Safety reports log¶
Every Air Safety Report, Fatigue Report and Ground Safety Report I have filed at
Loganair, plus the free-text fatigue escalations that sit alongside them and the
company responses received. Reconstructed from the Loganair mailbox on
2026-08-29: Q-Pulse alert emails (app@ideagenqpulse.com up to late 2025,
app@iqmp.ideagen.com from 2026), my own sent emails, and the feedback emails
from the safety department.
Q-Pulse is the system of record. This note is the reading copy.
Master list¶
| Number | Type | Event date | Title | Investigation | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASR-5071 | ASR | 01/08/2024 | Sudden onset of sickness, Captain | — | — |
| GSR-1772 | GSR | 31/10/2024 | Unauthorised pushback | GSR-INV-1549 | Nigel Pybus |
| ASR-5513 | ASR | 03/01/2025 | Missed approach | — | — |
| FR-352 | FR | 03/01/2025 | Early 6 sector day | — | Brian Robertson (replied 28/01/2025) |
| ASR-5581 | ASR | 21/01/2025 | Taxied onto stand without marshaller guidance | — | — |
| ASR-5575 | ASR | 26/01/2025 | Rejected landing | — | — |
| ASR-5743 | ASR | 11/04/2025 | Wake turbulence on takeoff | — | — |
| ASR-5815 | ASR | 09/04/2025 | Ongoing fatigue issues in the IOM | — | — |
| FR-377 | FR | 14/05/2025 | Predictive fatigue report | FR-INV-360 | Brian Robertson |
| FR-380 | FR | 14/05/2025 | Sudden fatigue on sector 5 | — | — |
| ASR-5979 | ASR | 10/07/2025 | Go around at minima | ASR-INV-5586 | Robert Green |
| FR-423 | FR | 12/09/2025 | Predictive fatigue report | FR-INV-403 | Brian Robertson |
| ASR-6434 | ASR | 21/12/2025 | Wrong flap selection | ASR-INV-6010 | Nigel Pybus |
| FR-477 | FR | 15/04/2026 | Fatiguing week | FR-INV-455 | Neil Hughes |
| ASR-6723 | ASR | 15/04/2026 | Fatiguing week | — | — |
| ASR-6756 | ASR | 03/05/2026 | Unaccompanied bag on board | GSR-INV-2072 | — |
| FR-493 | FR | 24/06/2026 | Lack of days off | FR-INV-470 | Neil Hughes |
| GSR-2571 | GSR | 07/08/2026 | Ground handling Manchester | — | — |
| FR-518 | FR | 29/08/2026 | Six sector duty standby fallout | — | — |
Nineteen reports over two years: eight fatigue reports, nine air safety reports, two ground safety reports.
Fatigue reports¶
FR-352 — Early 6 sector day¶
Event 03/01/2025, BHX–IOM, G-LMTE (MSN1283). Raised 06/01/2025.
The early 6 sector on the Isle of Man is getting problematic. It only has a very short break after the first sector because of the ATC closure in IOM, when we don't need it, but consequently there is no break whatsoever. We're getting up at before 5am and only get home after 4pm (without delays). No adequate nutrition break is provided for lunch. Workload is consistently high throughout the day and becomes too much around sector 5.
On this occasion, I started making little mistakes at sector 5 and as PM almost made a big one on the last one: for a split second instead of going to flaps 30 I went to flaps 0 on the approach, without actually doing it as I stopped myself.
Having thought about this and having done extremely long extended duties in a previous company where physical fatigue was a real challenge, I think this particular shift is more akin to "mental fatigue" on the day. That is, we can recover from it with a single good night's sleep but because of the consistently high workload on the day you never have a rest, and this can potentially become quite dangerous.
Brian Robertson (Head of Safety and Emergency Response) replied 28/01/2025.
