I. Dw Rheinüchen Jahrbücher or the Philosophy of True Socialism
RHEINISCHE JAHRBÜCHER, 1. BD., P. 167 ET SEQ.
We begin with this essay because it displays quite consciously and with great self-confidence the national German character of true socialism.
Page 168: "It seems that the French do not understand their own men of genius. At this point German science comes to their aid and in the shape of socialism presents the most reasonable social order, if one can speak of a superlative degree of reasonableness."
"German science" here, therefore, presents a social order, in fact "the most reasonable social order',' "in the shape of socialism". Socialism is reduced to a branch of that omnipotent, omniscient, all-embracing German science which is even able to set up a society. It is true that socialism is French in origin, but the French socialists were "essentially" Germans, for which reason the real Frenchmen "did not understand" them. Thus the writer can say:
"Communism is French, socialism is German; the French are lucky to possess so apt a social instinct, which will serve them one day as a substitute for scientific investigation. This result has been determined by the course of development of the two nations; the French arrived at communism by way of politics" (now it is clear, of course, how the French people came to communism); "the Germans arrived at socialism" (namely "true socialism") "by way of metaphysics, which eventually changed into anthropology. Ultimately both are resolved in humanism."
After having transformed communism and socialism into two abstract theories, two principles, there is, of course, nothing easier than to excogitate at will any Hegelian unity of these two opposites and to give it any vague name one chooses. One has thereby not only
The author of this article is Hermann Semmig.—Ed.
/
submitted "the course of development of the two nations" to a piercing scrutiny but has also brilliantly demonstrated the superiority of the speculative individual over both Frenchmen and Germans.
Incidentally, the sentence is copied more or less literally from Püttmann's Bürgerbuch, p. 43 and elsewhere(1); the writer's "scientific investigation" of socialism is likewise limited to a reinterpretative reproduction of ideas contained in this book, in the Einundzwanzig Bogen and in other writings dating from the early days of German communism.
We will only give a few examples of the objections raised to communism in this essay:
Page 168: "Communism does not combine the atoms into an organic whole."
The demand that the "atoms" should be combined into an "organic whole" is no more realistic than the demand for the squaring of the circle.
"Communism, as it is actually advocated in France, its main centre, takes the form of crude opposition to the egoistical dissipation of the shopkeeper's state; it never transcends this political opposition; it never attains to unconditional, unqualified freedom" (ibid.).
Voilà the German ideological postulate of "unconditional, unqualified freedom", which is only the practical formula for "unconditional, unqualified thought". French communism is admittedly "crude" because it is the theoretical expression of a real opposition; however, according to the writer, French communism ought to have transcended this opposition by imagining it to be already overcome. Compare also Bürgerbuch, p. 43, etc.
"Tyranny can perfectly well persist within communism, since the latter refuses to permit the continuance of the species" (p. 168).
Hapless species! "Species" and "tyranny" have hitherto existed simultaneously; but it is precisely because communism abolishes the "species" that it can allow "tyranny" to persist. And how, according to our true socialist, does communism set about abolishing the "species"? It "has the masses in view" (ibid.).
"In communism man is not conscious of his essence ... his dependence is reduced by communism to the lowest, most brutal relationship, to dependence on crude matter—the separation of labour and enjoyment. Man does not attain to free moral activity."
To appreciate the "scientific investigation" which has led our true socialist to this proposition, it is necessary to consider the following passage:
"French socialists and communists ... have by no means theoretically understood the essence of socialism ... even the radical" (French) "communists have still by no means transcended the antithesis of labour and enjoyment ... have not yet risen to the idea of free activity.... The only difference between communism and the world of the shopkeeper is that in communism the complete alienation of real human property is to be made independent of all fortuity, i.e., is to be idealised" (Bürgerbuch, p. 43).
That is to say, our true socialist is here reproaching the French for having a correct consciousness of their actual social conditions, whereas they ought to bring to light "Man's" consciousness of "his essence". All objections raised by these true socialists against the French amount to this, that they do not consider Feuerbach's philosophy to be the quintessence of their movement as a whole. The writer proceeds from the already existing proposition of the separation of labour and enjoyment. Instead of starting with this proposition, he ideologically turns the whole thing upside-down, begins with the missing consciousness of man, deduces from it "dependence on crude matter" and assumes this to be realised in the "separation of labour and enjoyment". Incidentally we shall see later on where our true socialist gets to with his independence "from crude matter".
