.
The liberal party in Copenhagen has put forward its list of candidates for the approaching elections. The representatives of the middle class, the editors of the Faedreland and other "men of the people" of the "constitutional monarchy established on a democratic basis" (note how thoroughly the Danes have plagiarised the Germans) have met to draw up the list. It consists of a bank manager, a director of a life-insurance institution, two schoolmasters, an attorney, a lieutenant-colonel, a naval officer, two artisans and a "disvacheur" (!). It can be seen what sort of intellectual forces are at the disposal of the " Hovedstad'.(3)
The Prussian Government is unfortunate. In the Danish affair too it has managed to give Prussia a reputation for ambiguity which almost verges on treason against both sides. This ambiguity has always been a well-known feature of Prussian policy; we need only think of the "Great" Elector's[15] betrayal of Poland when he suddenly went over to Sweden, of the Basle Peace, of 1805 and more recently of the ambiguity through which the Ministry enticed Poland into the trap.[284] And now, in the Danish affair, the Prussian Government has abused the interests of the German people and not even earned a word of thanks from Denmark. Let us listen to what the Faedreland says:
"According to the note of the Prussian Prime Minister Auerswald (to the Provisional Government in Rendsburg), which we publish below, it is plain that Prussia is playing a very ambiguous role. In the first place it is extremely surprising that the Prussian Government should have any dealings at all with the rebel Government in the duchies. Furthermore, Herr Auerswald has in more than one respect completely twisted the meaning of the terms of the armistice. Although the armistice was in no way intended to furnish any basis for a final peace, Herr Auerswald nonetheless claims that through it conditions are being prepared that will bring about a favourable final solution. He talks further of the significance of the terms whereby the federal troops are to remain in Schleswig and the Schleswig-Holstein army corps is to continue at its present strength, even though the armistice stipulates that the Schleswig and the Holstein troops should be separated and the federal troops remain in Altona. Lastly, he puts forward a similar falsehood when he says that the legal situation in the duchies is to continue on its present basis, whereas the armistice says that the decrees issued since March 17 both by the King of Denmark and by the Provisional Government should be repealed. As regards the Central Authority, it has shown such a lack of firmness towards the Assembly in its negotiations over Limburg that from that side one can really expect anything."
Written by Engels on September 14, 1848
116. Freedom of Debate in Berlin
Cologne, September 16. Ever since the beginning of the crisis the counter-revolutionary press keeps alleging that the deliberations of the Berlin Assembly are not free from interference. In particular, the well-known correspondent "G" of the Kölnische Zeitung, who also discharges his duties only "temporarily pending the appointment of a successor",[287] refers with obvious fear to the "8,000 to 10,000 strong-arm men" in the Kastanienwäldchen who "morally" support their friends of the Left. The Vossische, Spenersche and other newspapers have set up a similar wail, and on the 7th of this month Herr Reichensperger has even tabled a motion frankly demanding that the Assembly be removed from Berlin (to Charlottenburg perhaps?).
The Berliner Zeitungs-Halle publishes a long article(1) in which it tries to refute these accusations. It declares that the large majority obtained by the Left was by no means inconsistent with the former irresolute attitude of the Assembly. It can be shown, it says,
"that the voting of the 7th could have taken place without conflicting with the former attitude even of those members who previously voted always for the Government, that it was indeed from their point of view in perfect harmony with their former position...." The members who came over from the Centre parties "had laboured under a delusion; they imagined that the Ministers carried out the will of the people; they had taken the endeavours of the Ministers to restore law and order for an expression of their own will, i.e. that of the majority of deputies, and had not realised that the Ministers could accede to the popular will only when it did not run counter to the will of the Crown, but not when it was opposed to it".
"Berlin, 14. September", Berliner Zeitungs-Halle No. 213, September 15, 1848.— Ed.
Thus the Zeitungs-Halle "explains" the striking phenomenon of the sudden change in the attitude of so many deputies by ascribing it to the notions and delusions of these deputies. The thing could not be presented in a more innocent way.
The paper admits, however, that intimidations did occur. But, it says,
"if outside influences did have any effect, it was only that they partially counterbalanced the ministerial misrepresentations and artful temptation, thus enabling the many weak and irresolute deputies to follow their natural vital instinct...."
The reasons which induced the Zeitungs-Halle thus morally to justify the vacillating members of the Centre parties in the eyes of the public are obvious. The article is written for these gentlemen of the Centre parties rather than for the general public. For us, however, these reasons do not exist, since we are privileged to speak plainly, and since we support the representatives of a party only as long and insofar as they act in a revolutionary manner.
Why should we not say it? The Centre parties certainly were intimidated by the masses on September 7(2); we leave it open whether their fear was well founded or not.
The right of the democratic popular masses, by their presence, to exert a moral influence on the attitude of constituent assemblies is an old revolutionary right of the people which could not be dispensed with in all stormy periods ever since the English and French revolutions. History owes to this right almost all the energetic steps taken by such assemblies. The only reason why people dwelling on the "legal basis" and the timorous and philistine friends of "freedom of debate" lament about this right, is that they do not want any energetic decisions at all.