FR-377 — Predictive fatigue report¶
Event date recorded as 14/05/2025, IOM–MAN, G-LMTH (MSN1142). Raised 01/05/2025. Accepted 02/05/2025 as FR-INV-360, owner Brian Robertson, target date 22/05/2025.
General picture: 70 block hours for the month with a leave day and admin day. No standby duties.
Concrete concern for which I am filing a predictive fatigue report: I am rostered a block of four days which includes two 6 sector days (one on May 12th and another one two days later on May 14th). I then get two days off and go straight into six days in a row, with another 6 sector day and a double London.
I know from experience this won't work and is unsafe. These 6 sector days are exhausting and it is not responsible rostering to give us several in the space of a few days.
Proposed solution: get rid of one of the 6 sector days on the 12th or 14th, and please try to give me at least one proper standby or BALPA admin day in this block of six working days (17-22 May). How can I have zero standby duties for the whole month?
FR-380 — Sudden fatigue on sector 5¶
Event 14/05/2025, IOM–LPL, G-LMTF (MSN1054). Raised 15/05/2025. This is the report that the FR-377 prediction was about.
See previous predictive fatigue report FR-377 and ASR-5815. I've had no response to the above so performed the duties as rostered.
On sector 5 taxiing out of IOM a sudden fatigue hit me. We had just done 4 sectors without any breaks, and up until then I was relatively fine. I was PM for the rest of the day and mentioned to the FO (PF) that I felt very tired all of a sudden. We had just waved the ground team goodbye and decided to continue but to be extra vigilant. We took off without issue but on landing in LPL I completely zoned out and didn't grasp the taxi instructions. We had vacated runway 09 via E and were told to hold at A5 to let a Ryanair get out of the apron first. We went past A5 when I suddenly remembered the clearance limit. The FO pointed out that we had already been cleared all the way to stand 2. So in the end there was no breach but I have no recollection of this final taxi instruction.
It is my understanding that there have been a few taxi incidents recently and this could easily have been another one.
I will say it again: rostering too many 6 sector days is not safe and the company needs to address this practice at the planning stage. You cannot underestimate how fatiguing it is to do a continuous shift like that without scheduled breaks, where you have to be switched on all the time. Doing several of these in one week pushes the human body beyond its limits.
FR-423 — Predictive fatigue report¶
Event date recorded as 12/09/2025. Raised 03/09/2025. Accepted 04/09/2025 as FR-INV-403, owner Brian Robertson, target date 18/09/2025. Closed ("Incident Completed") 17/09/2025.
I would like to file a predictive fatigue report. This is in addition to my previous reports FR-380, FR-377 and ASR-5815, none of which I ever got any feedback on.
General context: close to 70 block hours in September (161 duty), with again zero standby duties, one admin day, one leave day and several online course days.
My concrete concern is the way next week is rostered. It starts with a double London (10 hour duty), then on day 3 there is a 6 sector day. Day 4 is another double London, and day 5 is another 6 sector day.
This isn't going to work and I know from my own experience doing these duties that I will be fatigued by day 5. Not the way erroneously defined on Rise as "Fatigue can be defined as the likelihood of falling asleep" (!), but the better definition of a feeling of being exhausted and lacking energy, which can lead to impaired physical and cognitive function.
Could somebody in safety department please interact with me about the use of these 6 sector days. Do you think it is sensible to do a safety critical role for 9 hours in a row with absolutely no break whatsoever? Workload is consistently very high on these days. Do you understand how mentally draining a shift like that is? What does the company think is a reasonable number of 6 sector days in a week or a month?
Rebecca Borresen (Director of Safety & Sustainability) replied the same day. See Company responses.
FR-477 — Fatiguing week¶
Event 15/04/2026 16:27, IOM–LCY, G-LMTF (MSN1054). Raised 20/04/2026, after Brian Robertson asked for it. Accepted 21/04/2026 as FR-INV-455, owner Neil Hughes, target date 05/05/2026. Filed together with ASR-6723 covering the same week.