In fact, all these gentlemen display a remarkable delicacy of feeling. Everything shocks them, especially matter; they complain everywhere of crudity. Earlier we have already had a "crude antithesis", now we have "the most brutal relationship" of "dependence on crude matter".
With gaping jaws the German cries: Too crude love must not be Or you'll get an infirmity.3
German philosophy in its socialist disguise appears, of course, to investigate "crude reality", but it always keeps at a respectable distance and, in hysterical irritation, cries: noli me tangere!b
After these scientific objections to French communism, we come to several historical arguments, which brilliantly demonstrate the "free moral activity" and the "scientific investigation" of our true socialist and his independence of crude matter.
On page 170 he arrives at the "result" that the only communism which "exists" is "crude French communism" (crude once again).
Modified quotation from Heine's poem "Sie sassen und tranken am Teetisch..." in Lyrisches Intermezzo. The first line of Heine's poem reads: With gaping jaws the canon cries.—Ed.
The construction of this truth a priori is carried out with great "social instinct" and shows that "man has become conscious of his essence". Listen to this:
"There is no other communism, for what Weitling has produced is only an elaboration of Fourierist and communist ideas with which he became acquainted in Paris and Geneva."
"There is no" English communism, "for what Weitling", etc. Thomas More, the Levellers,[124] Owen, Thompson, Watts, Holyoake, Harney, Morgan, Southwell, Goodwyn Barmby, Greaves, Edmonds, Hobson, Spence will be amazed, or turn in their graves, when they hear that they are no communists "for" Weitling went to Paris and Geneva.
Moreover, Weitling's communism does seem to be different in kind from the "crude French" variety, in vulgar parlance, from Babouvism, since it contains some of "Fourier's ideas" as well.
"The communists were particularly good at drawing up systems or even complete social orders (Cabet's Icarie, La Félicité,3 Weitling). All systems are, however, dogmatic and dictatorial" (p. 170).
By this verdict on systems in general true socialism has, of course, saved itself the trouble of acquainting itself at first hand with the communist systems. With one blow it has overthrown not only Icarie but also every philosophical system from Aristotle to Hegel, the Systeme de la naturel the botanical systems of Linné and Jussieu and even the solar system. Incidentally, as to the systems themselves they nearly all appeared in the early days of the communist movement and had at that time propaganda value as popular novels, which corresponded perfectly to the still undeveloped consciousness of the proletarians, who were then just beginning to play an active part. Cabet himself calls his Icarie a "roman philosophique" and he should on no account be judged by his system but rather by his polemical writings, in fact his whole activity as a party leader. In some of these novels, e.g., Fourier's system, there is a vein of true poetry; others, like the systems of Owen and Cabet, show not a shred of imagination and are written in a business-like calculating way or else with an eye to the views of the class to be influenced, in sly lawyer fashion. As the party develops, these systems lose all importance and are at best retained purely nominally as catchwords. Who in France believes in Icarie, who in England believes in the plans of Owen, which he preached in various modifications with an eye to propaganda among particular classes or with respect to the altered circumstances of the moment? Fourier's orthodox disciples of the
Démocratie pacifique show most clearly how little the real content of these systems lies in their systematic form; they are, for all their orthodoxy, doctrinaire bourgeois, the very antipodes of Fourier. All epoch-making systems have as their real content the needs of the time in which they arose. Each one of them is based on the whole of the antecedent development of a nation, on the historical growth of its class relations with their political, moral, philosophical and other consequences. The assertion that all systems are dogmatic and dictatorial gets us nowhere with regard to this basis and this content of the communist systems. Unlike the English and the French, the Germans did not encounter fully developed class relations. The German communists could, therefore, only base their system on the relations of the class from which they sprang. It is, therefore, perfectly natural that the only existing German communist system should be a reproduction of French ideas in terms of a mental outlook which was limited by the petty circumstances of the artisan.
"The madness of Cabet, who insists that everybody should subscribe to his Populaire", p. 168, is proof of the tyranny that persists within communism. If our friend first distorts the claims which a party leader makes on his party, impelled by particular circumstances and the danger of failing to concentrate limited financial means, and then evaluates them in terms of the "essence of man", he is indeed bound to conclude that this party leader and all other party members are "mad" whereas purely disinterested figures, like himself and the "essence of man", are of sound intellect. But let him find out the true state of affairs from Cabet's Ma ligne droite.