"Freedom of debate"—there is no emptier phrase than this. The "freedom of debate" is, on the one hand, impaired by the freedom of the press, by the freedom of assembly and of speech, and by the right of the people to take up arms. It is impaired by the existing state power in the hands of the Crown and its Ministers — the army, the police and the so-called independent judges, who depend, however, on every promotion and every political change.
The freedom of debate is always a phrase denoting simply independence of all influences that are not recognised in law. It is only the recognised influences, such as bribery, promotion, private interests and fear of a dissolution of the Assembly, that make the debates really "free". In times of revolution, however, this phrase becomes entirely meaningless. When two forces, two parties in arms confront each other, when a fight may start at any moment, the deputies have only this choice:
Either they place themselves under the protection of the people, in which case they will put up occasionally with a small lecture;
Or they place themselves under the protection of the Crown, move to some small town, deliberate under the protection of bayonets and guns or even a state of siege, in which case they will raise no objections when the Crown and the bayonets dictate their decisions to them.
Intimidation by the unarmed people or intimidation by an armed soldiery — that is the choice before the Assembly.
The French Constituent Assembly transferred its sessions from Versailles to Paris. It would be quite in character with the German revolution if the Assembly of Agreement were to move from Berlin to
Charlottenburg.
117. Ratification of the Armistice[1]
Cologne, September 19. The German National Assembly has ratified the armistice. We were not mistaken: "Germany's honour has fallen into bad hands."[3]
The vote was taken amidst uproar and complete darkness, when the benches of the deputies were thronged with strangers, diplomats etc. A majority of two forced the Assembly to vote simultaneously on two entirely different questions. The armistice was carried, Schleswig-Holstein sacrificed, "Germany's honour" trampled under foot and the merging of Germany in Prussia decided by a majority of 21 votes.
On no other issue has there been such a clear expression of public opinion. On no other issue have the gentlemen of the Right so openly admitted that they uphold a cause which is indefensible. In no other issue were Germany's interests so indubitable and so obvious as in this. The National Assembly has made its decision — it has pronounced the death sentence upon itself and upon the so-called Central Authority created by it. If Germany had a Cromwell it would not be long before he would say: "You are no Parliament.... Depart, I say.... In the name of God,—go!"(1)
There is talk of the impending withdrawal of the Left. If it had courage, this poor derided Left, which has been attacked with fists by the majority and in addition called to order by the noble Gagera! Never has a minority been so insolently and consistently maltreated as has been the Frankfurt Left by the noble Gagern and his 250 champions of the majority. If only it had courage!
Lack of courage is ruining the entire German movement. The counter-revolution just as much as the revolutionary party lacks the courage for decisive blows. All Germans, whether on the Right or on the Left, know now that the present movement must lead to terrible clashes, to bloody battles, fought either to suppress it or to carry it through. But instead of courageously facing these unavoidable battles, instead of fighting them out with a few rapid and decisive blows, the two parties — the party of the counter-revolution and that of the movement — virtually conspire to put them off as long as possible. It is due to this constant resort to petty expedients, to trivial concessions and palliatives, to these attempts at mediation, that the unbearable and uncertain political situation has led everywhere to numerous isolated uprisings, which can only be liquidated by bloodshed and the curtailment of rights already won. It is this fear of struggle that gives rise to thousands of minor clashes making the year 1848 exceptionally sanguinary and so complicating the position of the contending parties that in the end the struggle is bound to become the more violent and destructive. But "our dear friends' lack of courage"![3]
The crucial struggle for Germany's centralisation and democratic organisation cannot possibly be avoided. Every day brings it nearer despite all attempts to gloss over it and compromise. The complex situation in Vienna, Berlin and Frankfurt demands a decision, and if everything should fail because of German timidity and indecision, we shall be saved by France. The consequences of the June victory are now taking shape in Paris — the royalists are getting the better of Cavaignac and his "pure republicans" in the National Assembly, in the press and in the clubs; a general uprising is threatening to break out in the legitimist South; Cavaignac has to resort to Ledru-Rollin's revolutionary remedies, i.e. to departmental commissioners invested with extraordinary powers; it was with the greatest difficulty that he managed to defend himself and his Government in Parliament last Saturday. Another such division, and Thiers, Barrot and company, the men in whose interests the June victory was won, will possess a majority, Cavaignac will be thrown into the arms of the red republic, and the struggle for the republic's existence will begin.
If Germany's irresoluteness should persist, this new phase of the French revolution will also be a signal for a fresh outbreak of open struggle in Germany, a struggle which we hope will take us a little further and will at least free Germany from the traditional fetters of her past.
Written by Engels on September 19, 1848
118. The Uprising in Frankfurt
[Neue Rheinische Zeitung No. 107 (supplement), September 20, 1848]
Cologne, September 19, 7 p.m. The German-Danish armistice has raised a storm. A sanguinary revolt has begun in Frankfurt. The workers of Frankfurt, Offenbach and Hanau, and the peasants of the surrounding districts, are defending with their lives Germany's honour betrayed by the National Assembly to a Prussian Government which has ignominiously resigned.