This report covers a period of accumulating fatigue across the working week, culminating in a duty on 15 April after which I assessed myself as unfit to report for the following day and informed crewing accordingly.
The initial fatigue-inducing event was a six-sector day on the 13th involving a series of compounding demands: an engine ITT indication requiring assessment at a critical phase of flight at BHX (we continued, split second decision as transient master caution that disappeared); following consultation with IOM engineering, who required a data download from the aircraft, operations swapped us onto a replacement aircraft which itself carried a TLU defect requiring us to operate at a reduced speed of 50 knots below normal; this, combined with an IOM airport closure window of 1745-1835z, introduced schedule pressure into an already disrupted duty; crosswind conditions at or near aircraft limits across multiple sectors; and an elevated supervisory workload operating with new first officers.
The days between the 13th and 15th did not provide sufficient recovery. The duty on the 15th was a double London rotation (IOM-LHR-IOM-LCY-IOM), a four-sector day routinely approaching ten hours. The penultimate sector included an approach into LCY in windshear conditions reported on the ATIS, resulting in a speed-unstable approach that required sustained active management to remain within parameters I was satisfied to continue — a demanding conclusion to an already fatiguing week. By the end of that final sector I had reached a point of genuine exhaustion that I did not consider compatible with safe operation the following day. I made the decision to remove myself from duty and notify crewing, which I consider the correct safety action.
I am filing this report belatedly. The delay reflects the state I was in at the time; I am submitting now to ensure the data is captured within the safety reporting system.
FR-493 — Lack of days off¶
Event date recorded as 24/06/2026 08:48, IOM–EDI, G-LMTC (MSN1257). Raised 21/06/2026. Accepted 22/06/2026 as FR-INV-470, owner Neil Hughes, target date 06/07/2026.
Flagging my current run of duties. Did several long double London duties last week, then on day 5 stuck overnight in Liverpool due fog IOM. My off day became a day 6, flying back with disgruntled passengers to minima. One day off yesterday, now back on my original stretcher of 5, earlies now. This isn't going to work, both physically and mentally. Can someone look into my roster, I'm probably fine for tomorrow but that 6 sector day on Wednesday then a double London again would push me over the edge.
FR-518 — Six sector duty standby fallout¶
Raised 29/08/2026, MAN–IOM, G-LMTC (MSN1257). Most recent report.
I was called from standby at 1100L. My rostered duty was standby from 1100L followed by IOM-LCY-IOM. On contact, crewing changed this to a 6 sector day, the reason given being crew sickness and no other crew being available. Scheduled departure was 1235L. With a one hour callout time I could not make the crew briefing and had to meet the crew at the aircraft, with the first sector departing late as a result.
I have reason to believe the absence was in fact a fatigue report by a colleague, rather than sickness. These are not the same thing. A colleague reporting fatigue on this duty is direct evidence that the duty itself is demanding, and it is relevant information for anyone being asked to pick it up at short notice.
Contributing factors to why I am filing this report: - I had operated a 6 sector day two days before. From experience I know I cannot operate more than one 6 sector day in a working week without accumulating fatigue that affects my performance. - My sleep the previous night was interrupted by my toddler, so I began the duty without having recovered from that earlier 6 sector day. - Workload during the duty was elevated, with CB activity requiring weather avoidance on multiple sectors. - The aircraft had recurring technical issues over the preceding days, adding to workload and preparation demands.
Individually none of these would have been limiting. In combination, and on top of the recent 6 sector duty and short sleep, I judged that my alertness and capacity would not be adequate for sectors 5 and 6. I offloaded myself after sector 4. I made that decision while I still had the capacity to assess my own state reliably, rather than continuing and reassessing later in the duty when I would have been less able to judge it.
I would ask that crewing recognise that converting a standby callout into a 6 sector day, particularly where the crew member has recently operated a similar duty, carries a fatigue and safety cost. A callout of this length and intensity is not equivalent to a rostered duty of the same length and should not be planned as though it were.