The whole antithesis of our author, and of German true socialists and ideologists in general, to the real movements of other nations is finally epitomised in one classic sentence. The Germans judge everything sub specie aeterno (in terms of the essence of Man), foreigners view everything practically, in terms of actually existing men and circumstances. The thoughts and actions of the foreigner are concerned with temporariness, the thoughts and actions of the German with eternity. Our true socialist confesses this as follows:
After having thus thoroughly disposed of communism, the writer proceeds to its contrary, socialism.
"Socialism establishes that anarchic system which is an essential characteristic of the human race and the universe" (p. 170) and for that very reason has hitherto never existed for "the human race".
Free competition is too "crude" to be regarded by our true socialist as an "anarchic system".
"Relying entirely on the moral core of mankind, socialism" decrees that "the union of the sexes is and should be merely the highest intensification of love; for only what is natural is true and what is true is moral" (p. 171).
The reason why "the union, etc., etc. is and should be," can be applied to everything. For example, "socialism, relying entirely on the moral core" of the apes, might just as well decree that the masturbation which occurs naturally among them "is, and should be, merely the highest intensification of" self-"love; for only what is natural is true and what is true is moral".
It would be hard to say by what standard socialism judges what is "natural".
"Activity and enjoyment coincide in the peculiar nature of man; they are determined by this and not by the products external to us."
"But since these products are indispensable for activity, that is to say, for true life, and since by reason of the common activity of mankind as a whole they have, so to speak, detached themselves from mankind, they are or should be the common substratum of further development for all (community of goods)."
"Our present-day society has indeed relapsed into savagery to such an extent that some individuals fall upon the products of another's labour with beastly voracity and at the same time they indolently allow their own essence to decay (rentiers); as a necessary consequence, others are driven to mechanical labour; their property (their own human essence) has been stunted, not by idleness, but by exhausting exertion (proletarians).... The two extremes of our society, rentiers and proletarians, are, however, at the same stage of development. Both are dependent upon things external to them" or are "Negroes", as Saint Max would say (pp. 169, 170).
The "results" reached above by our "Mongol" concerning "our Negroism" are the most perfect achievements which true socialism has, "so to speak, detached from itself, as a product indispensable for true life"; our Mongol, by reason of "the peculiar nature of man", believes that "mankind as a whole" is bound to "fall upon" them with "beastly voracity".
The four concepts—"rentiers", "proletarians", "mechanical" and "community of goods"—are for our Mongol at any rate "products external to him"; as far as they are concerned, his "activity" and his "enjoyment" consist in representing them simply as anticipated terms for the results of his own "mechanical labour".
Society, we learn, has relapsed into savagery and consequently the individuals who form this very society suffer from all kinds of infirmities. Society is abstracted from these individuals, it is made independent, it relapses into savagery on its own, and the individuals suffer only as a result of this relapse. The expressions — beast of prey, idler and possessor of "one's own decaying essence"—are the first result of this relapse; whereupon we learn to our horror that these expressions define the "rentier". The only comment necessary is that this "allowing one's own essence to decay" is nothing but a philosophically mystified manner of speaking used in an endeavour to comprehend "idleness", the actual character of which seems to be very little known.
The two expressions, "stunted growth of their own human essence as a result of exhausting exertion" and "being driven to mechanical labour", are the second "necessary consequence" of the first result of the relapse into savagery. These two expressions are a "necessary consequence of the fact that the rentiers allow their own essence to decay", and are known in vulgar parlance, we learn, once more to our horror, as "proletarians".
The sentence, therefore, contains the following sequence of cause and effect: It is a fact that proletarians exist and that they work mechanically. Why are proletarians driven to "mechanical labour"? Because the rentiers "allow their own essence to decay". Why is it that the rentiers allow their own essence to decay? Because "our present-day society has relapsed into savagery to such an extent". Why has it relapsed into savagery? Ask thy Maker.