The outcome of the struggle is still uncertain. Until yesterday evening the soldiers apparently made little progress. In Frankfurt, apart from the Zeil and perhaps a few other streets and squares, artillery is of little use, and cavalry of almost no use at all. In this respect the people are in an advantageous position. Citizens of Hanau, armed with weapons from the arsenal they had stormed, have come to their assistance, as have also peasants from numerous villages in the vicinity. Yesterday evening the military probably numbered about 10,000 men and very little artillery. Large reinforcements of peasants must have arrived during the night, and considerably smaller ones of soldiers, the immediate vicinity being denuded of troops. The revolutionary temper of the peasants in the Odenwald, Nassau and the Electorate of Hesse precluded further withdrawals; it is likely that communications have been interrupted. If today the insurgents are still holding out, then the whole of the Odenwald, Nassau, the Electorate of Hesse and Rhenish Hesse will take up arms, the entire population between Fulda, Koblenz, Mannheim and Aschaffenburg will be in arms, and there are insufficient troops available to crush the uprising. And who will answer for Mainz, Mannheim, Marburg, Cassel and Wiesba-den — towns in which hatred of the brutal soldiery has reached its highest pitch as a result of the bloody excesses of the so-called federal troops? Who will answer for the peasants on the Rhine, who can easily prevent troops being sent along the river?
We admit, nevertheless, that we have little hope of the courageous insurgents being able to win the day. Frankfurt is too small a town, the number of troops is disproportionately large, and the well-known counter-revolutionary sentiments of the local petty bourgeoisie are too great to allow us to be very hopeful.
But even if the insurgents are defeated, this will settle nothing. The counter-revolution will become arrogant, it will enslave us for a time by introducing martial law, by suppressing freedom of the press, and banning the clubs and public meetings; but before long the crowing of the Gallic cock(1) will announce the hour of liberation, the hour of revenge.
[Neue Rheinische Zeitung No. 108, September 21, 1848]
Cologne, September 20. The news from Frankfurt is beginning to gradually confirm our fears of yesterday. It seems certain that the insurgents have been ejected from Frankfurt, and that now they are holding only Sachsenhausen, where they are said to be strongly entrenched. A state of siege has been declared in Frankfurt; anyone caught carrying weapons or resisting the "federal authority" is to be court -martialled.
Thus the gentlemen in St. Paul's Church are now on an equal footing with their colleagues in Paris. They can now at their leisure and under the rule of martial law reduce the fundamental rights of the German people to a "minimum".
The railway line to Mainz is torn up in many places, and the post arrives either late or not at all.
It appears that artillery decided the outcome of the fight in the wide streets and enabled the army to attack the fighters on the barricades from the rear. Additional factors were the zeal with which the petty bourgeois of Frankfurt opened their houses to the soldiers, thus giving them every advantage in the street-fighting, and the superior strength of the troops, swiftly brought up by rail, over the peasant contingents, which arrived showly on foot.
But even if the fight has not been renewed in Frankfurt itself, it certainly does not mean that the uprising has been crushed. The angry peasants are not likely to put their weapons down forthwith. Though they may not be able to break up the National Assembly, they still have enough at home that has to be cleared away. The storm that was repelled outside St. Paul's Church can spread to six or eight petty princely residences and to hundreds of manorial estates. The peasant war begun this spring will not come to an end until its goal, the liberation of the peasants from feudalism, has been achieved.
What is the reason for the persistent victory of "order" throughout Europe and for the numerous recurrent defeats of the revolutionary party from Naples, Prague and Paris to Milan, Vienna and Frankfurt?
It is because all parties know that the struggle impending in all civilised countries is quite different from, infinitely more significant than, all previous revolutions; in Vienna and Paris, in Berlin and Frankfurt, in London and Milan the point at issue is the overthrow of the political rule of the bourgeoisie, an upheaval whose immediate consequences are enough to terrify all portly, stockjobbing bourgeois.
Is there a revolutionary centre anywhere in the world where the red flag, the battle emblem of the united proletariat of Europe, has not been found flying on the barricades during the last five months?
In Frankfurt, too, the fight against the Parliament of the combined landowners and bourgeois was waged under the red flag.
The reason for all these defeats is that every uprising that now takes place is a direct threat to the political existence of the bourgeoisie, and an indirect threat to its social existence. The people, mostly unarmed, have to fight not only the organised power of the bureaucratic and military state which the bourgeoisie has taken over, they have to fight the armed bourgeoisie itself. The people, who are unorganised and poorly armed, are confronted by all the other social classes, who are well organised and fully armed. That is the reason why up to now the people have been defeated and will continue to be defeated until their opponents are weakened either through dissension, or because the army is engaged in war — or until some important event impels the people to begin a desperate fight and demoralises their opponents.
Such a great event is impending in France. Hence we need not give up hope, even though during the last four months the barricades everywhere have been defeated by grape-shot. On the contrary, every victory of our opponents was at the same time a defeat for them, for it divided them and, ultimately, gave control not to the conservative party that was victorious in February and March, but in each case to the party that had been overthrown in February and March. Only for a short time did the victory won in Paris in June establish the rule of the petty bourgeoisie, the pure republicans; hardly three months have passed and the big bourgeoisie, the constitutional party, is threatening to overthrow Cavaignac and drive the "pure ones" into the arms of the "reds". This will happen in Frankfurt too — the victory will benefit, not the respectable gentlemen from the Centre parties, but those of the Right. The bourgeoisie will have to give pride of place to the gendemen representing the military, bureaucratic and junker state and will very soon taste the bitter fruits of its victory.