Air safety reports¶
ASR-5071 — Sudden onset of sickness, Captain¶
01/08/2024, LCY–IOM, G-LMTF (MSN1054).
Captain suddenly felt unwell on the climbout out of LCY. Felt he had to vomit or go to the bathroom ASAP. Informed First Officer (PF), who took over the radios. Captain called SCCM to the flightdeck at FL120 and subsequently went to the toilet. After an episode of diarrhoea the feeling of sickness quickly dissipated. First Officer and SCCM asked a few times whether I was OK again, which I was. Flight continued normally and resumed PM duties.
ASR-5513 — Missed approach¶
03/01/2025, IOM–MAN, G-LMTE (MSN1283).
We were getting vectored for an ILS 23R with several speed restrictions given to us. The speed restrictions given were higher than usual and expected. Speed restriction was 230 knots until late base, then we were given 180 knots. These high speed restrictions meant we were close to the preceding aircraft, and as a result, we did not have the necessary wake vortex clearance from the preceding aircraft, so ATC told us to go around at around 2,200ft. We were only flaps 15 with gear still up but executed the go around without issue.
ASR-5575 — Rejected landing¶
26/01/2025, LHR–IOM, G-LMTE (MSN1283).
Approach flown into runway 08 into Isle of Man. Runway seen at around 1,800ft, with autopilot disengaged to line up with the runway at around 1,200ft (ILS 08 is offset). It was a moderate crosswind from the right. Approach flown normally, but bounced on first touchdown, and after 2nd bounce a rejected landing was initiated. Due to rejected landing and proximity to the ground, gear up and flap one notch were delayed slightly. The tail skid was scraped slightly but no tail strike. For info tech log entry.
ASR-5581 — Taxied onto stand without marshaller guidance¶
Event 21/01/2025, IOM–ABZ, G-LMTC (MSN1257). Raised 28/01/2025.
We parked on stand without marshaller guidance.
I am not familiar with Aberdeen Airport and assumed it was a self-positioning stand. FO equally unfamiliar was doing the radios and I didn't catch the bit about waiting for a marshaller (was using an old company headset, didn't bring mine as until just before that flight I thought I was positioning to Glasgow and had put flight bag from earlier LPL duty that morning in my car).
Other mitigating factors: fatiguing early six sector day the day before, followed by immediately afterwards going to A&E to visit my wife. That and a toddler deciding to randomly get up at various times of the night lately, so it was less than ideal to position an aircraft last minute to an unfamiliar airport at that time.
Nigel Pybus corresponded on this on 28/01/2025 under the reference GSR-1881 ("Aircraft taxied onto stand without any marshaller"), which appears to be the ground-safety counterpart record. I have not opened that email; confirm the linkage in Q-Pulse before citing it.
ASR-5743 — Wake turbulence on takeoff¶
11/04/2025, LCY–IOM, G-LMTH (MSN1142).
On climb out of LCY RW09 encountered severe wake turbulence from BA EMB190 which departed ahead. Roll observed to approx 40 degrees angle of bank to the right, autopilot disengaged by pilot flying and normal attitude resumed. LCY tower advised of the occurrence.
ASR-5815 — Ongoing fatigue issues in the IOM¶
Event date recorded as 09/04/2025, IOM–MAN, G-LMTH (MSN1142). Raised 01/05/2025. This is the base-level rostering report, filed in my BALPA rep capacity as much as my own.
I would like to formally flag up a potentially serious safety issue within the IOM base: bad rostering practices, leading to fatigue amongst crew of all ranks. Three recent examples to illustrate below.
1) for myself one month ago I was scheduled a block of 5 days that was very unreasonable: three 6 sector days separated by two double London shifts of 10 hours. I flagged this up immediately and through the base manager thankfully managed to avoid more than one of those 6 sector days, thus not becoming fatigued. Screenshot of original schedule attached.