It is characteristic of our true socialist that he sees "the extremes of our society" in the opposition of rentiers and proletarians. This opposition has pretty well been present at all fairly advanced stages of society and has been belaboured by all moralists since time immemorial; it was resurrected right at the beginning of the proletarian movement, at a time when the proletariat still had interests in common with the industrial and petty bourgeoisie. Compare, for example, the writings of Cobbett and P. L. Courier or Saint-Simon, who originally numbered the industrial capitalists among the travailleurs3 as opposed to the oisifsh, the rentiers. Stating this trivial antithesis, which moreover it expresses, not in ordinary language, but in the sacred language of philosophy, presenting this childish discovery in abstract, sanctified and quite inappropriate terms — this is what here, as in all other cases, the thoroughness of that German science which has been perfected by
Workers.—Ed. Idlers.—Ed.
true socialism amounts to. The conclusion puts the finishing touch to this kind of thoroughness. Our true socialist here merges the totally dissimilar stages of development of the proletarians and the rentiers into "one stage of development", because he ignores their real stages of development and subsumes them under the philosophic phrase: "dependence upon things external to them". True socialism has here discovered the stage of development at which the dissimilarity of all the stages of development in the three realms of nature, in geology and history, vanishes into thin air.
Although he detests "dependence upon things external to him", our true socialist nevertheless admits that he is dependent upon them, "since products", i.e., these very things, "are indispensable for activity" and for "true life". He makes this shamefaced admission so that he can clear the road for a philosophical construction of the community of goods — a construction that lapses into pure nonsense so that we need merely draw the reader's attention to it.
We now come to the first of the passages quoted above. Here again, "independence from things" is claimed in respect of activity and enjoyment. Activity and enjoyment "are determined" by "the peculiar nature of man". Instead of tracing this peculiar nature in the activity and enjoyment of the men who surround him — in which case he would very soon have found how far the products external to us have a voice in the matter, too — he makes activity and enjoyment "coincide in the peculiar nature of man". Instead of visualising the peculiar nature of men in their activity and their manner of enjoyment, which is conditioned by their activity, he explains both by invoking "the peculiar nature of man", which cuts short any further discussion. He abandons the real behaviour of the individual and again takes refuge in his indescribable, inaccessible, peculiar nature. We see here, moreover, what the true socialists understand by "free activity". Our author imprudently reveals to us that free activity is activity which "is not determined by things external to us", i.e., actus purus, pure, absolute activity, which is nothing but activity and is in the last instance tantamount to the illusion of "pure thought". It naturally sullies the purity of this activity if it has a material basis and a material result; the true socialist deals only reluctantly with impure activity of this kind; he despises its product, which he terms "a mere refuse of man", and not "a result" (p. 169). The subject from whom this pure activity proceeds cannot, therefore, be a real sentient human being; it can only be the thinking mind. This "free activity", thus*translated into German, is nothing but the foregoing "unconditional, unqualified freedom" expressed in a different way. Incidentally, that this talk of "free activity", which merely serves the true socialists to conceal their ignorance of real production, amounts in the final analysis to "pure thought" is also shown by the fact that the writer gives us as his last word the postulate of true cognition.
"This separation of the two principal parties of this age" (namely, French crude communism and German socialism) "is a result of the developments of the last two years, which started more particularly with Hess' Philosophie der That, in Herwegh's Einundzwanzig Bogen. Consequently it was high time to throw a little more light on the shibboleths of the social parties" (p. 173).
Here we have, on the one hand, the actually existing communist party in France with its literature and, on the other, a few German pseudo-scholars who are trying to comprehend the ideas of this literature philosophically. The latter are treated just as much as the former as a "principal party of this age", as a party, that is to say, of infinite importance not only to its immediate antithesis, the French communists, but also to the English Chartists and communists, the American national reformers [125] and indeed to every other party "of this age". It is unfortunate that none of these know of the existence of this "principal party". But it has for a considerable time been the fashion among German ideologists for each literary faction, particularly the one that thinks itself "most advanced", to proclaim itself not merely "one of the principal parties", but actually "the principal party of this age". We have among others, "the principal party" of critical criticism, the "principal party" of egoism in agreement with itself and now the "principal party" of the true socialists. In this fashion Germany can boast a whole horde of "principal parties", whose existence is known only in Germany and even there only among the small set of scholars, pseudo-scholars and literati. They all imagine that they are weaving the web of world history when, as a matter of fact, they are merely spinning the long yarn of their own imaginings.