May these bitter fruits do it good! Meanwhile we shall await the moment when the hour of liberation for Europe will have struck in Paris.
Written by Engels on September 19 and 20, 1848
119. The Faedrelandon the Armistice
Cologne, September 21. It is common knowledge that the so-called National Assembly in Frankfurt approved of the armistice on Prussia's assurance that the Danish Government has officially given notice of its readiness to agree to modifications.
It is well known, however, what intrigues went on during the voting on the preliminary question. The intrigues over the main question took place outside the Assembly.
Listen to what the Faedreland of September 16 says: After explaining the disadvantages of the armistice that was actually signed as compared with the first draft, the newspaper comes to the advantages for Denmark. England and Russia would intervene if the war broke out again; German unity, held together with difficulty by the Danish war, would immediately disintegrate; the population of Jutland could be trained as an army reserve and the army doubled in size:
"and 60,000 troops on the narrow peninsula, backed up by the fleet, are a Dannevirke which big, united Germany would think twice about storming".
"But whatever the terms of the armistice, it is plain that once it is signed, ratified and guaranteed, it would be irresponsible if we neglected to fulfil its terms, or tolerated their infringement by our enemies. There is no question of our Government doing such a thing, there can and must be no doubts about this, and for this reason it would be wrong to get alarmed at all the rumours hawked around in Schleswig-Holstein publications about changes in the terms once they have been accepted. We are fully aware that Prussian generals and officials and the Germans in general, with a few honourable exceptions, do not take their commitments and their vows, their bona fides so very seriously; we are quite ready to believe that General Wrangel had the effrontery to put proposals to the Danish Commissioner, Mr. Reedtz, suggesting a breach of the terms in order to make them more acceptable to his friends in Schleswig-Holstein; we are quite ready to believe that both the Frankfurt Assembly and the Prussian Ministry consider it quite in order to urge us to agree to arbitrary changes in a matter that has already been signed and sealed in due form. But we also believe that the worst thing our Government could do would be to permit them to alter even one jot or tittle of the treaty, for then "German honesty" would have no qualms about trampling the whole thing under foot. If Karl Moltke cannot find any co-regents, since it has been laid down how these are to be appointed, the Danish Government can proceed to choose two whose agreement is certain in advance, and it is then up to Prussia to find two of its own. If the people of Schleswig-Holstein are not willing to obey, it is up to Prussia to force them to. And if on the last appointed date, that is tomorrow, September 17, there is anything essential missing in the execution of the treaty after we for our part have conscientiously fulfilled all our obligations, then it is up to the Danish Government to set a final deadline, and if this also expires without any further developments, then it is the right and duty of the Danish Government to move the army to Schleswig and have it occupied. We will then see what Europe has to say and what guarantees and obligations actually mean. We certainly have no need to fear the consequences; whatever they are, it is easier to endure them than to disgrace ourselves in our own eyes and in the eyes of the whole world, than to allow ourselves to be treated as the bondsman (Traet) of German arrogance and German dishonesty.
"We are pleased to say that as we lay down our pen we can give the positive assurance that as far as Danish Government is concerned any modification of the armistice convention which has been concluded is out of the question.
Thus the semi-official organ of the Danish Cabinet. And now? Who is the deceiver now, who the deceived, who the deceived deceiver(1)?
Written by Engels on September 21, 1848
120. The Government of the Counter-Revolution
Cologne, September 22. It has happened after all! The Government of the Prince of Prussia is in being and the counter-revolution intends to risk the final decisive blow.[290]
Read the following letter by a deputy:
"Berlin, September 20, 10 p.m. We have just learned beyond doubt that an entirely counter-revolutionary Government has been formed, namely" (then follows the list of Ministers which we gave yesterday in accordance with the special edition of the Zeitungs-Halle). "At tomorrow's session this same Government will read out a royal message wherein the prospect of the disbandment of the Assembly will be held out. The result of this is a declaration of permanence which will probably lead to a new and very bloody revolution. All parties of the National Assembly are consulting permanently in their usual premises. The population is very excited. Wrangel has held a military review today. Everything seems to be in question!"
It has happened after all! The Crown seeks the protection of the Uckermark grandees and the Uckermark grandees oppose the revolutionary movement of the year 1848. The Don Quixotes of Further Pomerania, these old warriors and debt-encumbered landed proprietors, will finally have their opportunity to cleanse their rusty blades in the blood of the agitators.[291] The guards, crowned with the cheap glory of Schleswig, are supposed to strike the decisive blow against the revolution which intrudes upon the rights of the Crown, which wants to prohibit the officers from plotting secretly and which intends, by the implacable hand of Hansemann's financial measures, to take a terribly "bold dip" [3] into the already limp purse of the Brandenburg junkers. The guards will take revenge for the humiliation of March 18, disperse the Berlin Assembly and the officers will ride down Unter den Linden over the corpses of the revolutionaries.