2) last month, on 9 April, my FO was doing a similar block of days (two 6 sector days in the space of three days). By sector 4 they were making quite bad mistakes they otherwise don't make. I as Captain had a quiet word and we decided it was the right thing to declare oneself fatigued at that stage and not to complete the last two sectors (we found another FO to do those, unsure if a fatigue report was filed for this).
3) a very experienced cabin crew a few weeks ago talked about feeling exhausted during our double London shift. I was scheduled to do another double London with them the next day but they called in sick for that duty. They were reluctant to file a fatigue report for this for fear of creating a fuss.
I am flagging up these three separate instances as it indicates a worrying trend in the IOM base. There doesn't seem to be a culture for filing fatigue reports so as the BALPA rep I feel like it is my duty to flag this up and put it in writing that all is not well in this respect. Because crewing the base adequately seems to be an ongoing issue, some people are being worked beyond their limits, and this shouldn't be the case in a regional airline.
Rostering should pay a lot more attention to these 6 sector days and not treat them as a routine duty. Anyone who has done them can tell you we do this shift without any breaks whatsoever, which is mentally very fatiguing (always need to be switched on). Added to all of this, some ranks like Captains don't have any standby cover, and as a result we often work to our physical and mental limits.
Needless to say, all of this is a big safety issue and I hope the company can do something about it this time as we approach the summer season.
ASR-5979 — Go around at minima¶
10/07/2025, MAN–IOM, G-LMTA (MSN1265). Accepted 11/07/2025 as ASR-INV-5586, owner Robert Green, target date 25/07/2025.
Approach to RW26. Go around executed at minima due to low visibility. Approach then conducted to RW08 as at other end visibility much better. Accepted 8 knots tailwind component for a normal landing RW08.
ASR-6434 — Wrong flap selection¶
Event 21/12/2025 18:30. Accepted 22/12/2025 as ASR-INV-6010, owner Nigel Pybus, target date 05/01/2026.
On approach into Lpl PF asked for flaps 15. PM erroneously selected flaps 30. PF noticed immediately and brought the flap selection lever to 15. Flaps never went beyond 15 during the incident and no overspeed clacker occurred.
ASR-6723 — Fatiguing week¶
Event 15/04/2026 17:14, G-LMTF (MSN1054). Raised 20/04/2026, alongside FR-477. Departure and arrival airports recorded as N/A: this is a systemic report about the week, not about one sector.
This report documents a safety-relevant occurrence arising from the compounding of multiple degraded defences across a single duty on 13 April, within the context of accumulating fatigue across the preceding week and a further demanding duty on 15 April.
During the six-sector operation on the 13th the following factors were present concurrently: a master caution activation during the takeoff roll at BHX requiring a time-critical decision (transient ITT indication, we continued); following consultation with IOM engineering, who required a data download from the original aircraft, operations swapped the crew onto a replacement aircraft carrying a known TLU defect, necessitating operation at 50 knots below the normal speed profile; the combination of this speed reduction and an IOM airport closure window of 1745-1835z introduced schedule pressure at a point when the crew were already managing a technical defect on an unfamiliar aircraft; crosswind conditions at or near aircraft limits across multiple sectors; and an elevated supervisory workload arising from operating with new first officers.
The week concluded on 15 April with a double London rotation (IOM-LHR-IOM-LCY-IOM). The penultimate sector involved an approach into LCY in windshear conditions reported on the ATIS, producing a speed-unstable approach requiring sustained active management. The ATR does not carry an onboard windshear warning system, placing the management of this condition entirely on crew awareness and handling.
No single factor across either duty would individually constitute a reportable concern. What I am reporting is their cumulative and compounding presence across a fatiguing week, with no meaningful opportunity to reduce the overall load at any point. Of particular note is that the aircraft swap on the 13th, whilst operationally understandable, placed the crew onto a defective aircraft under time pressure — a combination that warrants scrutiny as a systemic risk factor rather than an isolated event.