This "principal party" of the true socialists is "a result of the developments of the last two years, which started more particularly with Hess' Philosophie". It is "a result", that is to say, of the developments "of the last two years" when our author first got entangled in socialism and found it was "high time" to enlighten himself "a little more", by means of a few "shibboleths", on what he considers to be "social parties".
Having thus dismissed communism and socialism, our author introduces us to the higher unity of the two, to humanism. Now we are entering the domain of "Man" and the entire true history of our true socialist will be enacted in Germany alone.
"All quibbles about names are resolved in humanism; wherefore communists, wherefore socialists? We are human beings" (p. 172)—tous frères, tous amis.
Swim not, brothers, against the stream, That's only a useless thing! Let us climb up on to Templow hill And cry: God save the King!(2)
Wherefore human beings, wherefore beasts, wherefore plants, wherefore stones? We are bodies!
There follows an historical discourse which is based upon German science and which "will one day help to replace the social instinct" of the French. Antiquity — naïveté, the Middle Ages — Romanticism, the Modern Age — Humanism. By means of these three trivialities, the writer has, of course, constructed his humanism historically and showed it to be the truth of the old Humaniora.[126] Compare "Saint Max" in the first volume for constructions of this kind; he manufactures such wares in a much more artistic and less amateurish way.
On page 172 we are informed that
"the final result of scholasticism is that cleavage of life which was abolished by Hess".
Here then, the cause of the "cleavage of life" is shown to be theory. It is difficult to see why these true socialists mention society at all if they believe with the philosophers that all real cleavages are caused by conceptual cleavages. On the basis of this philosophical belief in the power of concepts to make or destroy the world, they can likewise imagine that some individual "abolished the cleavage of life" by "abolishing" concepts in some way or other. Like all German ideologists, the true socialists continually mix up literary history and real history as equipotential. This habit is, of course, very understandable among the Germans, who conceal the abject part -they have played and continue to play in real history by equating the illusions, in which they are so rich, with reality.
And now to the "last two years", during which German science has so thoroughly disposed of all problems that nothing remains to the other nations but to carry out its decrees.
"Feuerbach only partially completed, or rather only began, the task of anthropology, the regaining by man of his estranged essence" (the essence of man or the essence of Feuerbach?); "he destroyed the religious illusion, the theoretical abstraction, the God-Man, whereas Hess annihilates the political illusion, the abstraction of his ability [Vermögen ], of his activity" (does this refer to Hess or to man?), "that is, he annihilates wealth. It was the work of Hess which freed man from the last of the forces external to him, and made him capable of moral activity — for all the unselfishness of earlier times" (before Hess) "was only an illusory unselfishness — and raised him once more to his former dignity; for was man ever previously" (before Hess) "esteemed for what he actually was? Was he not judged by what he possessed? He was esteemed for his money" (p. 171).
It is characteristic of all these high-sounding phrases about liberation, etc., that it is always "man" who is liberated. Although it would appear from the pronouncements made above that "wealth", "money", and so on, have ceased to exist, we nevertheless learn in the following sentence:
"Now that these illusions" (money, viewed sub specie aeterni, is, indeed, an illusion, l'or n'est qu'une chimère ) "have been destroyed, we can think about a new, human order of society" (ibid.).
But this is quite superfluous since
"the recognition of the essence of man has as a necessary and natural result a life which is truly human" (p. 172).
To arrive at communism or socialism by way of metaphysics or politics, etc., etc.—these phrases beloved of true socialists merely indicate that such and such a writer has adopted communist ideas (which have reached him from without and have arisen in circumstances quite different from his) translating them into the mode of expression corresponding to his former standpoint, and formulating them in accordance with this standpoint. Which of these points of view is predominant in a nation, whether its communist outlook has a political or metaphysical or any other tinge depends, of course, upon the whole development of the nation. The fact that the attitude of most French communists has a political complexion — this is, on the other hand, countered by the fact that very many French socialists have abstracted completely from politics — causes our author to infer that the French "have arrived at communism by way of politics", by way of their political development. This proposition, which has a very wide circulation in Germany, does not imply that the writer has any knowledge either of politics, particularly of French political developments, or of communism; it only shows that he considers politics to be an independent sphere of activity, which develops in its own independent way, a belief he shares with all ideologists.