Go on! Forward with God for King and Fatherland!(1)
121. The Cologne Committee of Public Safety[292]
Cologne, September 23. As already announced in this newspaper, the Committee of Public Safety has notified the authorities here that it has undertaken 1) to co-operate in the preservation of peace and 2) to watch over the gains of the revolution.(1) Herr von Wittgenstein has passed on this news to Public Prosecutor Hecker just as he received it, together with an official request to investigate whether the Committee's plans in any way constitute a punishable offence.
Poor Herr Hecker! Already overburdened with the duties of his office, he now has also to take over the capacity for judging from the administrative officials!!!
Written about September 23, 1848
122. Public Prosecutor Hecker Questions People Who Had Attended the Worringen Meeting
Cologne, September 24. The Public Prosecutor, Herr Hecker, is the most harassed man in Cologne. For several days now he has been personally questioning witnesses in an attempt to find out what sort of sins against the Holy Spirit of penal law were committed at the public meeting at Worringen.[293] Up to now the results of his inquiries are said to have been extremely meagre, 1) because nothing illegal happened and 2) because it is unlikely that witnesses still remember what each individual said and especially in what context he said it. As regards 2), we think it better to refer Herr Hecker to the band of disguised policemen and mouchards who were wandering around the meadow taking notes in shorthand. But there again, if some of these pillars of the state are unable to give any evidence, we should not be surprised. One of them in particular was so drunk even at midday that he made his way in tears from one bar to the next gratefully accepting the drinks offered him and telling people "in confidence" that it is true he was here as a spy, but apart from this he was a decent fellow.
123. Counter-Revolution in Cologne
Cologne, September 25. Scarcely had the official news of the formation of the counter-revolutionary Government(1) reached the Rhine when the Public Prosecutor's office here suddenly developed not only an almighty appetite for arrests but a zeal for activity such as was not encountered even in the old police state.
The counter-revolutionary campaign started this morning. Its heroes have won victories in some fields and suffered defeats in others — a fate that has befallen even greater generals. The intention was to lead away a few dozen Cologne democrats as early morning spoils and to delight the local wailers[294] over their breakfasts with the news. However, part of the prey was wrested from these gendemen. For example, Wächter, captain of the 9th Company of the civic militia, was snatched by the people from the clutches of the Holy Hermandad.[295] Six guardians of the law forced their way into the house of our fellow citizen Moll. The crowd that quickly gathered around the house and its threatening attitude caused two of these gendemen to flee into the attic and a third into the cellar. Unfortunately the house has only one exit. Moll acceded to the wishes of these terrified gentlemen and asked the people to allow the brigade of six men to withdraw in safety.
Becker and Schapper, on the other hand, were led off to gaol in the early hours of the morning. There are reports that in addition to Bürgers several other members of the editorial staff of our newspaper are on the proscribed list and that attempts have been made to arrest them.
If these gentlemen go ahead with their plans, it will soon be a mystery how the editorial work of our newspaper is to be carried out. But we believe we can declare that all the manoeuvres directed against us will fail in their main aim and that our readers will continue as usual to receive the newspaper regularly. It is merely a question of who will first lose their sense of humour: the gentlemen from the Public Prosecutor's office or the editors of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung.
We would add that even now some policemen etc. are on their way to Mülheim to punish several hated democrats there with arrest and imprisonment.
124. An Attempt to Arrest Moll
Cologne, 11 a. m. This morning a detachment of the 29th Regiment was sent into the Kranz to carry out Moll's arrest. The soldiers were driven back and with the aid of the workers Moll got away safely.
125. State of Siege in Cologne[2]
Cologne, September 26. Today we are also omitting the synopsis. We are hurrying to print the paper. We are being informed by a reliable source that the city will be placed in a state of siege within an hour or two, that the civic militia will be dissolved and disarmed, that the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, the Neue Kölnische Zeitung, the Arbeiter-Zeitung and the Wächter am Rhein will be suspended, that courts martial will be instituted and that all the rights gained in March are to be suppressed. It is reported that the civic militia is not inclined to let itself be disarmed.
Endnotes
[262] This article was first published in English in the collection: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung". 1848-49, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972.
[264] On August 21, 1848, workers' disturbances started in Vienna, caused by the growth of unemployment and the Government's decree on the reduction of wages. On August 23 the national guards of bourgeois and aristocratic districts opened fire on unarmed workers who were protesting against this measure. The counter-revolutionaries who supported Emperor Ferdinand (who returned to Vienna from Innsbruck on August 12) and his court camarilla, and were preparing to attack the achievements of the revolution, took advantage of the situation, which had undermined the unity of the democratic forces.
[266] The so-called Risquons-Tout trial, held in Antwerp from August 9 to 30, 1848, was a fabrication of the Government of Leopold, the King of the Belgians, against the democrats. The pretext was a clash, which took place on March 29, 1848, between the Belgian Republican Legion bound for its home country from France and a detachment of soldiers near the village of Risquons-Tout not far from the French border. Mellinet, Ballin, Tedesco and other principal accused were sentenced to death, but this was later commuted to 30 years imprisonment, and still later they were pardoned.