I am conscious that the organisation's stated position is one of safety primacy. I would respectfully observe that this is difficult to reconcile with operational realities routinely experienced on the line. I am filing this report so that the data exists, and in the expectation that it is acted upon.
ASR-6756 — Unaccompanied bag on board¶
Event 03/05/2026 16:01, LOG 687, IOM–LPL, G-LMTF (MSN1054), taxi-out. Accepted 05/05/2026, incident number GSR-INV-2072. Not an MOR.
Following the turnaround at IOM after the inbound LHR-IOM service, a cabin crew exchange took place (CC2 position). The outbound IOM-LPL service commenced boarding. During the turnaround, ground staff had advised the SCCM that a passenger from the inbound LHR-IOM service may have left a bag on board. The SCCM conducted a check of the overhead lockers in the relevant area (rows 18/19) but identified only what appeared to be suitcases, which she assessed to be crew luggage. No further action was taken and the aircraft departed.
After pushing back and whilst taxiing, ATC advised that the handling agent was attempting to make contact. We called the handling agent on their frequency, who confirmed that a passenger from the inbound LHR-IOM service had reported leaving a bag on board. We contacted the SCCM and requested she conduct a further check of the rows 18/19 area. She again reported finding nothing.
We requested she return to the area and ask passengers directly to identify any luggage in the overhead lockers in that vicinity. A small suitcase was subsequently identified as belonging to the inbound passenger. A decision was made to return to stand.
The return to stand was treated as an unusual situation and appropriate checks were completed. Engine 2 was kept running in hotel mode. The suitcase was offloaded and the aircraft pushed back again to continue to LPL.
Upon arrival at LPL, a second unidentified item — a bag — was discovered in the overhead locker in the same area. It is assessed that this item had been concealed beneath the suitcase that was offloaded at IOM and was therefore not identified during any of the checks conducted there. Glasgow Ops were contacted by phone for guidance. The decision was made to offload the item, and Liverpool Airport security attended to take possession of it.
Contributing factors identified: - The initial ground staff report described the missing item as "a bag." The SCCM, searching specifically for a bag, did not identify the suitcase as the item in question. Imprecise item descriptions hampered the check. - Turnaround cabin crew checks did not identify the forgotten item prior to departure. - A crew change at IOM (CC2 position) created ambiguity regarding which items in the overhead locker area belonged to crew members, making it more difficult to identify passenger luggage that had been left behind. - A second item beneath the first was not discovered until arrival at the destination airport, despite multiple checks.
Ground safety reports¶
GSR-1772 — Unauthorised pushback¶
31/10/2024, IOM–LCY, G-LMTD (MSN1237). Accepted 01/11/2024 as GSR-INV-1549, owner Nigel Pybus, priority Medium, flagged mandatory.
After pushback the ground controller informed us he hadn't cleared us for the push. We had run the checklists and asked for the departure clearance but in the rush to get going and make up the delay incurred earlier, we forgot to actually ask for the push clearance. The controller assured us twice it wasn't an issue but obviously this was a bad mistake on our part. Mitigating circumstance was that CM1 had just arrived on the flight by himself and joined crew who'd done 2 sectors earlier, so was a bit out of the loop and out of sync.
GSR-2571 — Ground handling Manchester¶
Raised 07/08/2026, MAN–IOM. Phillip Macken filed a cabin safety report on the same event.
On arrival on stand after a 5 minute wait for stand guidance, only one ramp team member was present. No dispatcher, manifest or turnaround paperwork had reached the flight deck. Over the following 45 minutes I attempted to raise Manchester ground handling on frequency three times, spaced out as the situation developed, with no response on any attempt. I also contacted Loganair operations on several occasions during this period, requesting they intervene directly with the handling agent, as we had no means of raising the absence of a dispatcher ourselves.