Another catchword of the true socialists is "true property", "true, personal property", "real", "social", "living", "natural", etc., etc., property, whereas it is very typical that they refer to private property as "so-called property". The Saint-Simonists were the first to adopt this manner of speaking, as we have already pointed out in the first volume; but they never lent it this German metaphysical-mysterious form; it was with them at the beginning of the socialist movement to some extent justified as a counter to the stupid clamour of the bourgeoisie.(3) The end to which most of the Saint-Simonists came shows at any rate the ease with which this "true property" is again resolved into "ordinary private property".
If one takes the antithesis of communism to the world of private property in its crudest form, i.e., in the most abstract form in which the real conditions of that antithesis are ignored, then one is faced with the antithesis of property and lack of property. The abolition of this antithesis can be viewed as the abolition of either the one side or the other; either property is abolished, in which case universal lack of property or destitution results, or else the lack of property is abolished, which means the establishment of true property. In reality, the actual property-owners stand on one side and the propertyless communist proletarians on the other. This opposition becomes keener day by day and is rapidly driving to a crisis. If, then, the theoretical representatives of the proletariat wish their literary activity to have any practical effect, they must first and foremost insist that all phrases are dropped which tend to dim the realisation of the sharpness of this opposition, all phrases which tend to conceal this opposition and may even give the bourgeois a chance to approach the communists for safety's sake on the strength of their philanthropic enthusiasms. All these bad qualities are, however, to be found in the catchwords of the true socialists and particularly in "true property". Of course, we realise that the communist movement cannot be impaired by a few German phrase-mongers. But in a country like Germany — where philosophic phrases have for centuries exerted a certain power, and where, moreover, communist consciousness is anyhow less keen and determined because class contradictions do not exist in as acute a form as in other nations — it is, nevertheless, necessary to resist all phrases which obscure and dilute still further the realisation that communism is totally opposed to the existing world order.
This theory of true property conceives real private property, as it has hitherto existed, merely as a semblance, whereas it views the concept abstracted from this real property as the truth and reality of the semblance; it is therefore ideological all through. All it does is to give clearer and more precise expression to the ideas of the petty bourgeois; for their benevolent endeavours and pious wishes aim likewise at the abolition of the lack of property.
In this essay we have had yet further evidence of the narrowly national outlook which underlies the alleged universalism and cosmopolitanism of the Germans.
The land belongs to the Russians and French, The English own the sea. But we in the airy realm of dreams Hold sovereign mastery.
Our unity is perfect here, Our power beyond dispute; The other folk in solid earth Have meanwhile taken root.3
With infinite self-confidence the Germans confront the other peoples with this airy realm of dreams, the realm of the "essence of man", claiming that it is the consummation and the goal of all world history; in every sphere they regard their dreamy fantasies as a final verdict on the actions of other nations; and because everywhere their lot is merely to look on and be left high and dry they believe themselves called upon to sit in judgment on the whole world while history attains its ultimate purpose in Germany. We have already observed several times that the complement of this inflated and extravagant national pride is practical activity of the pettiest kind, worthy of shopkeepers and artisans. National narrow-mindedness is everywhere repellent. In Germany it is positively odious, since, together with the illusion that the Germans are superior to nationality and to all real interests, it is held in the face of those nations which openly confess their national limitations and their dependence upon real interests. It is, incidentally, true of every nation that obstinate nationalism is now to be found only among the bourgeoisie and their writers.
Endnotes
[124] The Levellers were a democratic-republican trend in the English bourgeois revolution of the mid-17th century. The reference in the text is probably to the most radical section of the Levellers known as True Levellers, or Diggers. The Diggers represented the poorest strata that suffered both from feudal and capitalist exploitation in the town and the countryside. In contrast to the mass of the Levellers, who wanted to retain private property, the Diggers advocated common property and other ideas of equalitarian communism. 1
[125] National reformers — members of the National Reform Association founded in the U.S.A. in 1845. The Association, which consisted mainly of artisans and workers, and declared that every worker should have the right to a piece of land free of charge, started a campaign for a land reform against the slave-owning planters and land speculators. It also put forward a number of other democratic demands such as abolition of the standing army, abolition of slavery and introduction of the ten-hour working day.
[126] Humaniora (humanities) — the subjects the study of which was considered essential for the knowledge of ancient classical culture; the humanists of the Renaissance and their followers regarded these subjects as the basis of humanistic education. 1