[268] On his arrival in Cologne on April 11, 1848, Marx successfully applied to the Cologne City Council for citizenship. However, the decision was subject to approval by the local royal authorities who were slow in answering. At the beginning of August 1848, after four months' delay, Marx was informed that his application had been turned down. The conduct of the Cologne authorities aroused indignation in the city's democratic circles. The Cologne Democratic Society sent a deputation demanding that police measures against Marx should cease (see this volume, pp. 562-63). In reply to Marx's complaint, the Prussian Minister of the Interior Kühlwetter approved the decision of the local authorities on September 12, 1848 (see this volume, p. 581). Although the protest campaign prevented reactionary circles from carrying out their schemes with regard to Marx immediately, he was in danger of being deported from Prussia as a "foreigner". Subsequently, the Prussian Government deported Marx for alleged "violation of the right of hospitality". This act and repressive measures against other editors of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung caused the newspaper to cease publication in May 1849. (
[270] See Note 12.
[272] This editorial note was published in parentheses at the end of the article "The Financial Project of the Left" in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung. It gave the following information: "Berlin, Sept, 6. The deputies Waldeck, Zenker, Anwandter, Krackrügge, Reuter, d'Ester, Stein, Eisner, ,Otto, Behrends, Jacoby, Schultz and others on the Left have placed the following financial plan before the National Assembly: "The Ministry is empowered to issue paper money to the sum of — million talers at 3 /$ per cent interest and to be redeemed in twenty consecutive years against an annual sum of — million talers. "This paper money will bear the name 'Prussian interest-bearing notes'." The author then lists the terms of issue and circulation of the above-mentioned "interest-bearing notes" and quotes the opinion of the Left-wing deputies on the advantages of their financial project. The following consideration is given particular mention: "The above plan will provide the Government with the means it needs to meet the requirements of the state and save it from resorting either to the hated measure of a compulsory loan or the expensive one of a loan from individual bankers.... "By issuing smaller denominations the interest-bearing notes plan will satisfy the pressing need for a freer circulation of capital, which does not occur in the case of a loan ... make it possible to exchange government bonds, which are sluggish in circulation and exposed to big fluctuations in exchange, for interest-bearing notes; it will also give the private individual and every worker the chance to invest his savings at interest without losing his disposal of them and free him from the cumbersome savings-banks and from the intermediary of bankers with their usual deductions for commission. "The interest-bearing notes plan will entice out of its hiding-place and bring into circulation the ready cash at present lying unproductively in the hands of timid capitalists and as a necessary consequence promote the flow of ready cash back to the state banks, while at the same time impeding the export abroad of coined metal. This can only be to the benefit of the country.... "The same security that in any case would have to be put up by the Government for any loan will form the security for the Prussian interest-bearing notes, but this plan spares the Government the humiliation of having to haggle with foreign bankers over the amount to be gained by the latter at the expense of Prussia; the plan also gives the Government a favourable opportunity to show the world that Prussia possesses sufficient means within itself to pay for its requirements, thereby-reinforcing the confidence of the Prussian people in their own strength and emancipating them from the arbitrary power of foreign usurers."
[273] On August 9, 1848, in view of the frequent sorties of Prussian officers, the Prussian National Assembly voted for the proposal of Stein, a deputy of the Left, requesting the Minister of War to issue an army order to the effect that officers opposed to a constitutional system were bound to quit the army. Despite the National Assembly's decision, Schreckenstein, the Minister of War, did not issue the order; so Stein tabled his motion for the second time at the session of the National Assembly on September 7. As a result of the voting, the Auerswald-Hansemann M.nistry had to resign. Under the Pfuel Ministry that followed,the order though in modified form was issued on September 26, 1848, but this also remained on paper.
[274] This refers to the visit of Frederick William IV to Cologne on August 13-15, 1848, in connection with the festivities to mark the sixth centenary of the laying of the cornerstone of St. Peter's Church.
[276] See Note 146.
[277] Re August 10, 1792, see Note 20. During May 31-June 2, 1793, the Girondist Government representing the republican circles of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, which strove to prevent the further development of the revolution, was overthrown by the masses in Paris. Twenty-nine Girondist leaders were expelled from the National Convention (later on, many of them took part in counter-revolutionary conspiracies and riots), and the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the Jacobins was established in France.
[280] In his message of September 10, 1848, Frederick William IV agreed with the view of his Ministers that the resolution passed by the Prussian National Assembly on September 7, 1848 (see Note 273), was an infringement of the "principle of constitutional monarchy", and approved their decision to resign as a protest against the Assembly's action.
[81] The Camphausen Government began its activities on March 30, 1848. At about the same time, a national liberation uprising broke out in Posen and was cruelly suppressed by this Government (see Note 46).
[282] Vendée—see Note 164. The Constituent Assembly in France (Constituante) held its sessions from July 9, 1789, to September 30, 1791.