The outbound bus arrived shortly after our first attempts to make contact. The bus driver was advised passengers could not be accepted, as nobody was available to guide them to the aircraft, which would have left the crew liable had anything happened en route, and no paperwork had been received. Approximately twenty minutes later the bus driver returned, now quite insistent, advising passengers were distressed and the bus air conditioning was not functioning. With no dispatcher, no paperwork and no response from ground handling despite repeated attempts by both the crew and Loganair ops, the crew jointly assessed boarding directly as the lesser of two risks against leaving passengers on the bus. The SCCM donned high visibility clothing and met passengers at the aircraft steps to supervise boarding.
Loganair operations later confirmed they had also been unable to reach the handling agent, attributing this to a staffing shortage with resource prioritised toward a delayed company E145 on the adjacent stand. A dispatcher eventually arrived but was required to split attention between both aircraft, and a baggage discrepancy became apparent shortly after (a third of the bags never made it onto our flight). The aircraft was ultimately delayed 1 hour 10 minutes. The available evidence points to an understaffing issue within the ground handling provider rather than any failure by the individuals who did attend and who tried their best.
Flight deck safety concerns: neither the crew's repeated frequency calls nor Loganair ops' attempts to intervene resolved the situation. For 45 minutes the crew had no working line of contact with ground handling and no clear indication of when, or whether, a dispatcher would arrive.
Passengers were boarded without a manifest or load documentation. This is a weight and balance concern as well as a documentation one on the ATR, where seating frequently needs adjusting to achieve compliant trim. Boarding without confirmed passenger numbers removes the flight deck's ability to manage this proactively, creating risk that must be corrected after the fact under time pressure.
Recommendations: - Ground handling to confirm a resilient process for maintaining radio contact with aircraft on stand, with a defined escalation route when frequency goes unanswered - Passengers should not be boarded without a manifest and turnaround paperwork first reaching the flight deck, given the weight and balance implications on ATR operations - Review of ground handling resourcing at Manchester, given the apparent link to a broader staffing shortfall
Fatigue escalations by email¶
Separate from Q-Pulse. These are the emails sent directly to management, some of which later became formal reports.
| Date | Subject | Content |
|---|---|---|
| 22/04/2025 and 01/05/2025 | Fatigue | IOM base rostering, three examples. Became ASR-5815. |
| 01/05/2025 | Fatigue report | Predictive, May 12/14 six-sector days. Became FR-377. |
| 20/05/2025 | Fatigued | Declaring myself fatigued to Crewing. |
| 03/09/2025 | Fatigue | Predictive, September roster. Became FR-423. |
| 20/04/2026 | Fatigue report | Combined FR and ASR text. Became FR-477 and ASR-6723. |
| 27/04/2026 | Fatigue report / ASR | Forwarded the FR-477 and ASR-6723 records onward, "maybe relevant in light of the Whatsapp discussion today". |
| 29/08/2026 | Fatigue report | Text of FR-518. |
The 20/05/2025 email is the sharpest of these:
Dear Crewing,
I raised FR-380, FR-377 and ASR-5815 and unfortunately this has not been addressed. I am now absolutely shattered after doing three 6 sector days in the space of a week. I can probably still just about do the easier shift MAN-LPL later today, but, for safety reasons and my own health, there is no way I am in a position to do the double London tomorrow (10 hour shift), for which I have no option but to declare myself fatigued.
Company responses¶
Rebecca Borresen, Director of Safety & Sustainability — 03/09/2025¶
Reply to the FR-423 predictive report. The company's position on six-sector days in its own words.
Thank you for submitting a report regarding predictive fatigue. The roster will be sent to Dr Sleep for analysis, and I have also asked Brian to follow up on providing feedback on the earlier reports which are still open as the analysis would have been completed by now.
With regards to six sector days, this is a standard and essential part of our operation and we manage fatigue with an FTL scheme approved by the UK CAA with support on fatigue management from specialist Dr Sleep. These duties have been risk assessed to ensure there are appropriate mitigations in place, for example with additional break time built in to the roster. We have however recently carried out a further review on six sector days, and whilst we are satisfied there is no inherent safety issue with such duties and that they in and of themselves aren't fatiguing, we have been looking how they are placed in the roster to align to good practice.
In mid-September we are commencing a project to review pre-ops and crewing processes and have engaged a specialist consultant to carry out roster analysis and provide recommendations to introduce improvements into rostering practice. This will include consideration to fatigue management through rostering.
Brian Robertson, Head of Safety and Emergency Response — 20/04/2026¶
Prompted FR-477.
I noticed that you have a period of fatigue recorded on the 16/April… could I please ask for a Fatigue report to be submitted via Q-Pulse that captures this and allows us to better understand the circumstances that led to you being fatigued.
My reply the same morning said I would file the fatigue report and an ASR about the whole week, "as it's almost a textbook Swiss cheese model".
Brian Robertson also replied to FR-352 on 28/01/2025 (email held, contents not transcribed here).
Other threads¶
- Nigel Pybus, 28/01/2025 — GSR-1881, aircraft taxied onto stand without a marshaller. Related to ASR-5581.
- David King and Paul Quine, 02/05/2025 — replies to the "Ongoing fatigue issues" email (ASR-5815).
Reports by others I hold¶
Not mine, but in the mailbox and relevant to the same events or arguments.
- FR-351 (Paul Quine, event 30/12/2024, BHX–IOM). Another captain's fatigue report on the same six-sector duty pattern: "no discernible factored break… both myself and the rest of the operating crew experienced symptoms relatable to the onset of fatigue."
- ASR-5298 — turbulence, 21/10/2024, IOM–LCY, G-LMTF. Filed by another crew member; I was Captain. Robert Green's feedback of 11/02/2025 gives FDM 1.83G against a reported FMS 1.96G, and notes that a tech log entry should strictly have been made by CM1 given the "moderate to severe" narrative.
- ASR-5712 — go-around due weather, 27/03/2025. Filed by FO Tom Freeman; I was crew. Nigel Pybus's feedback of 01/05/2025 covers early flap retraction at 630ft against an acceleration altitude of 1100ft, and recommends engaging the autopilot after gear-up to reduce go-around workload. Both this event and a similar one were referred to Flight Operations/Training for an SOP wording review.
- ASR-5985 — duct OVHT, Chester Searle, November 2025. His challenge to the feedback that the flight "could have departed and the crew deal with the problem en-route".
- Phillip Macken's cabin safety report, 07/08/2026 — the Manchester ground handling event covered by my GSR-2571.
The argument this log makes¶
Read end to end, the fatigue reports say one thing repeatedly across nineteen months: six-sector days without a break are the problem, and stacking them within a week is the failure mode. FR-352 (January 2025) says it. FR-377 predicts it, FR-380 records it happening on exactly the duty predicted. FR-423 says nothing has been fed back on any of them. FR-493 and FR-518 are still saying it in 2026.
The company's answer, on the record from the Director of Safety in September 2025, is that six-sector days "in and of themselves aren't fatiguing", with the concession that their placement in the roster was under review and a consultant engaged from mid-September 2025.
Gaps and caveats¶
- Compiled from mailbox contents only. Q-Pulse holds the authoritative records, including any reports whose alert emails were deleted. Numbering gaps in the sequences here are expected and are not evidence of missing reports.
- Recipients could not be extracted from the mail client, so "who this went to" is not recorded per item.
- Reports predating August 2024 were not found in the mailbox. If earlier ones exist, they are not here.
- GSR-1881's relationship to ASR-5581 is inferred from subject and date, not confirmed.
- Outcome and closure status is recorded only where an "Occurrence Accepted" or "Incident Completed" email was found. Blank does not mean open.