[28] On March 29, 1848, the Camphausen Government in which Hansemann held the post of the Minister of Finance replaced the Government of Count Arhim-Boitzenburg, which had been formed on March 19, 1848, when revolution broke out in Prussia. In writing this and other articles concerning the Prussian National Assembly, the authors made use of the stenographic reports, which later came out as a separate edition entitled Verhandlungen der constituirenden Versammlung für Preussen 1848, Berlin, 1848. The article was first published in English in the collection: Karl Marx, The Revolutions of 1848. Political Writings, Vol. 1, London, Penguin Books, 1973. The United Diet— an assembly of representatives from the eight Provincial Diets of Prussia, similarly based on the estate principle. The United Diet sanctioned new taxes and loans, discussed new Bills and had the right to petition the King. The First United Diet, which opened on April 11, 1847, was dissolved in June, following its refusal to grant a new loan. The Second United Diet met on April 2, 1848, when the Camphausen Ministry was in office. It passed a law on the elections to a Prussian National Assembly and sanctioned the loan. The United Diet session was closed on April 10, 1848. See Note 10. According to tradition, around 390 B. C. the Gauls captured Rome with the exception of the Capitol, whose defenders were warned of the approaching enemy by the cackling of the geese from the Temple of Juno. In this article Engels describes one of the episodes in the war between Germany and Denmark over Schleswig and Holstein. By the decision of the Congress of Vienna (1815) the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were incorporated into the Kingdom of Denmark in spite of the fact that Germans constituted the majority of the population in Holstein and in Southern Schleswig. Under the impact of the March revolution, the national liberation movement of the German population grew in strength and assumed a radical and democratic nature, becoming part of the struggle for the unification of Germany. Volunteers from all over the country rushed to the aid of the local population when it rose up against Danish rule arms in hand. Prussia, Hanover and other states of the German Confederation sent to the duchies federal troops, under the command of the Prussian General Wrangel, who entered Jutland on May 2. The Prussian Government, however, declined to take a firm stand on the Schleswig-Holstein issue, for it feared a popular outbreak and an intensification of the revolution. The liberal majority of the Frankfurt National Assembly also cherished secret hopes of an agreement with the Danish ruling circles, at the expense of national unity. Things were complicated by the intervention of Britain, Sweden and Russia in favour of Denmark, and their demand that federal troops be withdrawn from the duchies. (In this connection, Engels alludes to the Note of May 8, 1848, which Chancellor Nesselrode handed in to the Berlin Cabinet and in which this demand was accompanied by the threat of a break between Russia and Prussia.) All these circumstances had a negative effect on the military operations against Denmark undertaken by the German federal troops and volunteer detachments. The report on the defeat of the German federal troops appeared on May 30, 1848, in No. 11179 of the Börsen-Halle, and was then reprinted in most of the German papers. In English it appeared on June 3 in The Times No. 19880. P-M
[15] The article was first published in English in the collection: Karl Marx, On Revolution, ed. by S. K. Padover, New York, 1971 ("The Karl Marx Library" series), Vol. 1.
[284] In 1648 Frederick William, the Elector of Brandenburg, supported the candidature of John Casimir to the Polish throne; in 1656, after taking advantage of the King of Poland's difficult situation he concluded a military pact with Charles Gustav, King of Sweden, and supported his claims to the Polish crown. In the war of 1655-60 between Sweden and Poland, he manoeuvred between the warring parties and thus secured the final incorporation of Eastern Prussia in Brandenburg. On April 5, 1795, in Basle, Prussia concluded a separate peace treaty with France, the first anti-French coalition having already begun to disintegrate. In November 1805, Russia and Prussia concluded a convention in Potsdam on joint action against Napoleonic France. The Prussian Government undertook to join the third anti-French coalition (Britain, Austria, Russia and Naples), but after the defeat sustained by the Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz, it renounced its obligations.
[287] After the Ministers sent in their resignation, Frederick William IV, in his message of September 10, 1848, while expressing his agreement with their motives for resigning, asked them to carry out their duties pending the appointment of successors.
[1] N O T E S "Demands of the Communist Party in Germany" were written by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in Paris between March 21 (when Engels arrived in Paris from Brussels) and March 24, 1848. This document was discussed by members of the Central Authority, who approved and signed it as the political programme of the Communist League in the revolution that broke out in Germany. In March it was printed as a leaflet, for distribution among revolutionary German emigrant workers who were about to return home. Austrian and German diplomats in Paris informed their respective governments about this as early as March 27, 28 and 29. (The Austrian Ambassador enclosed in his letter a copy of the leaflet which he dated "March 25".) The leaflet soon reached members of the Communist League in other countries, in particular, German emigrant workers in London. Early in April, the "Demands of the Communist Party in Germany" were published in such German democratic papers as Berliner Zeitungs-Halle (special supplement to No. 82, April 5, 1848), Düsseldorfer Zeitung (No. 96, April 5, 1848), Mannheimer Abendzeitung (No. 96, April 6, 1848), Trier'sche Zeitung (No. 97, April 6, 1848, supplement), Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (No. 100, April 9, 1848, supplement), and Zeitung für das deutsche Volk (No. 21, April 9, 1848). Marx and Engels, who left for Germany round about April 6 and some time later settled in Cologne, did their best along with their followers to popularise this programme document during the revolution. In 1848 and 1849 it was repeatedly published in the periodical press and in leaflet form'. Not later than September 10, 1848, the "Demands" were printed in Cologne as a leaflet for circulation by the Cologne Workers' Association both in the town itself and in a number of districts of Rhenish Prussia. In addition to minor stylistic changes, point 10 in the text of the leaflet was worded differently from that published in March-April 1848. At the Second Democratic Congress held in Berlin in October 1848, Friedrich Beust, delegate from the Cologne Workers' Association, spoke, on behalf of the social question commission, in favour of adopting a programme of action closely following the "Demands". In November and December 1848, various points of the "Demands" were discussed at meetings of the Cologne Workers' Association. Many editions of the "Demands" published during the revolution and after its defeat have survived to this day in their original form, some of them as copies kept in the police archives.
[290] On September 21, 1848, a Ministry headed by Pfuel was formed in Prussia by royal order. It consisted of top officials and high-ranking officers. Outwardly its attitude towards the National Assembly was one of loyalty, but actually the Pfuel Ministry sought to organise and unite the counter-revolutionary forces. Pfuel and his colleagues paved the way for the overtly counter-revolutionary Government of Count Brandenburg (November 8, 1848), which accomplished a coup d'état in Prussia.
[291] See Note 23.
[292] The Committee of Public Safety consisting of 30 people was formed by the democratic and workers' organisations of Cologne at their mass meeting on September 13, in view of the ministerial crisis in Prussia, the menace of a counter-revolutionary coup and the increasing popular unrest in the Rhine Province aroused by the armistice with Denmark concluded at Malmö. The editors of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, including Marx, Engels, Wolff, Dronke and Bürgers, as well as the leaders of the Cologne Workers' Association Schapper and Moll, were elected among its members. The Committee of Public Safety became a guiding centre of the Cologne solidarity movement with the Frankfurt insurgents and of the mass struggle against encroachments on the revolutionary gains and democratic freedoms by the Prussian authorities, who started openly to persecute members of democratic and proletarian organisations.
[293] The public meeting at Worringen (near Cologne), at which, besides the townspeople, peasants from the neighbouring villages were present, was called by the workers' and democratic organisations on September 17, 1848. It played an important part in rallying the masses to fight against the counter-revolution. The meeting recognised the Committee of Public Safety in Cologne, adopted an address supporting the protest made by democratic circles against the armistice between Prussia and Denmark and declared for a democratic social republic in Germany. For details on the meeting see this volume,pp. 586-87.
[294] See Note 23.
[295] See Note 137.
[3] At the end of 1848 or the beginning of 184-9 an abridged version of the "Demands" was published in pamphlet form by Weiler Publishers in Leipzig. The slogan at the beginning of the document, the second paragraph of point 9 and the last sentence of point 10 were omitted, and the words "The Committee" were not included among the signatories. In 1853, an abridged version of the "Demands" was printed, together with other documents of the Communist League, in the first part of the book Die Communisten-Ver schworungen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, published in Berlin for purposes of information by Wermuth and Stieber, two police officials, who staged a trial against the Communists in Cologne in 1852. Later Engels reproduced the main points of the "Demands" in his essay On the History of the Communist League, published in November 1885 in the newspaper Sozialdemokrat, and as an introduction to the pamphlet: K. Marx, Enthüllungen über den Kommunisten Prozess zu Köln, Hottingen-Zürich, 1885. English translations of the "Demands of the Communist Party in Germany" appeared in the collections: The Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels with an introduction and explanatory notes by D. Ryazanoff, Martin Lawrence, London (1930); K. Marx, Selected Works, Vol. II, ed. V. Adoratsky, Moscow-Leningrad, Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR (1936); ibid., New York (1936); Birth of the Communist Manifesto, edited and annotated, with an Introduction by D. J. Struik, International Publishers, New York, 1971, and in other publications. The letter to the editor of the Populaire and the Declaration are in Engels' handwriting. Both documents were drawn up at the end of March 1848 after Engels' arrival in Paris and reflect the struggle which the leaders of the Communist League were waging against those German petty-bourgeois emigrant leaders in Paris, Herwegh and Bornstedt among others, who intended to speed up revolution in Germany by moving in a volunteer legion organised by using private donations and subsidies from the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Appeals to enlist were accompanied by demagogic appeals to the patriotic and revolutionary sentiments of German emigrants. Marx, Engels and other members of the Central Authority of the Communist League spoke out against the adventurist nature of such plans to "export revolution" and advised German workers instead to return to their home country individually in order to take part in the revolutionary events that were brewing there. "We opposed this playing with revolution in the most decisive fashion," Engels later wrote in his work On the History of the Communist League. "To carry out an invasion, which was to import the revolution forcibly from outside, into the midst of the ferment then going on in Germany, meant to undermine the revolution in Germany itself, to strengthen the governments and to deliver the legionaries ... defenceless into the hands of the German troops." The letter and the Declaration were first published in English in the journal Science and Society, 1940, Vol. IV, No. 2. The first publication in the language of the original appeared in the collection Der Bund der Kommunisten. Dokumente und Materialien, Bd. I, 1836-1849, Berlin, 1970. The Cerman Democratic Society (below it is called the Society of German Democrats) was formed in Paris after the February revolution of 1848. The society was headed by petty-bourgeois democrats, Herwegh, Bornstedt (the latter expelled from the Communist League) and others, who campaigned to raise a volunteer legion of German emigrants with the intention of marching into
[2]